It is no doubt true that relief is denied in many cases of fraudulent representations where the representations were such that no reasonable person ought to have relied upon them.66 It is on this ground that misrepresentations of opinion and of law are not actionable. But in order to give a fraudulent person immunity for his statements, it is not enough that a more careful person might not have been deceived. It has indeed been held by the Supreme Court of the United States 67 and by other courts, that if means were at hand by which the deceived person might have detected the untruth, and no artifice used to prevent investigation, the fraud will not be actionable.68 But this doctrine can hardly be accepted broadly to-day; misrepresentations often cause the person to whom they are addressed not to use the means of knowledge within his power. The modern tendency is certainly toward the doctrine that negligence in trusting to a misrepresentation will not excuse positive willful fraud or deprive the defrauded person of his remedy.69 Es-

61 Slaughter's Admr. v. Geraon, 13 Wall 379, 20 L. Ed. 627; Clark v. feeder, 158 U. S. 505, 525, 15 S. Ct. 849, 39 L. Ed. 1070; Hough v. Richardson, 3 Story, 659; Brown v. Smith, 109 Fed. 26; Brewer v. Arantz, 124 Ala. 127, 26 So. 922; Wheeler v. Dunn, 13 Colo. 428, 22 Pac. 827; Tuck v. Downing, 76 111. 71; Dady v. Gondit, 163 11I. 511, 45 N. E. 224; Hagee v. Grossman, 31 Ind. 223; Merritt v. Dufur, 99 Iowa, 211, 68 N. W. 553; Lilienthal v. Suffolk Brewing Co., 154 Mass. 185, 28 N. E. 151, 12 L. R. A. 821, 26 Am. St. Rep. 234; Buxton v. Jones, 120 Mich. 522, 79 N. W. 960; Halls v. Thompson, 1 Smedes & M. 443, 481, 482; Black v. Irvin, 76 Oreg. 661,149 Pac. 540; Hegdale v. Wade, 78 Oreg. 349, 153 Pac. 107; Reimers v. Brennan, 84 Oreg. 53, 164 Pac. 552; Phipps v. Buckman, 30 Pa. St. 401;

Columbia Say. Bank etc. Go. v. True, 108 S. Car. 56, 93 S. E. 389; Irby v. Tilsley, 41 Wash. 211, 83 Pac. 97.

62 "The fact that the plaintiff called in two men to advise her in the matter may have been evidence that she did not rely entirely on what Smith said, but it is not conclusive that she was not misled by his statements. It was clearly competent for the jury to find that she was." Sleeper v. Smith, 77 N. H. 337, 91 Atl. 866, 868. See also Schmidt v. Thompson, (Minn. 1918), 167 N. W. 543.

63Trammell v. Ashworth, 99 Va. 646, 652, 39 S. E. 593.

64 Pratt v. Philbrook, 41 Me. 132.

65 Hicks v. Stevens, 121 11I. 186, 11 N. E. 241. See also references to the analogous question in regard to warranties, Williston, Sales, Sec. 206.

66 See supra, Sec.Sec. 1491, 1405.

67 Slaughter's Admr. v. Gereon, 13 Wall. 370, 20 L. Ed. 627; Andrus v. St. Louis, etc., Refining Co., 130 U. S. 643, 647, 9 S. Ct. 645, 32 L. Ed. 1054.

68 Anschuts v. Miller (C. C), 20 Fed. 376; Journal Printing Co. v. Maxwell, 1 Pennew. 511, 43 Atl. 615; Gatling v. Newell, 12 Ind. 118; Brown v. Leach, 107 Mass. 364; Poland v. Brownell, 131 Mass. 138, 41 Am. Rep. 215; Como Orchard Land Co. v. Mark-ham, 54 Mont. 438,171 Pac. 274; Long v. Warren, 68 N. Y. 426 (but see Schu-maker v. Mather, 133 N. Y. 590, 595, 30 N. E. 755); Reimers v. Brennan, 84 Oreg. 53, 164 Pac. 552; Whitman v. Seaboard Air line Ry., 107 S. Car. 198, 200,92 S. E. 861; Winter v. Johnson, 27 S. Dak. 512, 131 N. W. 1020; Griffith v. Strand, 19 Wash. 686, 54 Pa. 613; Walquist v. Johnson (Wash.), 173 Pac. 735. See also Grata v. Schuler, 25 Cal. App. 117, 142 Pac. 899/

69 Redgrave v. Hurd, 20 Ch. D. 1; Henderson v. Henshall, 54 Fed. 320, 7 U. 8. App. 565, 4 C. C. A. 357; Strand v. Griffith, 97 Fed. 854, 38 C. C. A. 444; Martin v. Burford, 181 Fed. 922, 104 C. C. A. 360; Barnett Oil & Gas Co. v. New Martinsville Oil Co., 254 Fed. 481; Burroughs v. Guano Co., 81 Ala. 255, 1 So. 212; King v. Livingston Mfg. Co., 180 Ala. 118, 60 So. 143; Graham v. Thompson, 55 Ark. 296, 299, 18 S. W. 58, 29 Am. St. Rep. 40; Neely v. Rembert, 71 Ark. 91, 71 S. W. 259; Hunt v. Davis, 98 Ark. 44, 135 S.

