Outside of the class of public agents the actual authority conferred by a principal upon his agent is practically inaccessible to the public at large. Accordingly persons who do not know what the agent's authority really is are justified in dealing with him upon the assumption that he has the authority which the principal indicates by his conduct that the agent possesses. Thus dealing with the agent, such persons may hold the principal on contracts outside the real authority of the agent but inside his apparent authority.1 Thus if a husband is his wife's agent to deliver a note signed by them both, his statement that she is principal is binding on her, if her name is written above his and prevents her from interposing the defense that she was a surety.2 In contracts made in excess of the real authority of the agent the liability of the principal depends on the application of principles of estoppel. Thus the principal is liable only so far as the person dealing through the alleged agent had reason to believe from the facts known to him at the time, that the contract was within the scope of the agent's authority.3 The principal may be estopped to deny the authority of the agent by actively holding him out to the world as his agent. Thus private instructions contrary to the apparent authority of the agent and not known to the person dealing with him,4 or an uncommuni-cated revocation of the agent's authority,5 do not prevent the principal from being bound by the contract of his agent made in his behalf with a person acting in good faith. Thus a recorded power of attorney and a deed made in pursuance thereof passes title to a bona fide grantee is against a grantee from the principal by a prior unrecorded deed.6 So a principal is bound by a letter written by his agent at his order, though its contents differ from the instructions given,7 and a third person may rely on the impression created by A's agent that the contract is made with A, though in fact the agent is making it for B.8 So an uncom-numicated rule that the insurance agent must make a persona] examination is not binding on persons taking insurance.9 So secret instructions to an agent not to insure certain kinds of property do not prevent the principal from being liable on insurance covering such property.10 So a sub-agent, who was employed as the agent of the general agent and not as the agent of the insurance company, may bind the company if held out as an agent.11 The same rule applies where a sub-agent, with similar powers, having authority to sign the general agent's name, signs it to a policy contrary to the instructions of the company. Such policy binds the company and therefore the general agent is liable over to the company.12 So where an agent having power to deliver a note on receipt of a written contract delivers the note before such contract is executed, relying on the promise of the adversary party to execute it later, such note is valid in the hands of a bona fide holder.13 So one who authorizes an agent to make a loan is liable for usury exacted by such agent, though such principal did not authorize usury or know of it.14 So an agent authorized to sell crops binds his principal by waiving his principal's lien as landlord though he sells more of the crops than specified in his secret instructions.15 The principal may be estopped by acquiescence in conduct of the alleged agent, known,16 or which should be known,17 to such principal. Thus if a principal has acquiesced in an agent's collecting certain payments, he is estopped to deny his authority to collect later payments.18 It has been held that the liability of the principal to third persons is not based on estoppel; and that it is not necessary to show that the person dealing with the agent knew of the facts upon which his apparent authority was based.19 This is not in accordance with the weight of authority; and probably the courts so holding do so through a confusion between apparent authority vesting in estoppel; and real authority which is proved by the past conduct of principal and agent, whether such conduct is known to the adversary party or not.20

68 Kilmer v. Gallaher, 112 Ia. 583; 84 Am. St. Rep. 358; 84 N. W. 697.

69 Rust-Owen Lumber Co. v. Holt, 60 Neb. 80; 83 Am. St. Rep. 512; 82 N. W. 112.

1 Garfield, etc., Co. v. Lime Co., 184 Mass. 60; 61 L. R. A. 946; 67 N. E. 863; Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Kuhlman, 58 Neb. 488; 76 Am. St. Rep. 1ll; 78 N. W. 936; Nutter v. Brown, 51 W. Va. 598; 42 S. E. 661.

