(Tex. Civ. App.), 169 S. W. 906 (sale of automobile); Rossiter v. Cooper, 23 Vt. 622 (contract for labor); McClure s. Briggs, 68 Vt. 82, 2 Atl 583, 56 Am. Rep. 557 (sale of organ); Taturn v. Grist, 46 Wash. 226, 89 Pac. 547 (sale of machine); Exhaust Ventilator Co. v. Chicago, etc., By. Co., 66 Wis. 218, 28 N. W. 343, 57 Am. Rep. 257, 69 Wis. 464, 34 N. W. 609 (sale of exhaust fans).

15Sidney School Furniture Co. v. Warsaw School District, 130 Pa. St. 76, 18 Atl. 604. See also Williams v. Hirshom, 91 N. J. L. 419,103 Atl. 23.

16 Richardson v. Coffman, 87 Iowa, 121; McCormick Co. v. Ockerstrom, 114 Iowa, 260, 86 N. W. 284; Hawkins v. Graham, 149 Mass. 284, 21 N. E. 312, 14 Am. St. Rep. 422; Lack-wood Mfg. Co. v. Mason Co., 183 Mass. 25, 66 N. E. 420; Frary v. American Rubber Co., 52 Minn. 264, 53 N. W. 1156, 18 L. R. A. 644; Williams v. Hirshorn, 91 N. J. L. 419, 103 Atl. 23. In Noa Spears Co. v. Inbau (Tex. Civ. App.), 186 S. W. 357, an employee who had undertaken to work to his employer's satisfaction was discharged, though no fault was found with his work, but apparently because of bis infidelity to his wife. The court held the discharge a breach of contract. There is no warrant for the statement in Joliet Bottling Co. v. Joliet Brewing Co., 254 111. 215, 98 N. E. 263, 265, that where a contract provided that the quality of beer was to be satisfactory to the appellant it "had the option of refusing to accept beer from the appellee at its pleasure, upon the ground that it was not satisfactory." A similar misconstruction was made in Texas Produce Exchange v. Sorrell (Tex. Civ. App.), 168 S. W. 74.

17 See infra, Sec. 677.

18Gladding v. Montgomery, 20 Cal. App. 276, 128 P. 790; McCartney v. Badovinac (Colo. 1916), 160 Pac. 190, L. R. A. 1917, A. 1146; Fuchs&Lang Mnfg. Co. c. Kittredge, 242 111. 88, 89 N. E. 723; Keeler v. Clifford, 165 111. 644, 46 N. E. 248; Bridgeford v. Meagher, 144 Ky. 479,139 S. W. 760; Union League Club v. Blymyer Ice Machine Co., 204 111. 117,68 N. E. 409; Schmand v. Jandorf, 175 Mich. 88, 140 N. W. 996; Boyd v. Hallowell, 60 Minn. 225, 62 N. W. 125; Barnett v. Sweringen, 77 Mo. App. 64; Waite p. Shoemaker, 50 Mont. 264, 146 Pac. 736; Doll v. Noble, 116 N. Y. 230, 22 N. E. 406, 15 Am. St. Rep. 398; a. c. sub turn. Dull v. Noble, 5 L. R. A. 554; Hummel v. Stern, 164 N. Y. 603, 58 N. E. 1038; Miller v. Phillips, 39 R. I. 416, 98 Atl. 59; Richison v. Mead, 11 S. Dak. 639, SON. W. 131.

19 Devine v. Chicago Ac. R. Co., 266 111. 248, 107 N. E. 593, 595. In Doll v. Noble, 116 N. Y. 230, 22 N. E. 406 15 Am. St. Rep. 398; s. c. sub. nam, Dall v. Noble, 5 L. R. A. 554, a contract to "finish woodwork to the entire satisfaction of the owner" was held complied with by finishing the work in a workmanlike manner. So in Hummel v. Stern, 164 N. Y. 603.

58 N. E. 1088, the same doctrine was applied in regard to a contract for ventilating machinery which it was agreed should ventilate the premises to the satisfaction of the buyer. On the other hand, in Haven v. Russell, 34 N. Y. Supp. 292, a contract to write a play to the satisfaction of a theatrical manager was held to make the actual satisfaction of the manager the only test. So in Gray v. Alabama Natl. Bank, 14 N. Y. Supp. 155, a contract to make a lithographic design subject to a similar condition, and in Crawford v. Mail & Express Pub. Co., 163 N. Y. 404, 57 N. E. 616, a contract to write articles for a newspaper, to the satisfaction of the defendant were held to mean actual satisfaction. In Diamond v. Mendelsohn, 156 N. Y. App. D. 636, 141 N. Y. S. 775, the contract of a foreman for employment was similarly treated. It will be observed that the line of distinction between these cases is rather fine. The finish of woodwork and the ventilation of a room are matters involving a good deal of personal taste to some people-as much perhaps as the writing of a newspaper article. See also Waldt v. Goodwin Mfg. Co., 166 N. Y. App. D. 244, 150 N. Y. S. 831.

20 Fechteler v. Whittemore, 205 Mass. 6, 91 N. E. 155; Hawkins v. Graham, 140 Mass. 284, 21 N. E. 312, 14 Am. St. Rep. 422; Wentworth v. Manhattan Market Co., 218 Mam. 91, 106 N. E. 118. See also Devine v. Chicago Ac. Co., 266 111. 248, 107 N. E. 693.

21See supra, Sec.34.

