That champerty is no longer deemed so serious in effect as formerly, and probably also that the owner of the right of action is not regarded as in pari delicto with the attorney with whom he contracts, is shown by the fact that it is no defence to an action for the defendant to assert, allege or prove, that it is being prosecuted under a champertous agreement between the plaintiff and his attorney.12 Nor is it a defence to a conlain v. Grimes, 42 Neb. 701, 60 N. W. 948; Proeky v. Clark, 32 Nev. 441, 109 Pac. 793, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 512; Taylor v. Gilman, 58 N. H. 417; Connecticut Ins. Co. v. Way, 62 N. H. 622; Whitney v. Kirtland, 27 N. J. Eq. 333; Hall v. Gird, 7 Hill, 586; Schwabe v. Herzog, 161 N. Y. App. D. 712, 146 N. Y. S. 644; Pennsylvania Co. v. Lombardo, 49 Ohio St. 1, 29 N. E. 573, 14 L. R. A. 785; Potter v. Ajax Mining Co., 22 Utah, 273, 61 Pac. 999; Davis v. Settle, 43 W. Va. 17,26 S. E. 557. See also Elser v. Gross Point, 223 111. 230, 79 N. E. 27, 114 Am. St. 326; Caldwell v. Board, 41 Ind. Ap. 40, 83 N. E. 355; Bowser v. Patrick, 23 Ky. L. 1578, 65 S. W. 824, 24 Ky. L. 228, 68 S. W. 1097; Euneau v. Rieger, 105 Mo. 659, 682, 16 S. W. 854; Cooke v. Pool, 25 S. Car. 593. But see Keiper v. Miller, 68 Fed. 627, 70 Fed. 128; Greenman v. Cohee, 61 Ind. 201; Stewart v. Welch, 41 Ohio St. 483; Davy v. JStna L. Ins. Co., 78 Ohio St. 256, 441, 85 N. E. 504, 1123, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 443; Hudson v. Sheafe (S. Dak.), 125 Am. St. 694, 171 N. W. 320; Webb v. Armstrong, 5 Humph. 379; Barker v. Barker, 14 Wis. 131; Kelly v. Kelly, 86 Wis. 170, 56 N. W. 637. See also Brown v. Ginn, 66 Ohio St. 316, 64 N. E. 123.

11 Weeks v. Gattell, 126 N. Y. App. Div. 402, 109 N. Y. S. 977, affd. 193 N. Y. 681, 87 N. E. 1129. In Dennin v. Powers, 96 N. Y. Misc. 252, 160 N. Y. S. 636, 642, the court upholding an agreement for a contingent compensation for services and expenses, said: "The common-law doctrine relating to champerty and maintenance no longer exists in this state (Sedgwick v. Stanton, 14 N. Y. 289), and the subject is now regulated by section 274 of the Penal Law, formerly sections 73, 74, and 75 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Irwin p. Curie, 171 N. Y. 409, 411, 64 N. E. 161, 58 L. R. A. 830; In re Fitzsimons, 174 N. Y. 15, 21, 66 N. E. 554). As these provisions have been construed, the attorney's agreement is not champertous. Browning v. Marvin, 100 N. Y. 144, 2 N. E. 635; In re Clark, 184 N. Y. 222, 77 N.E.I; Ransom v. Cutting, 188 N. Y. 447, 81 N. E. 324; Weeks v. Gattell, 125 N. Y. App. Div. 402, 109 N. Y. S. 977. According to these cases an attorney may agree to receive as his compensation and for expenses incurred a percentage of the recovery in an action. He may not offer or give any valuable consideration for his retainer, and his contract of employment must not tend to encourage, instigate, or promote ill feeling and strife, by securing the ownership or control of a demand of any kind for the purpose of bringing an action thereon. Ransom v. Cutting, 188 N. Y. 447, 81 N. E. 324; Fowler v. Callan, 102 N. Y. 395, 398, 7 N. E. 169."