2 Henken v. Schwicker, 174 N. Y. 298; 66 N. E. 971.

3 Bergtholdt v. Porter Bros. Co., 114 Cal. 681; 46 Pac. 738; Simpson v. Guano Co., .99 Ga. 168; 25 S. E. 94; Allison v. Sutlive, 99 Ga. 151; 25 S. E. 11; Baldwin v. Garrett, 111 Ga. 876; 36 S. E. 966; Woodford v. Hamilton, 139 Ind. 481; 39 N. E. 47; Steele-Smith Grocery Co. v. Potthast, 109 Ia. 413;

80 N. W. 517; Jones v. Johnson, 86 Ky. 530; 6 S. W. 582; Maxcy Mfg. Co. v. Burnham, 89 Me. 538; 56 Am. St. Rep. 436; 36 Atl. 1003; Schendel v. Stevenson, 153 Mass. 351; 26 N. E. 689; Simmons Hardware Co. v. Todd, 79 Miss. 163; 29 So. 851; Weber v. Collins, 139 Mo. 501; 41 S. W. 249; Yates v. Repet-to, 65 N. J. L. 294; 47 Atl. 632; Belt v. Water Power Co., 24 Wash. 387; 64 Pac. 525. An undisclosed principal is not liable on a conveyance of realty. Sanger v. Warren, 91 Tex. 472; 66 Am. St. Rep. 913; 44 S. W. 477.

4 Cheshire Provident Institution v. Gibson (Neb.), 89 N. W. 243.

5 Crawford v. Moran, 168 Mass. 446; 47 N. E. 132.

6 Simmons Hardware Co. v. Todd, 79 Miss. 163; 29 So. 851.

1 Post v. Pearson, 108 U. S. 418; Lucas v. Brooks, 18 Wall. (U. S.) 436; Phillips, etc. Co. v. Whitney, 109 Ala. 645; 20 So. 333; A. G. Rhodes Furniture Co. v. Weeden, 108 Ala. 252; 19 So. 318; Buckley v. Silverberg, 113 Cal. 673; 45 Pac. 804; Camp v. Hall, 39 Fla. 535; 22 So. 792; Thornton v. Lawther, 169 111. 228; 48 N. E. 412; reversing 67 111. App. 214; Nash v. Classen, 163 111. 409; 45 N. E. 276; Croy v. Busenbark, 72 Ind. 48; Sawin v. Savings Association, 95 Ia. 477; 64 N. W. 401; Vanada v. Hopkins, 1 J. J. Mar. (Ky.) 285; 19 Am. Dec. 92; Columbia, etc., Co. v. Tinsley (Ky.), 60 S. W. 10; H. Herman Sawmill Co. v. Bailey (Ky.), 58 S. W. 449; Heath v. Stoddard, 91 Me. 499; 40 Atl. 547; Schendel v. Stevenson, 153 Mass. 351; 26 N. E. 689; Lock v. Lewis, 124 Mass. 1; 26 Am. Rep. 631; Thompson v. Clay, 60 Mich. 627; 27 N. W. 699; Drohan v. Lumber Co., 75 Minn. 251; 77 N. W. 957; Day, etc., Co. v. Bixby. (Neb.), 93 N. W. 688; Phoenix

Ins. Co. v. Walter. 51 Neb. 182; 70 N. W. 938; Thomson v. Shelton, 49 Neb. 644; 68 N. W. 1055; Camden, etc., Co. v. Abbott, 44 N. J. L. 257; Edwards v. Dooley, 120 N. Y. 540; 24 N. E. 827; Schley v. Fryer. 100 N. Y. 71; 2 N. E. 280; Hubbard v. Tenbrook, 124 Pa. St. 291; 10 Am. St. Rep. 585; 2 L. R. A. 823; 16 Atl. 817; Minnelly v. Goodwin (Tenn. Ch.), 39 S. W. 855; Griggs v. Selden, 58 Vt. 561; 5 Atl. 504; Rohrbough v. Express Co.. 50 W. Va. 148; 88 Am. St. Rep. 849; 40 S. E. 398. "Persons dealing with an agent have a right to presume that his agency is general and not limited, and notice of the limited authority must be brought to their knowledge before they are bound to regard it." Trainer v. Morison, 78 Me. 160, 163; 57 Am. Rep. 790; 3 Atl. 185; quoted in Wood v. Finson, 89 Me. 459, 460; 36 Atl. 911.

2 Tompkins v. Triplett, 110 Ky. 824; 62 S. W. 1021.

3 Nofsinger v. Goldman, 122 Cal. 609; 55 Pac. 425; Rodgers v. Peck-ham, 120 Cal. 238; 52 Pac. 483; Blass v. Terry, 156 N. Y. 122; 50 N. E. 953; reversing 87 Hun (N. Y.) 563; Fabian Mfg. Co. v. Newman (Tenn. Ch. App.), 62 S. W. 218.

