Again, it is often thought to allow a plaintiff to sue and recover full damages before the time for the completion of all the defendant's performance is to allow the doctrine of anticipatory breach,8 yet this is not the case. As soon as a party to a contract breaks any promise he has made, he is liable to an action. In such an action the plaintiff will recover whatever damages the breach has caused. If the breach is a trifling one such damages cannot well be more than the direct injury caused by that trifling breach. But if the breach is serious or is accompanied by repudiation of the whole contract, it may and frequently will involve as a consequence that all the rest of the contract will not be carried out. This may be a necessary consequence of the situation of affairs or it may result simply from the plaintiff's right to decline to let the defendant continue performance, since even if all the remaining performances were properly rendered, the plaintiff would not get substantially what he bargained for. The plaintiff is entitled to damages which will compensate him for all the consequences which naturally follow the breach, and therefore to damages for the loss of the entire contract. This is no different principle from allowing a plaintiff in an action of tort for personal injuries to recover the damages he will probably suffer in the future. If the cause of action has accrued, the fact that the damages or all of them have not yet been suffered is no bar in any form of action to the recovery of damages estimated on the basis of full compensation. This is law where the doctrine of Hoch-ster v. De la Tour is denied, as well as where it is admitted.9 Indeed in the action of assumpsit the early law seems always to have allowed full damages as soon as any instalment of performance was due and not performed.10 In most of the cases cited in support of the doctrine of anticipatory breach there had been in fact an actual breach, and, therefore, no novel principle was needed to sustain recovery.11

7 See infra, Sec.1466. Similarly an employee unable to complete performance of his contract because cf Alness may recover on a quantum merit before the day when his compensation was payable under the contract Ryan v. Dayton, 25 Conn. 188, 65 Am. Dec. 560. The contrary decision of Tebo v. Ballard, 36 Vt. 612, is justly criticised in 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 317.

8 Nichols v. Scranton, etc., Co., 137 N. Y. 471, 33 N. E. 561; Union Ins. Co. v. Central Trust Co., 157 N. Y. 633, 52 N. E. 671, 44 L. R. A. 227; Hocking v. Hamilton, 158 Pa. 107, 27 Atl. 836, illustrate this. These cases are unquestionably right. They do not involve the question of anticipatory breach, though in each of them the court seems to have thought so.

9 Pierce v. Tennessee Ac. Co., 173 U. S. 1, 43 L. Ed. 691,19 Sup. Ct. 335; Re Manhattan Ice Co., 114 Fed. 399; Northrop v. Mercantile Trust Co., 119 Fed.. 969; Strauss v. Meertief, 64 Ala. 299, 38 Am. Rep. 8; Howard College v. Turner, 71 Ala. 429; jEtna Life Ins. Co. v. Nexsen, 84 Ind. 347, 43 Am. Rep. 91; Goldman v. Goldman, 51 La. Ann. 761, 25 So. 555; Sutherland v. Wyer, 67 Me. 64; Speirs v. Union Drop-Forge Co., 180 Mass. 87, 61 N. E. 825; St. John v. St. John, 223 Mass. 137, 111 N. E. 719; Schell v. Plumb, 55 N. Y. 592; Girard v. Tag-gart, 5 S. & R. 19, 9 Am. Dec. 327; King v. Steiren, 44 Pa. St. 99, 84 Am. Dec. 419; Chamberlin v. Morgan, 68 Pa. 168; Remelee v. Hall, 31 Vt. 582, 76 Am. Dec. 140; Treat v. Hiles, 81 Wis. 280, 50 N. W. 896; Zdan v. Hru-den, 22 Manitoba, 387. See also Mayne on Damages (6th ed.), 106 el 8eq.; Sutherland on Damages, Sec.Sec. 108, 112, 113. The contrary decisions of Lichenstein v. Brooks, 75 Tex. 196, 198, 12 S. W. 975; Gordon v. Brewster, 7 Wis. 356 (cf. Treat v. Hiles, 81 Wis. 280, 50 N. W. 896); Walsh v. Myers, 92 Wis. 397, 66 N. W. 250, are not to be supported. See also Salyers v. Smith, 67 Ark. 526, 55 S. W. 936.

10 See supra, 11290, n. 10.

111 In Bridgeport v. AStna Indemnity Co., 91 Conn. 197, 99 Atl. 566, 568, the court said: "The breach was one of a dependent covenant going to the whole consideration, and therefore total. Kauffman v. Raeder, 108 Fed. 171, 179, 47 C. C. A. 278, 54 L. R. A. 247; Leopold v. Salkey, 89 111. 412, 418, 31 Am. Rep. 93. A cause of action in favor of the city thereupon arose for the recovery of the damages consequent upon such breach. It might have brought suit immediately, or waited such length of time as the statute of limitations permitted, but only one action could be brought, and in that action, whenever brought, full recovery, covering the future as well as the past, could be had. Cohn v. Norton, 57 Conn. 480, 490, 18 Atl. 595, 5 L. R. A. 572; Stanton v. New York, etc., Ry. Co., 59 Conn. 272, 283, 22 Atl. 300, 21 Am. St. Rep. 110; Pierce v. Tennessee, etc., R. Co., 173 U. S. 1,13,19 Sup. Ct. 335, 43 L. Ed. 591; Parker v. Russell, 133 Mass. 74, 75; Schell v. Plumb, 55 N. Y. 592, 597; Sutherland v. Wyer, 67 Me. 64, 68; Remelee v. Hall, 31 Vt. 582, 585, 76 Am. Dec. 140; 1 Sedgwick on Damages, Sec. 90; Sutherland on Damages, 1108.

"It makes no difference that the liquidation of damages suffered by the