The election resulted in giving to Adams all the votes of New England, 26 votes from New York, 1 from Delaware, 3 from Maryland, 2 from Louisiana, and 1 from Illinois - 84 in all; while Jackson had 99 - those of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Indiana, and 2 of the 3 votes of Illinois among the number. Crawford had 41, and Clay had 37, including the votes of Kentucky and Ohio. Calhoun, who had previously withdrawn from the contest, was chosen vice president almost unanimously. There being no choice by the people, the election came into the house, where, by the influence of Clay, Adams was chosen at the first ballot - 13 states voting for him, 7 for Jackson, and 4 for Crawford. Jefferson, in a letter a few days before to John Adams, had characterized the decision between John Quincy Adams and Jackson - the only two candidates really before the house - as involving the question whether he and his correspondent were to end their days " under a civil or military government." It is probable that Jefferson's favorite candidate had been Crawford, who received the vote of Virginia; but by nobody had Jackson been more vehemently opposed as the backwoods, uncivilized, and military candidate than by the supporters of Crawford, who had painted in very strong colors the probable barbarizing consequences of Jackson's election.

Crawford himself, in a subsequent letter to Clay, most decidedly approved of Clay's preference of Adams to Jackson. No sooner, however, had Adams entered upon the presidency (March 4, 1825), with Clay as his secretary of state, than a coalition was formed between the late supporters of Crawford and Jackson, with the understanding that Jackson should be their candidate, and with the resolute determination to break down the administration of Mr. Adams, and to prevent his reelection. For this purpose no effort was spared. The Crawford presses, which had abused Jackson, now began to sing praises to him. Adams, considering himself the successor to Monroe in the regular democratic line, and wishing to impress that fact on the public, made few or no removals from office, and when vacancies occurred hardly ventured to appoint a single federalist - a proscription under which that party had labored now for a quarter of a century, and to which Adams's own charges and denunciations had in fact contributed. It was well known that as to this subject Jackson entertained very liberal views; in fact, that he had advised Monroe upon his accession to a much more liberal course in appointing federalists to office than Monroe had seen fit to adopt.

Hence, especially in all those states where the opposition was predominant, many enterprising young federalists mustered to the side of Jackson, some of them even joining loudly in those charges of secret federalism against Adams, and in appeals to the long cherished prejudices against New England, which were conspicuous weapons in the party warfare of that day. The new party, assuming to themselves the title of democrats, refused to accord it to Adams and his supporters, to many of whom, indeed, it was not very agreeable, and who invented for themselves the new name of "National Republicans." Some of these young federalists, transformed so suddenly into democrats and Jackson men, hit upon another party expedient no less effective. Even before the election they had gone to Jackson with the story of a secret bargain between Adams and Clay, to result in Adams's election and Clay's appointment as secretary of state; and the charge of bargain and corruption thus originated, and taken up even by Jackson himself, was loudly reechoed after the election, to the damage of both Clay and Adams. The new administration endeavored to strengthen itself by assuming the championship of internal improvements, which had hitherto been Calhoun's specialty, and of protection to domestic industry, of which Clay had been a leading advocate, and which just before Adams's accession had carried the enactment of the tariff of 1824. Although the tobacco and cotton growing states were strongly opposed to protection, yet that idea was at this time far too popular in the middle states to be repudiated.

The supporters of Gen. Jackson, at least in the northern and middle states, represented him and themselves as in favor of a "moderate" and "judicious" tariff, as opposed to the high tariff policy which they ascribed to Adams and Clay. In this position of parties, all the free-traders north and south joined the opposition, including for the most part the powerful navigating interest of New England and the importing interest of New York, thus carrying over to that side a large additional section of the old federal party. Upon the internal improvement question, the opposition, notwithstanding that Calhoun was one of their principal leaders, took more decisive ground, going so far as to deny, as Crawford formerly had done in opposition to Calhoun, the constitutional authority of congress to vote money for that purpose. As additional means of affecting popular opinion, loud charges of extravagance were brought against the government, whose expenses, exclusive of, the public debt, scarcely amounted to thirteen millions a year, and retrenchment and reform were loudly promised in case the opposition should triumph. This was for the people. To the politicians another more inviting lure was held out.

From Adams's peculiar position in relation to those whom he found in office, he had, as we have seen, nothing in that way to promise his supporters. He did not even dare to remove men apparently hostile to him, while the opposition held out the prospect, in case of their triumph, of a general sweep of the present officeholders - at least of such as were not strongly on thei side - and the distribution of their places as spoils to the victors- rewards, that is, for electioneering services. The debates of congress at this period were largely made up of electioneering harangues; and to give free scope to the remarks of John Randolph and other opposition senators, Mr. Calhoun started and acted upon the idea that as presiding officer of the senate he had no authority to call any senator to order. It was in vain to struggle against this combination, which, in the latter part of Mr. Adams's presidential term, had a majority against him in both houses of congress. Nor was his administration any more fortunate in its exterior relations.