There are exceptions to the general rule that silence cannot amount to fraud. While it is nowhere held that collateral circumstances tending to enhance the value of the subject of the sale must be disclosed in the absence of some special relation between the parties, it is held in many States that if the subject-matter of the sale is materially defective to the knowledge of the seller, and the defect is latent, an action of deceit or other remedy based on fraud will lie in favor of a buyer who purchases the goods on the assumption that they are what they seem.72 One who knowingly transfers for value the negotiable paper of an insolvent,73 or pays a debt with a worthless check74 or counterfeit money,75 is similarly chargeable. On the other hand, it has been held that a person who knows that there is a mine on the land of another, of which the latter is ignorant, may, nevertheless, buy the land without disclosing the existence of the mine;76 though such nondisclosure may afford ground for a court of equity to refuse specific performance of a contract." It may perhaps fairly be said that the offer of goods which appear to be of a certain character is itself a representation that they are what they seem.78 But it is more difficult, where the . buyer is guilty of fraudulent concealment, to regard his offer as a representation that the seller's property is what it seems, and it is impossible to say that an offer by either party amounts to a representation that all collateral circumstances are what the other party supposes. It is certainly true that any active conduct or words which tend to produce an erroneous impression may amount to fraud, and half the truth may be a he in effect.79

70 See supra, Sec. 1490.

718ee infra, Sec. 1544.

72 Armstrong v. Huffstutler, 19 Ala. 51; Turner v. Hugging, 14 Ark. 21; Parriah v. Thurston, 87 Ind. 437; Raeside v. Hamm, 87 la. 720, 54 N. W. 1079; Downing v. Dearborn, 77 Me. 457, 1 Atl. 407; Sebastian May Co. v. Codd, 77 Md. 293, 26 Atl. 316; Marsh v. Webber, 13 Minn. 109; Barron v. Alexander, 27 Mo. 530; Grigsby v. Stapleton, 94 Mo. 423, 7 S. W. 421; Joplin Water Co. v. Bathe, 41 Mo. App. 285; Hanson v. Edgerly, 29 N. H. 343; Wheeler v. Metropolitan Stock Exchange, 72 N. H. 315, 320, 56 Atl. 754; Jeffrey v. Bigelow, 13 Wend. 518, 28 Am. Dec. 476; Nichthauser v. Friedman, 161 N. Y. S. 199, 200; Hadley v. Clinton County Importing Co., 13 Ohio St. 502; Puis v. Hornbeck, 24 Okl. 288, 103 Pac. 665, 29 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 202; Sahnonson v. Horawill, 39 S. Dak. 402, 164 N. W. 973; Cardwell v. Mc-

Clelland, 3 Sneed, 150; Paddock v. Strobridge, 29 Vt. 470; Maynard v. Maynard, 49 Vt. 297. See also Stewart v. Wyoming Ranche Co., 128 U. 8. 383, 9 S. Ct. 101, 32 L Ed. 439; Marcotte v. Allen, 91 Me. 74, 77, 39 Atl. 346, 40 L. R. A. 185; Elliott v. Clark (Tex. Civ. App.), 157 8. W. 437. But see contra, Ward v. Hobbs, 3 Q. B. D. 150,4 A. C. 13; Morris v. Thompson, 85 111. 16; Paul v. Hadley, 23 Barb. 521.

73 See supra, Sec. 1162, infra, Sec. 1572.

74Ibid. See also Commercial Bank v. Varnum, 176 Mo. App. 78,162 8. W. 1080.

75 Ibid.

76 Fox v. Mackreth, 2 Bro. Ch. 400, 420; Falcke v. Gray, 38 L. J. Ch. 28, 31; Smith v. Beatty, 2 Ir. Eq. 456; Caples v. Steel, 7 Or. 491; Harris v. Tyson, 24 Pa. St. 347, 64 Am. Dec. 661. And see Williams v. Spurr, 24 Mich. 335; Burt v. Mason, 97 Mich. 127, 56 N. W. 365; Guaranty etc. Trust Co. v.