12 Hilton v. Woods, L. R. 4 Eq. 432; Burnes v. Scott, Exr., 117 U. S. 582, 29 L. Ed. 991, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 865; Courtright v. Burnes, 3 McCrary, 60; Globe Works v. United States, 45 Ct. CI. 497; Sibley v. Alba, 95 Ala. 191, 10 So. 831; Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Smith, 60 Ark. 221, 29 S. W. 752; Gage v. Downey, 79 Oak 140, 21 Pac. 527, 855; Robison v. Beail, 26 Ga. 17; Ellis v. Smith, 112 Ga. 480, 37 S. E. 739; Torrence v. Shedd, 112 III. 466; Stearns v. Reidy, 135 111. 119, 25 N. E. 762; Gage v. Du Puy, 137 111. 652, 24 N. E. 541, 26 N. E. 386; Burton v. Perry, 146 111. 71, 34 N. E. 60; Allen v. Frasee, 85 Ind. 283; Zeigler v. Mize, 132 Ind. 403, 31 N. E. 945; Small v. Chicago Ac R. Co., 55 la. 582,8 N. W. 437; Gilkeson Co. v. Bond, 44 La. Ann. 481, 11 So. 220; Brinley v. Whiting, 5 Pick. 348; Foley v. Grand Rapids Ac. R., 157 Mich. 67, 121 N. W. 257; Morgan v. Blewett, 71 Miss. 409,14 So. 33; Bent v. Priest, 86 Mo. 475; Bick v. Overfelt, 88 Mo. App. 139; Chambertract, not itself champertous, of an attorney to pay a portion of his fee to another, that the contract under which the fee was obtained was champertous.13 Some decisions even go so far as to allow a recovery under a quantum meruit by an attorney who has rendered services under a champertous agreement.14 Such decisions certainly indicate a very lenient attitude towards champerty, for it is anomalous to allow recovery for the value of services or property furnished under an illegal contract.15 To allow such recovery is in effect treating champerty as making a contract merely unenforceable.

13 Kelerher v. Henderson, 203 Mo. 498, 101 S. W. 1083. See also Bowser v. Patrick, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1578, 65

S. W. 824,24 Ky. L. Rep. 228,68 S. W. 1097.

14 Holloway v. Lowe, 1 Ala. 246; Elliott v. McClelland, 17 Ala. 206; Goodman v. Walker, 30 Ala. 482, 500, 68 Am. Dec. 134; Farrell v. Betts (Ala. App.), 81 So. 188; Brush v. Car-bondale, 229 Dl. 144, 82 N. E. 252, 11 Ann. Cas. 121; Rochester v. Campbell, 184 Ind. 421, 11I N. E. 420; Rust p. Larue, 4 Litt. 411, 14 Am. Dec. 172; Caldwell v. Shepherd, 6 T. B. Mon. 389; Gammons v. Johnson, 69 Minn. 488, 72 N. W. 563; In re Snyder, 190 N. Y. 66, 82 N. E. 742, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1101, 123 Am. St. 533; Steams v. Felker, 28 Wis. 594. See also Mer-ritt v. Lambert, 10 Paige, 352, affd. sub nam. Wallis v. Loubat, 2 Denio, 607.

15 The following cases hold, or seem to indicate that the courts deciding them would not allow quasi-contractual recovery: Ackert v. Barker, 131 Mass. 436; Gammons v. Johnson, 76 Minn. 76, 78 N. W. 1035; Butler v. Legro, 62 N. H. 350, 13 Am. St. Rep. 573; Munday v. Whissenhunt, 90 N. C. 458; Arlington Hotel Co. v. Ewing, 124 Tenn. 536, 138 S. W. 054, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 842, Ann. Gas. 1913 A. 121; Roller v. Murray, 112 Va. 780, 72 S. E. 665, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1202, Ann. Cas. 1913 B. 1088. See also Pince v. Beattie, 32 L. J. Ch. 734; Grell v. Levy, 16 C. B. (N. S.) 73; Willlemin v. Bateeon, 63 Mich. 309, 29 N. W. 734.