Active concealment of the facts, also, would be held fraudulent by some courts which would not hold mere silence sufficient, though it may seem difficult to make out an actual misrepresentation from acts of concealment unknown to the other party.80

Iiebold, 207 Pa. 399, 56 Atl. 961; Crompton o. Beedle, S3 Vt. 287, 75 AU. 331, 30 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 748. In the Pennsylvania and in the second Michigan case cited the purchaser knew of collateral facts likely to increase largely the value of the lands. The law is otherwise between partners. Hanley v. Sweeny, 109 Fed. 712, 43 C. C. A. 812.

77 See supra, { 1426.

78 Paddock v. Strobridge, 29 Vt. 470, and cases cited. Supra, n. 72.

79 Peek v. Guroey, LR.6H.L 377, 392, 403; Gluckstein v. Barnes, [1900] A. C. 240; Stevenson v. Marble, 84 Fed. 23; Fay v. Hill, 249 Fed. 415,161 C. C. A. 389; Macdonald v. Roeth (Cal.), 176 Pac. 38; Kenner a. Harding, 85 111. 264, 28 Am. Rep. 615; Coles v. Kennedy, 81 la. 360,46 N. W. 1088,25 Am. St. 503; Henry v. Vance, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 491, 63 S. W. 273; State v. Fox, 79 Md. 514, 29 Atl. 601, 24 L. R. A. 679, 47 Am. St. Rep. 424; Potts v. Chapin, 133 Mass. 276; Burns v. Dockray, 156 Mass. 135, 30 N. E. 551; Van Houten v. Morse, 162 Mass. 414, 38 N. E. 705, 26 L. R. A. 430, 44 Am. St. Rep. 373; Newell v. Randall, 32 Minn, 171, 19 N. W.-972, 50 Am. Rep. 662; Melick v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co., 84 N. J. L. 437, 87 AU. 75; Wegenaar v. Dechow, 33 N. Y. App. Div. 12, 53 N. Y. S. 240; Hadley v. Clinton Importing Co., 13 Ohio St. 602, 513, 82 Am. Dec. 4S4; Gidney v. Chappie, 26 Old. 737, 110 Pac. 1099; Croyle v. Moses, 90 Pa. St. 250, 35 Am. Rep. 654; George v. Johnson, 6 Humph. 36, 44 Am. Dec. 288; MsJlory ». Leach, 35 Vt. 156, 168, 82 Am. Dec. 625; Crompton v. Beedle, 83 Vt. 287, 76 Atl. 331; Tolley o. Poteet, 62W.Va. 231, 57 8. E. 811.

80 "In an action of deceit, it is true that silence as to a material fact is not necessarily, as matter of law, equivalent to a false representation. But mere silence is quite different from concealment; a&ud est tacere, alivd cdare; a suppression of the {truth may amount to a suggestion of falsehood; and if, with intent to deceive, either party to a contract of

In some contracts, such as insurance 81 and, to a leas extent, guaranty 82 failure to disclose material facts is already recognized by the law as fraudulent, and the tendency in the law of sales, as well as in other contracts, is doubtless toward requiring a somewhat higher degree of good faith than formerly, especially where the opportunities for information are not equally open to both parties.83 In case a fiduciary relation exists between the parties, as that of trustee and cestui que trust, guardian and ward, lawyer and client, there is a positive duty, a failure to observe which is constructively fraudulent;84 and the nature of the transaction or the relation of the parties may be such that as to the particular transaction in question, the duties of a fiduciary are imposed upon one or the other party, sale conceals or suppresses a material fact, which he is in good faith bound to disclose, this is evidence of and equivalent to a false representation, because the concealment or suppression is in effect a representation that what is disclosed is the whole truth. The gist of the action is fraudulently producing a false impression upon the mind of the other party; and if this result is accomplished, it is unimportant whether the . means of accomplishing it are words or acts of the defendant, or his concealment or suppression of material facts not equally within the knowledge or reach of the plaintiff." Stewart v. Wyoming Ranche Co., 128 U. S. 383, 388, 9 S. Ct. 101, 32 L. Ed. 439, per Gray, J. See also Tooker v. Alston, 169 Fed. 599,86 C. C. A. 425; Roseman v. Canovan, 43 Cal. 110; Kenner v. Harding, 85 El. 264; Timmisv. Wade, 5 Ind. App. 139, 31 N. E. 827; Raeside v. Hamm, 87 Iowa, 720, 54 N. W. 1079; Sherman v. Smith (la.), 169 N. W. 216; Singleton's Admr. v. Kennedy, 9 B. Mon. 222; Phelps v. Jones, 141 Mo. App. 223, 124 S. W. 1067; Barrett v. Lewiston Ac. R., 110 Me. 24, 85 Atl. 306; Sockman v. Keim, 19 N. Dak. 317, 124 N. W. 64; Croyle v. Moses, 90 Pa. St. 250, 35 Am. Rep. 654.

81 In marine insurance non-disclosure of a material fact though without fraudulent intent vitiates the policy. Ionides v. Pender, L. R. 9 Q. B. 531, 537; McLanahan 0. Insurance Co., 1 Pet. 170, 185, 7 L. Ed. 98; Hart v. British Ins. Co., 80 Cal. 440, 22 Pao. 302; Fiske v. New England Ins. Co., 15 Pick. 310,316. The rule is the same in fire insurance, though applied less strictly. Clark v. Manufacturers' Ins. Co., 8 How. 235, 12 L. Ed. 1061; Daniels v. Hudson River F. Ins. Co., 12 Cush. 416, 59 Am. Dec. 192; Oarkson v. Western Assur. Co., 33 N. Y. App. D. 23, 53 N. Y. S. 508; McFaul v. Montreal Inland Ins. Co., 2 U. Can. Q. B. 59. In life insurance the universal practice of requiring answers to a great number of questions seems to have made the only duty of the insured to answer fully and truthfully. See Phenix Ins. Co. v. Raddin, 120 U. S. 183, 192, 30 L. Ed. 644.

82 See supra, Sec. 1249.

83 See Gottschalk v. Kircher, 109 Mo. 170, 184, 17 S. N. 905.

84 Haviland v. Willetts, 141 N. Y. 35, 35 N. E. 958. As to how far the position of betrothed persons brings them within the same principle, see In re Malchow's Est., (Minn. 1919), 172 N. W. 915.

and such a relation involves a duty of disclosure." In many cases where the silence of a party to the contract is not such as to amount to actionable fraud or to justify the rescission of contract, a court of equity will, nevertheless, refuse to enforce specific performance of the contract, since this relief is in many cases denied where the bargain is inequitable even though legally enforceable.85