6Lindlay v. Raydure, 239 Fed. 928.

Probably at modern law a deed needs no expressed consideration, although most courts avoid deciding this question wherever it is possible. In any event, all that is necessary is the recital of a valuable consideration, and since this is all that is necessary, extrinsic evidence to contradict such recital is immaterial in the absence of fraud, undue influence or mistake, and accordingly it is inadmissible. The validity of a deed can not be affected by the fact that the consideration is inadequate in the absence of fraud, undue influence, or mistake.9

In some cases in which it is said that extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to contradict the recital of a valuable consideration in a contract so as to render it inoperative in law, the contract was under seal.10 Contracts of this sort are governed by. principles different from those which apply to simple executory contracts. At common law in the classic period a contract under seal was valid and enforceable without a valuable consideration.11 The recital of a valuable consideration was unnecessary to its validity, and accordingly evidence which tended to show there was in fact no valuable consideration was inadmissible as being immaterial. In addition to this reason, the doctrine of estoppel is invoked to prevent a party to a sealed instrument from denying recitals therein.12

7 Din v. Prase, 169 Ind. 53, 79 N. E. 971.

8Haslam v. Jordan, 104 Me. 49, 70 Atl. 1066.

9 Weissenfels v. Gable, 206 Mo. 516, 106 S. W. 1028.

Other cases which are cited as authority for the proposition that the recital of a consideration in a contract can not be contradicted for the purpose of defeating the legal effect of the contract, are cases in which the provision with reference to the consideration which it is sought to contradict is a contractual provision and not the recital of a fact;13 or are cases in which a specific consideration is set forth in the written contract and it is attempted to show that an additional consideration was agreed upon,14 thus contradicting the provisions of the contract and adding new terms thereto.15 If a lease appears to be complete upon its face, extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to show that a part of the consideration therefor was an agreement to build up the business of the hotel for which the lease was given, at least if such agreement would change the legal effect of the lease.16

If the contract is a simple executory contract and the consideration appears as the recital of a fact, the right of the promisor to contradict such recital for the purpose of rendering the instrument invalid depends in part upon the question whether the real intention of the parties was to pay such consideration or whether such consideration was recited as a mere form in order to turn a gratuitous promise, if possible, into a legal obligation. If the real intention of the parties was that the consideration should be paid on performance, a recital of the payment or performance of such consideration may be contradicted for the purpose of recovering such consideration,17 but it can not be contradicted for the purpose of rendering the contract invalid,18 unless the failure to pay or perform is such a breach as will operate as a discharge.19 If the parties have entered into an ante-nuptial contract by which the prospective wife agrees to release her claims upon her husband's estate, in consideration of marriage and a certain sum of money, a receipt for the payment of which appears in the contract, the legal effect of such receipt may be contradicted for the purpose of enabling the wife to collect such amount of money if not paid, but it can not be contradicted for the purpose of rendering the antenuptial contract invalid.20 The recital of the payment of the first premium in a contract of insurance can not be contradicted for the purpose of showing that the policy has not taken effect, if it was the real intention of the parties that such premium should be paid.21

10 Illinois Central Insurance Co. v. Wolf, 37 111. 355; Hebbard v. Haughian, 70 N. Y. 54.

11 See Sec. 1166.

12 See Sec. 1164 et seq.

13Wellmaker v. Wheatley, 123 Ga. 201, 51 S. E. 436. See { 2166.

14Eggleston v. Pantages, 93 Wash. 221, 160 Pac. 425.

15 See Sec. 2145, 2193 and 2194.

16 Grubb v. House, 93 Wash. 200, 160 Pac. 421.

17 Britton v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 165 N. Car. 149, Ann. Cm.

1915D, 363, 80 S. E. 1072; Southern Life Insurance Co. v. Booker, 56 Tenn. (9 Heisk.) 606, 24 Am. Rep. 344; Bibelhausen v. Bibelhausen, 159 Wis. 365, 150 N. W. 516.

18 England. Roberts v. Security Co. [1897], 1 Q. B. 111.

California. Farnum v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 83 Cal. 246, 17 Am. St. Rep. 233, 23 Pac. 869.

Indiana. Home Insurance Co. v. Gil-man, 112 Ind. 7, 13 N. E. 118.

Missouri. Dobyns v. Bay State Beneficiary Co., 144 Mo. 95, 45 S. W. 1107.

North Carolina. Britton v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 165 N. Car. 149, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 363, 80 S. E. 1072.

Wisconsin. Bibelhausen v. Bibel-hausen, 159 Wis. 365, 150 N. W. 516.

"The general doctrine as to such unilaterally executed documents as the one before us, will be found stated, frequently in substance, that the mention of a consideration in an instrument executed by the party to whom it purports to have moved for the thing conveyed, and the formal receipt are mere recitals not contractual in character, and may be explained or varied; but not so as to vary or defeat the instrument for the purpose for which it was given. As to such purpose, and that only, in the absence of efficient fraud, the person executing the paper is estopped from contradicting the recital."

Contra, Christopherson v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 199 Mich. 634, 165 N. W. 793; Sheldon v. Atlantic Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 26 N. Y. 460, 84 Am. Dec. 213; Bibelhausen v. Bibelhausen, 159 Wis. 365, 150 N. W. 516.

19 See ch. LXXXIV.

20 Bibelhausen v. Bibelhausen, 159 Wis. 365, 150 N. W. 516.

21 England. Roberts v. Security Co. [1897], 1 Q. B. 111.

California. Farnum v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 83 Cal. 246, 17 Am. St. Rep. 233, 23 Pac. 869.

Indiana. Home Insurance Co. v. Gil-man, 112 Ind. 7, 13 N. E. 118.

Missouri. Dobyns v. Bay State Beneficiary Association, 144 Mo. 95, 45 S. W. 1107.

North Carolina. Kendrick v. Mutual Benefit Insurance Co., 124 N. Car. 315. 70 Am. St. Rep. 592, 32 S. E. 728; Britton v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 165 N. Car. 149, Ann. Cas. 1915D. 363 80 S. E. 1072.