W. 458; Maxon-Nowlin Co. v. Nors-wing, 166 Cal. 509, 137 Pac. 240; Iin-ington v. Strong, 107 111. 295; Carr v. Harnstrom, 207 11I. App. 31; Hale v. Philbrick, 42 Iowa, 81; McDowell v. Caldwell, 116 Iowa, 475,89 N. W. 1111; Severson v. Kock, 159 Ia. 343, 140 N. W. 220; Wakefield v. Coleman, 169 la. 241, 140 N. W. 386; Eastern Trust etc. Co. v. Cunningham, 103 Me. 456, 70 Atl. 17; Harlow v. Perry, 113 Me. 239, 93 Atl. 544; Bixler v. Wright, 116 Me. 133, 100 Atl. 467; Lewis v. Jewell, 151 Mass. 345, 24 N. E. 52, 21 Am. St. Rep. 454; Reggio v. Warren, 207 Mass. 525, 93 N. E. 805, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 340; Shapira v. Wildey Sav. Bank, 213 Mass. 498, 100 N. E. 619; Jackson v. Collins, 39 Mich. 557; Hubbard v. Oliver, 173 Mich. 337, 139 N. W. 77; Maxfield v. Schwartz, 45 Minn. 150, 47 N. W. 448,10 L. R. A. 606; Van Metre v. Nunn, 116 Minn. 444, 133 N. W. 1012; Snider v. McAtee, 165 Mo. App. 260, 147 S. W. 136; Laird v. Keithley, (Mo. 1918), 201 S. W. 1138; Perry v. Rogers, 62 Neb. 898, 87 N. W. 1063; Albany Institution v. Burdick, 87 N. Y. 40; Muller v. Rosenblath, 142 N. Y. S. 602,157 N. Y. App. Div. 513; White Sewing Mach. Co. v. Bullock, 161 N. C.

1, 76 S. E. 634; Fargo Gas A Coke Co. v. Fargo Gas & Electric Co., 4 N. Dak. 219, 59 N. W. 1066, 37 L. R. A. 503; Elliott Supply Co. v. Lish, 36 N. Dak. 640, 163 N. W. 271; Mangold & Glandt Bank v. Utterback (Okl.), 174 pecially whore there is a relation of natural trust and confidence (though not strictly a fiduciary relation) the failure of the defrauded party to exercise vigilance will not deprive him of redress.10 It is on the ground of unjustifiable reliance that relief is sometimes denied to those who execute written contracts without reading them, on the faith of representations as to the contents of the documents. If no relation of trust existed be-

Pac. 542; Davis v. Mitchell, 72 Or. 165, 142 Pac. 788; Dupree v. Savage (Tex. Civ. App.), 154 S. W. 701; Cham-berlin v. Fuller, 59 Vt. 247, 9 Atl. 832; Jordan v. Walker, 115 Va. 109, 78 S. E. 643; Stone v. Moody, 41 Wash. 680, 84 Pac. 617, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 799; Warder v. Whitish, 77 Wis. 430, 46 N. W.540. In Whiting v.Price, 172 Mass. 240, 51 N. . 1084, 70 Am. St. Rep. 262, an action for false representations, it appeared that the plaintiff was induced to buy a bond on the faith of false representations. The defendant who made these representations gave as his source of information several persons, whom he named, living in the same town with the plaintiff and known to him. These persons the defendant advised the plaintiff to see and consult. The defendant asked an instruction that the plaintiff could not recover for such statements since he was referred to the sources of information. This request was refused, and the question was left to the jury whether the plaintiff ought to have inquired of the persons named. On exceptions this procedure was held correct, Holmes, J., saying: "It is true that in cases of representations as to quality, correspondence to sample, etc., of goods exhibited in the buyer's presence, the court has ruled that if the buyer had full means of ascertaining the truth for himself he could not set up that he was imposed upon by fraud (Salem India Rubber Go. v. Adams, 23 Pick. 256, 266; Slaughter's Admr. v. Gerson, 13 Wall. 370, 20 L. Ed. 627; Long v.

Warren, 68 N. Y. 426); and that a verdict has been directed partly on that ground. Poland v. Brownell, 131 Mass. 138, 41 Am. Rep. 215. See Bayly v. Merrel, Cro. Jac. 386. But the requirement as it has been worked out does not call for more than reasonable diligence (Hoist v. Stewart, 161 Mass. 516, 522, 37 N. E. 755, 42 Am. St. Rep. 442; Brown v. Leach, 107 Mass. 364, 368; Now-lan v, Cain, 3 Allen, 261, 264); and distance or other slight circumstances have been held sufficient to warrant leaving the question to the jury. Hoist v. Stewart, 161 Mass. 516, 522, 523, 37 N. E. 755, 42 Am. St. Rep. 442. See Burns v. Lane, 138 Mass. 350, 355, 356; Whiteside v. Brawley, 152 Mass. 133, 24 N. E. 1088. The matter may have been confused a little by not distinguishing between seller's talk as to value and the like, where the rule is absolute in ordinary cases that the buyer must look out for himself, and representation of facts concerning which even sellers may be held liable for fraud, and as to which the buyer may be warranted in relying wholly on the seller's word* The notion that the buyer must look out for himself sometimes has been pressed a little too strongly into the latter class of cases."

70 Edward Barron Est. Co. v. Woodruff Co., 163 Cal. 561, 126 Pac. 351, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 125; Stonemets v. Head, 248 Mo. 243, 154 S. W. 108; Gray v. Reeves, 69 Wash. 374,125 Pac. 162.

tween the parties, and if the defrauded person was not so ignorant or illiterate as to excuse reliance on the superior knowledge of the other party! some courts have so held.71 But the better view is rather to deny to one who has been guilty of positive fraud in inducing the other party to refrain from reading the document the privilege of excusing his own misconduct by the stupidity or credulity of the defrauded party.72