If A makes a contract with B, in which B's personality is material, such as a contract by which he contracts for B's personal skill or labor, or reposes special trust in B, such contract can not be assigned by either party without the consent of the other, as long as such contract is executory on the part of the party in whom such trust and confidence is reposed.1 Whether the personality of one or both parties is material depends upon the intention of the parties as shown by the language which they have used and upon the nature of the contract.2

1 Gandy v. Tippett, 155 Ala. 206, 46 So. 463; Cooper v. Hillsboro Garden Tracts, 78 Or. 74, 152 Pac. 488.

2 Pardoe v. Bank, 106 Ia. 345, 76 N. W. 800.

3 Terry v. Allen, 134 Ala. 259, 32 So. 664; Gandy v. Tippett, 155 Ala. 296, 46 So. 463.

4 Thwing v. Winkler, 13 Okla. 643, 75 Pac. 1126.

5 Thwing v. Winkler, 13 Okla. 643, 75 Pac. 1126.

6 Smith v. Bank, 137 Cal. 363, 70 Pac. 184.

7 Cooper v. Hillsboro Garden Tracts, 78 Or. 74, 152 Pac. 488.

1 England. Kemp v. Baerselman [1906], 2 K. B. 604.

United States. Burck v. Taylor, 152 U. S. 634, 38 L. ed. 578; Hunt v. Springfield Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 196 U. S. 47, 49 L. ed. 381; Colton v. Raymond, 114 Fed. 863, 52 C. C. A. 382; Demarest v. Dunton Lumber Co., 161 Fed. 264; Central Brass & Stamping Co. v. Stuber, 220 Fed. 909, 136 C. C. A. 475; Walker Electric Co. v. New York Shipbuilding Co., 241 Fed. 569, 154 C. C. A. 345; American Smelting & Refining Co. v. Bunker Hill & Sullivan Mining A. Concentrating Co., 248 Fed. 172; Foster v. Callaghan, 248 Fed. 944.

Alabama. Crawford v. Chattanooga Savings Bank, - Ala. - , 78 So. 58.

California. Montgomery v. DePicot, 153 Cal. 509, 96 Pac. 305.

Delaware. Illinois Finance Co. v. Interstate Rural Credit Association, - Del. - , 101 Atl 870.

Florida. Parker v. Evening News Publ. Co., 54 Fla. 544, 45 So. 309.

Georgia. Tifton, etc., Ry. v. Bed-good, 116 Ga. 945, 43 S. E. 257.

Illinois. Sloan v. Williams, 138 111 43, 12 L. R. A. 496, 27 N. E. 531.

Iowa. Linn County Abstract Co. v. Beechley, 124 la. 146, 99 N. W. 702.

Kansas. Campbell v. Sumner County, 64 Kan. 376, 67 Pac. 866.

If the contract is personal in its nature it is not made assignable by the fact that it purports to be a contract with the adversary party, his heirs and assigns,3 or on behalf of the promisor, his heirs and assigns.4

Massachusetts. New England Cabinet Works v. Morris, 226 Mass. 246, 115 N. E. 315.

Minnesota. W. H. Barber Agency Co. v. Cooperative Barrel Co.< 133 Minn. 207, L. R. A. 1916F, 88, 158 N. W. 38.

Montana. Standard Sewing Machine Co. v. Smith, 51 Mont. 245, L. R. A. 1918A, 202, 152 Pac. 38.

Nebraska. Omaha v. Oil Co., 55 Neb 337, 75 N. W. 859; Zetterlund v. Texas, etc., Co., 55 Neb. 355, 75 N. W. 860; Corson v. Lewis, 77 Neb. 446, 109 N. W. 735.

New Jersey. People's Bank & Trust Co. v. Weidinger, 73 N. J. L. 433, 64 Atl. 179; Schlesinger v. Forest Products Co., 78 N. J. L. 637, 30 L. R. A. (N.S.) 347, 76 Atl. 1024; Wooster v. Crane, 73 N. J. Eq. 22, 66 Atl. 1093; Edison v. Edison Polyform Mfg. Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 136, 67 Atl. 392.