4 Butler v. Maples, 9 Wall. (U. S.) 766; A. G. Rhodes Furniture Co. v. Weeden, 108 Ala. 252; 19 So. 318; Sweetser v. Shorter, 123 Ala. 518; 26 So. 298; Lytle v. Bank, 121 Ala. 215; 26 So. 6; Louis-ville, etc., Co. v. Tift, 100 Ga. 86; 27 S. E. 765; Armour v. Ross, 110 Ga. 403; 35 S. E. 787; Crain v. Bank, 114 111. 516; 2 N. E. 486; Hichhorn v. Bradley, 117 Ia. 130; 90 N. W. 592; Dreyfus v. Goss, 67 Kan. 57; 72 Pac. 537; Sanford v. Ins. Co., 174 Mass. 416; 75 Am. St. Rep. 358; 54 N. E. 883; Brown v. Ins. Co., 165 Mass. 565; 52 Am. St. Rep. 535; 43 N. E. 512; Baker v. Produce Co., 113 Mich. 533; 71 N. W. 866; Allis v. Voigt, 90 Mich. 125; 51 N. W. 190; Leo Austrian & Co. v. Springer. 94 Mich. 343; 34 Am. St. Rep. 350; 54 N. W. 50;

Van Santvoord v. Smith, 79 Minn. 316; 82 N. W. 642; Watts v. Howard, 70 Minn. 122; 72 N. W. 840; Potter v. Milling Co., 75 Miss. 532; 23 So. 259; Cross v. R. R. Co., 141 Mo. 132; 42 S. W. 675; affirming 71 Mo. App. 585; Hall v. Hopper, 64 Neb. 633; 90 N. W. 549; Rathbun v. Snow, 123 N. Y. 343; 10 L. R. A. 355; 25 N. E. 379; Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Bradford, 201 Pa. St. 32; 88 Am. St. Rep. 770; 55 L. R. A. 408; 50 Atl. 286; Anderson v. Surety Co., 196 Pa. St. 288; 46 Atl. 306; Wilson v. Assurance Co., 51 S. C. 540; 64 Am. St. Rep. 700; 29 S. E. 245; Smith v. Droubay, 20 Utah 443; 58 Pac. 1112; Hall v. Ins. Co., 23 Wash. 610; 83 Am. St. Rep. 844; 51 L. R. A. 288; 63 Pac. 505.

5 Swinnerton v. Argonaut, etc., Co., 112 Cal. 375; 44 Pac. 719; Maxcy Mfg. Co. v. Burnham, 89 Me. 538; 56 Am. St. Rep. 436; 36 Atl. 1003.

6 Gratz v. Improvement Co., 82 Fed. 381; 40 L. R. A. 393; 27 C. C. A. 30a.

7 Morris v. Posner, 111 Ia. 335;

82 N. W. 755.

8 Lambert v. Loan Association, 65 N. J. L. 79; 46 Atl. 766.

9 Phillips v. Ins. Co., 101 Fed. 33.

10 Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Bradford, 201 Pa. St. 32; 88 Am. St. Rep. 770; 55 L. R. A. 408; 50 Atl. 286.

11 Hall v. Ins. Co., 23 Wash. 610;

83 Am. St. Rep. 844; 51 L. R. A. 288; 63 Pac. 505.

12 Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Bradford, 201 Pa. St. 32; 88 Am. St. Rep. 770; 55 L. R. A. 408; 50 Atl. 286.

13 Chase National Bank v. Fau-rot, 149 N. Y. 532; 35 L. R. A. 605; 44 N. E. 165. So if the purchaser of a note leaves it in the custody of payee and knowingly allows the payee to collect it he is estopped to deny payee's agency. Morgan v. Neal, 7 Ida. 629; 97 Am. St. Rep. 264; 65 Pac. 66.

14 Robinson v. Blaken, 85 Minn. 242; 89 Am. St. Rep. 541; 88 N. W. 845.

15 Fishbaugh v. Spunaugle, 118 Ia. 337; 92 N. W. 58.