7 Yelie Motor Car Co. v. Kopmeier Motor Co., 194 Fed. 324; Ellis v. Dodge, 237 Fed. 860. See also cases cited infra, Sec. 55, n., and Toledo Computing Scale Co. . Stephens, 96 Ark. 606, 132 S. W. 926. But where, as in Whites. McCollagh, 74 W. Va. 116, 81 S. E. 720, the right of cancellation may not be exercised arbitrarily, but only in the exercise of the judgment of the promisor as a fiduciary for others, the reservation of the right does not prevent the existence of a contract. Id Cummer v. Butts, 40 Mich. 322, 29 Am. Rep. 530, either party was given the right to terminate an agreement "for good cause." It was held that any revocation made in good faith by other party was effectual. And so when an agreement reserved a right to each party to terminate it "for just cause." Oakland Motor Car Co. v. Indiana Automobile Co., 201 Fed. 499, 121 C. C. A. 319. But see infra Sec. 160 n., as to damages which may arise from the exercise of a right of cancellation.
8 Cable Co. v. Hancock, 2 Ga. App. 73, 58 S. E. 319; American Publishing etc. Co. v. Walker, 87 Mo. App. 503; Senner & Kaplan Co. v. Gera Mills, 185 N. Y. App. D. 662,173 N. Y. S. 206; Thomas Mfg. Co. v. Lyons, 29 S. Dak. 600, 137 N. W. 340; Waco Mill Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 109 8. W. 224.
9 Mayer v. McCreery, 119 N. Y. 434, 23 N. E. 1045.
10 Ryan v. Hamilton, 206 111. 191, 68 N. E. 781.
11 Shadbolt, etc., Boyd Iron Co. v. Topliff, 86 Wis. 613, 66 N. W. 854.
12 See infra, Sec. 104.
as destructive of the validity of the promise as such an option given to the promisor. Certainly the promise is not illusory where the option is given to the promisee; that is, it does not fail by its very terms to promise anything, as is the case where the promisor retains an unlimited option. Nor is there objectionable indefiniteness since a means is provided (the promisee's election) for determining the precise thing which the promisor is to do. Such difficulty as exists is the opposite from that where the promisor retains the choice. So much is promised by a promise to do or give whatever the promisee may choose, that an infinitely great performance may be demanded. And such a promise in many cases would be against public policy.13 But though a wholly unlimited option to the promisee may not be permitted, it is possible to give him a large choice of what performance he will demand or accept. A common illustration of such a promise is where a seller promises to deliver goods or render some other performance which shall be satisfactory to the buyer. Such a promise is usually considered as requiring the promisor to render performance which shall be satisfactory to the promisee if he exercises an honest judgment.14 But the promisee must or none at all will amount to prevention of performance of the condition and excuse it.17 In New York and some other States a broader and artificial meaning is given to such a promise. It is construed as matter of law as imposing upon the promisor the duty only of satisfying a reasonable man,18 unless the subject-matter of the contract involves personal taste. In such a case even in these latter States the contract is held to require the actual satisfaction of the promisee.19 Frequently, no doubt, on a true construction of promises for satisfactory performance, reasonable satisfaction and not actual satisfaction of the promisee is all that is required. Especially is this likely to be the case where the contract provides definite tests or specifications for the required performance, and the satisfaction of one of the parties is not made the sole determining factor.20 Other promises are not infrequent where the promisee is given an option to determine within specified limits or as to a particular matter the performance which he wishes. Sometimes this choice on the part of the promisee must be exercised when the offer is accepted.21 In other cases the option need not be exercised until the time for performance of the contract. Frequently such a choice is given in regard to the time of performing a contract.22 So the place of performance; 22 the quantity of goods to be sold,24 the kind of goods,25 the method of shipment,26 or any other matter 27 may be left optional to the promisee. But though such promises may give rise to a binding obligation, if consideration is given, at the time of the promise no liability can arise for breach of them until the promisee exercises his option and gives notice of his choice to the promisor.28 Frequently in a bilateral
13 Crane v. Crane Co., 105 Fed Rep. 869, 45 C. C. A. 96, and infra, Sec. 1652. Cf. Western Newspaper Union v. Kitchel, 201 Mich. 121, 166 N. W. 1021.
