The principle stated in the preceding section finds frequent application in attempted acceptance of offers of reward. Thus where a reward was offered "for the apprehension of John H. Surratt," one who had made disclosures leading to Surratt's apprehension was held not entitled to the reward,42 the court holding that the offer requested the actual arrest. Doubtless it is possible to make an offer for the actual arrest of a criminal and such an offer can only be accepted by compliance with the request, and the Surratt case seems to have been of that sort, but in most cases of rewards offered for apprehension of a criminal, the more reasonable construction of the offer is that causing the arrest by giving the necessary information to officers of the law is the efficient cause and is a compliance with the offer.43

Where a reward was offered for the "apprehension and conviction " of a criminal, it was held that no recovery could be had for the conviction unless the plaintiff had also apprehended the criminal.44 Other illustrations of the exact per-

41 Neer v. Lang, 262 Fed. 675, 164 C. C. A. 491. See also Sharp v. West, 150 Fed. 468; Lacey v. Thomas, 164 Fed. 623; Greenawalt v. Este, 40 Kan. 418, 19 Pac. 803; Cameron p. Wright, 21 N. Y. App. D. 395, 47 N. Y. S. 571.

42 Shuey v. United States, 92 U. S. 73, 23 L. Ed. 697. See also McClaughry v. King, 147 Fed. 463, 79 C. C. A. 91,7 L. R A. (N. S.) 216; Chambers v. Ogle, 117 Ark. 242, 174 S. W. 532; Juniata County v. McDonald, 122 Pa. 115, 15 Atl. 696; Williams v. West Chi-cagp St. Ry. Co., 191 111. 610,61 N. E. 458, 86 Am. St. Rep. 278.

43Union Pac. R. Co. v. Belek, 211 Fed. 099; Elkins v. Board, 91 Kan. 518, 120 Pac 542, 138 Pac. 578, 46 L R. A. (N. S.) 662; Haskell v. Davidson, 91 Me. 488,40 Atl. 330,42 L. R.A.

156, 64 Am. St. Rep. 254; Rogers v. McCoach, 120 N. Y. Supp. 680, 66 N. Y. Misc. 85; Stair v. Heska Amone Congregation, 128 Tenn. 190,159 S. W. 840; Hall v. State, 102 Wash. 519, 173 Pac. 429; Kinn v. First Nat. Bank, 118 Wis. 537,95 N. W. 969,99 Am. St. Rep. 1012. In the Tennessee case it was held that though a police officer is precluded by public policy from receiving reward for an arrest, the fact that a reward was voluntarily paid an officer after notice that a private citizen claimed it does not enlarge the rights of such citizen, or entitle him thereto, where the officer, rather than he, was the efficient cause of the arrest.

44 Fitch v. Snedaker, 38 N. Y. 248, 97 Am. Dec. 791. See also Hogan v. Stophlet, 179 111. 150, 53 N. E. 604, formance required in order to entitle a plaintiff to a reward may be found in the cases.45 But offers of reward should "be construed in the sense in which they are ordinarily understood and acted upon " and with reference to "the purposes for which they are intended." 46

An offer of reward contemplates ordinarily but a single performance. Therefore, if several persons perform the requested act, the first one only has entered into a contract, the offer immediately lapsing thereafter.47 It is of course possible to make a general offer not to the first person who does a certain act, but to every person who may do it,48 but where performance of the requested act by one person fulfils the apparent purpose of the offeror, the natural construction of the offer would confine it to the first person coming within its terms. Sometimes the service requested in an offer of reward is performed by several persons, no one of whom, alone, renders the whole service. If these persons are acting in concert there seems no doubt of their right to recover as joint promisees.49 Where, however, there is no joint action in fact by the several persons rendering the service, it seems difficult on principle to make out a promise to them jointly. Nevertheless, a joint recovery has been held allowable even in such cases.50 In one or two cases it has been held that where pert of the service requested was rendered, a proportionate part of the reward offered could be recovered.51 But these decisions are opposed both to principle and the weight of authority. If an act is requested in return for a promise, that act, and the whole of that act must be performed or there is no contract.52 If full performance was prevented by the offeror, however, it seems that a quasi-contractual liability would arise to pay for any benefit received.53 Where a reward is offered for the apprehension or conviction of a criminal, the criminal himself is not one of the public to whom the offer is addressed, and he cannot by surrendering himself become entitled to the reward.54

44 L. R. A. 809; Williams v. West Chicago St. R. Co., 191 111. 610, 61 N. E. 456, 85 Am. St. Rep. 278; Furman v. Parke, 21 N. J. L. 310; Blain v.. Pacific Ex. Co., 69 Tex. 74, 6 S. W. 679; Kinn v. First Nat. Bank, 118 Wis. 537, 95 N. W. 969, 99 Am. St. Rep. 1012.

45 Comelson v. Insurance Co., 7 La. Ann. 345; Bloomfield v Maloney, 176 Mich. 548, 142 N. W. 785; Jones v. Phcenix Bank, 8 N. Y. 228; Clanton v. Young, 11 Rich. L. 546; cf. Mosley v. Stone, 108 Ky. 492, 56 N. W. 965; Mudd v. Woodside, 136 Ky. 296, 124 S. W. 321; Stair v. Heska Amone Congregation, 128 Tenn. 190, 159 S. W. 840.

46 Marsh v. Wells Fargo & Co., 88 Kan. 538, 129 Pac. 168, 43 L. R. A.

(N. S.) 133; Hall v. State, 102 Wash. 519, 173 Pac. 429.

47 Lancaater v. Walsh, 4 M. 4 W. 16; United States v. Simone, 7 Fed. 709; Bloomfield v. Maloney, 176 Mich. 548, 142 N. W. 785; Fargo v. Arthur, 43 How. Pr. 193.

48 This seems to have been the true construction of the offer in Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., [1892] 2 Q. B. 484, [1893] 1 Q. B. 256, where an offer of 100 was made to any person who should contract influenza while using one of the defendants' smoke balls. See also supra, Sec. 32.

49 Williams v. Carwardine, 5 C. & P. 566, 573; Janvrin v. Exeter, 48 N. H. 83, 2 Am. Rep. 185.

50 Bloomfield v. Maloney, 176 Mich.