New York. New York Bank Notes Co. v. Hamilton Bank Note Engraving & Printing Co., 180 N. Y. 280, 73 N. E. 48.

Oregon. Meyer v. Livesley, 45 Or. '487, 106 Am. St. Rep. 667, 78 Pac. 670.

Rhode Island. Swarts v. Narragan-sett Electric Lighting Co., 26 R. I. 436, 59 Atl. 111.

Texas. Allen v. Camp, 101 Tex. 260, 106 S. W. 315.

Utah. Shearn's Estate, 38 Utah 492, 114 Pac. 131.

Washington. Deaton v. Lawson, 40 Wash. 486, 111 Am. St. Rep. 922, 2 L. R. A. (N.S.) 392, 82 Pac. 879.

West Virginia. Poling v. Candon-Lane Boom & Lumber Co., 55 W. Va. 529, 47 S. E. 279.

Wisconsin. Johnson v. Vickers, 139 Wis. 145, 21 L. R. A. (N.S.) 359, 120 N. W. 837. "You have a right to the benefit you contemplate from the character, credit and substance of the person with whom you contract." Lord Denman in Humble v. Hunter, 12 Q. B. 310, 317.

2 United States. Walker Electric Co. v. New York Shipbuilding Co., 241 Fed. 569, 154 C. C. A. 345; American Smelting & Refining Co. v. Bunker Hill & Sullivan Mining & Concentrating Co., 248 Fed. 172.

California. Montgomery v. DePicot, 153 Cal. 509, 96 Pac. 305.

New Jersey. Schlesinger v. Forest Products Co., 78 N. J. L. 637, 30 L. R. A. (N.S.) 347, 76 Atl. 1024.

Rhode Island. Swarts v. Narragan-sett Electric Lighting Co., 26 R. I. 436, 59 Atl. 111.

3 Central Brass & Stamping Co. v. Stuber, 220 Fed. 909, 136 C. C. A. 475; Swarts v. Narragansett Electric Lighting Co., 20 R. I. 388, 59 Atl. 77.

Contra, Alden v. George W. Frank Improvement Co., 57 Neb. 67, 77 N. W. 369. Such a provision seems to have been regarded as decisive in a doubtful case. Columbia Water Power Co. v. Columbia, 5 S. Car. 225.

4 Schlesinger v. Forest Products Co., 78 N. J. L. 637, 30 L. R. A. (N.S.) 347, 76 Atl. 1024.

"The fact that Freeman agreed for himself, his heirs and assigns, does not make the contract assignable so as to bind Gatfinel. Its object was to bind Freeman's heirs to liability in case of breach, and so tar as concerns assigns, is applicable only to the extent to which the contract might legally be assignable by Freeman - for example, an assignment by him of the money due for staves that might be actually sold and delivered. To hold that these words made the contract assignable in the wider sense would necessitate the conclusion that it might be performed by his heirs at law. A somewhat simi-lar case arose in Wooster v. Crane & Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 22, 66 Atl. 1093." Schlesinger v. Forest Products Co., 78 N J. L. 637, 30 L. R. A. (N.S.) 347, 76 Atl. 1024.

While the distinction is not always made by the adjudicated cases, contracts in which the personality of the adversary party is material should be divided into two classes: In some contracts the personality of the adversary party is material as to the performance of the contract; that is, the contract by its express terms or by its fair implication calls for performance by the adversary party, and shows that the personality of the adversary party in rendering such performance is material. In other contracts, the act which is stipulated for can be performed by one person as well as by another, but by the terms of the contract credit is to be given and the personality of the party to whom credit is given is material to the willingness of the adversary party to accept a promise in place of his performance.

A further distinction must be made in contracts in which the personality of one of the parties is material to the performance. As long as performance remains executory on his part, his right to assign the contract is governed by considerations which are very different from those which control when the materiality of the personality has been eliminated by performance, breach, and the like, and when he is seeking to assign the right to the benefits of the contract or the right to bring an action thereon for breach.