14Cases of promises or conditions requiring the satisfaction of the promisee axe-Andrews v. Belfield, 2 C. B. (N. S.) 779 (sale of a carriage); Biggie v, Ogston Motor Co., 112 L. T. 1029 (contract of employment); Silsby Mfg. Co. v. Chico, 24 Fed. Rep. 893 (sale of steam engine); Campbell Printing Press Co. v. Thorp, 36 Fed. Rep. 414 (sale of printing presses); Re George M. Hill Co., 123 Fed. Rep. 866, 59 C. C. A. 354 (sal of machine); Bar-nett v. Beggs, 208 Fed. 255,125 C. C. A. 455 (contract for plans and specifications); American Music Stores v Kussell, 232 Fed. 306, 146 C. C. A. 354, L. R. A. 1916 F. 882 (contract of employment); Hallidie v, Sutter St. R. R. Co., 63 Cal. 575 (sale of steel rope or cable); Koll v. Bush, 6 Colo. App. 294, 40 Pac. 579 (contract of employment); Zaleski v. Clark, 44 Conn. 218, 26 Am. Rep. 446 (making plaster bust); MacKensie v. Minis, 132 Ga. 323, 63 S. E. 900, 23 L. R. A.. (N. 8.) 1003 (contract of employment); Goodrich v. Van Nortwick, 43 111. 445 (sale of a fanning mill); Buckley v Meidroth, 93 111pp. 460 (sale of acetylene gas generator and fixtures); Inma Mfg. Co. v. American Cereal Co., 124 Iowa, 737, 100 N. W. 860 (sale of machine for mill); Brown v Foster, 113 Mass, 136, 18 Am. Rep. 463 (sale of suit of clothes); Gibson v Cranage, 39 Mich. 49, 33 Am. Rep. 351 (contract for enlarging a photograph); Wood Reaping & Mowing Machine Co. v. Smith, 5 Mich. 565, 45 Am. Rep. 67 (sale of give fur consideration to the matter. A refusal to examine tin promisor's performance,15 or a rejection of it not in reality based on its unsatisfactory nature 16 but on fictitious grounds agricultural machine); Platt v. Broder-ick, 70 Mich577, 38 N. W. 579 (sale of machine); United States Fir Alarm Co. p. Big Rapids, 78 Mich. 67,43 N. W. 1030 (sale of fire alarm bell); Housding v. Solomon, 127 Mich. 664, 87 N. W. 57 (sale of hones); Isbell v. Anderson Carriage Co., 170 Mich. 304, 136 N. W. 467 (contract of employment); Schmand v. Jandorf, 175 Mich. 88,140 N. W. 996, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 680, Ann. Cas. 1916 A. 740 (contract of employment); MeCormiok Machinery Co.v.Chesrown,33Minn. 33, 21N.W. 846 (sale of machinery); Magee v. Scott Lumber Co., 78 Minn. 11, 80 N. W. 781 (contract to tow logs); Beissel v. Vermillion Farmers' Ele-vator Co., 102 Minn. 220, 113 N. W. 677,12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 403 (contract of employment); Hayes v. Kluge, 86 N. J. L. 657, 92 Atl 358; Gwynne v. Hitchner, 66 N. J. L. 97, 48 Atl 671 (contract of employment); Potter Printing Press Co. v. Newark Ac. Pub. Co., 82 N. J. L. 671,83 Atl. 969 (sale of machine); Hoffman v. Gallaher, 6 Daly, 42 (contract to paint a portrait); Tyler v. Ames, 6 Lans. 280 (contract to employ an agent); Gray v. Central R. R. Co., 11 Hun, 70 (sale of a steamboat); Moore v. Goodwin, 43 Hun, 534 (contract for crayon protrait); Haven v. Russell, 34 N. Y. Supp. 292 (contract for playwright to write a play); Garland p. Keeler, 15 N. Dak. 548, 108 N. W. 484 (ante of machine); Diamond v. Mendelsohn, 156 N. Y. App. D. 636, 141N. Y. S. 775 (contract as foreman); Singerly v. Thayer, 108 Pa. St. 291, 2 Atl. 230, 66 Am. Rep. 207 (sale of hydraulic elevator); Seeley v. Welles, 120 Pa. St. 69, 13 Atl. 736 (sale of reaper and binder); Corgan v. Lee Coal Co., 218 Pa. 386, 67 Atl. 655 (contract of employment); Halff Co. v. Jones