22Empire State Phosphate Co. v. Heifer, 61 Fed. 280, 20 U. S. App. 689, 9 C. C. A. 604; Colvin v. Weedman, 50 111. 311, Henkle v. Smith, 21 111. 233; Posey p. Scales, 55 Ind. 282; Bell v. Hatfield, 121 Ky. 560, 89 8. W. 544, 2, L. R. A. (N. S.) 629; Sousely v. Burns's Adms., 10 Bush, 87; Russell v. Clark, 112 Me. 160, 91 At!. 602; Bolles v. Sachs, 37 Minn. 315, 33 N. W. 862; Odium v. Wagstaff, 48 Pa. 300; Lockhart v. Bonsall, 77 Pa, 53.

23Warner v. Wilson, 4 Cal. 310; Weill v. American Metal Co., 182 111. 128, 54 N. E. 1060; Hunter v. Wetsell, 84 N. Y. 549, 38 Am. Rep. 544; Lock-hart v. Bonsall, 77 Pa. 53.

24Kingman v. Hanna Wagon Co., 176 111 645, 52 N. E. 328; Harrow Spring Co. v. Whipple Harrow Co., 90 Mich. 147,51N. W. 197,30 Am. St.

Rep. 421; Burstein v. Phillips, 154 Wis, 691, 143 N. W. 679.

25Whitman v. Namquit Worsted Co., 206 Fed. Rep. 549; Consolidated Coal Co. v. Smelting Co., 53 111. App. 565; Storm v. Rosenthal, 141 N. V. Sup. 339, 156 N. Y. App. Div. 544.

26 Wackerbarth v. Masson, 3 Campb. 270; Armitage v. Insole, 14 Q. B. 728; Sutherland v. Allhueen, 14 L. T. (N. S.) 666; Walton v. Black, 6 Houst. 149; Dwight v. Eckcrt, 117 Pa. 490, 12 Atl. 32.

27 Hinckley v. Pittsburg' Steel Co., 121 U. S. 264, 30 L. Ed. 967; United States v. McMullen, 222 U. S. 460, 56 L. Ed. 269, 32 S. Ct. 128; Aller v. Pen-nell, 51 Ia. 537, 2 N. W. 385; Butter e. Butler, 77 N. Y. 472, 33 Am. Rep. 648; Hurd v. Gill, 45 N. Y. 341; Eisel v. Hayes, 141 Ind. 41, 40 N. E. 119 (a promise not to become a competitor with the buyer of a business, while the business was carried on by the latter).

28See cases cited in the preceding fire notes. If the choice related to time limited by an ultimate day, the failure of the promisee expressly to exercise his option operates as a tacit agreement the same option is contained in both promisee, in one promise being given to the promisee, in the other reserved to the promisor. As where one party agrees to buy what he wishes or needs, and the other party agrees to sell what the first party wishes or needs. In such an agreement the seller's promise is not too indefinite. It promises the buyer an option; but the buyer's promise, if it reserves an unlimited option which may be exercised without incurring a detriment, will be insufficient consideration for the seller's promise.29

Sec. 45. Offers and agreements where something is reserved for future determination. Although a promise may be sufficiently definite when it contains an option given to the promisor or promisee, yet if something is reserved for the future agreement of both parties, the promise can give rise to no legal obligation until such future agreement. Since either party by the very terms of the promise may refuse to agree to anything to which the other party will agree, it is impossible for the law to affix any obligation to such a promise.30 It should be observed, however, that though such a promise is invalid, it will not necessarily invalidate an entire agreement of which it forms a part. Whether choice of the latest time. Sousely v. Burro's Adm., 10 Bush, 87. See also Troy Fertiliser Co. v. Logan, 96 Ala. 619, 12 So. 712.

29See infro, Sec.104.

30Olmstead v. Distilling & Cattle Feeding Co., 77 Fed. Rep. 266, 267; Gunn v. Newcomb, 82 Iowa, 468,48 N. W. 989; Anderson v, Desonia, 23 111. App. 422; Denton v. Booth, (Mich. 1919) 168 N. W. 491; Jamestown Port-land Cement Corp. v. Bowles, 228 Mass. 176,117 N. E. 41; Shepard v. Carpenter, 64 Minn. 153,55 N. W. 906; Davila v. United Fruit Co., 88 N. J. Eq. 602, 103 Atl.519; Mayer v. McCreery, 119 N. Y. 434,23 N. E. 1045; Elks v. North State Life Ins. Co., 159 N. C. 619, 75 S. E. 808; Holts v. Olds, 84 Oreg. 567, 164 Pac. 583, 1184; Pennsylvania Lubricating Co. v. Wilhelm, 255 Pa. 390,100 Atl. 93. And see cases in the preceding sections paarim. In Weeghman v. Killifer, 215 Fed. 168, 170, s. c. afid. 215 Fed. 239, 131 C. C. A. 558, an agreement to play baseball "at a salary to be determined by the parties," was said to be invalid. An agreement which in terms is open to the objection stated in the text, may be definite enough when applied to existing facto. Thus in Kresge v. Taylor, 194 Fed. Rep. 379, there was a contract to sell a stock of merchandise, the saleable merchandise to be taken at cost and that which was "damaged, soiled, or out of date" at a price to be agreed upon. This was held a binding contract, since there were no damaged, soiled or out of date goods in the stock.

it will have this effect depends upon its relative importance and its severability from the remainder of the contract of which it forms a part.31