35 Kans. 464, 11 Pac. 421; Jones v. Ricketts, 7 Md. 108; Harriman v. Harriman, 12 Gray, 341; Riley v. Kershaw, 52 Mo. 224; Murphy v. Kastner, 50 N. J. Eq. 214, 24 Atl. 564; Galowitz v. Hendlin (App. Term.) 150 N. Y. S. 641; Smoot v. Checketts, 41 Utah, 211, 125 Pac. 412. See also Harms v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 172 Mo. App. 241, 157 S.W. 1046. See, however, the contrary decisions (based frequently on statutes), at the end of the next note.

A receipt in full under seal is a discharge of the unpaid balance of a debt, where seals still have their common-law efficacy. Jackson v. Security Mut. Ins. Co., 233 111. 161,84 N. E. 198.

44Smith, p. Johnson, 224 Mass. 50, 112 N. E. 644.

45 Some of the secriticisms are quoted by Professor Ames, 12 Harv. L. Rev. 525.

46Clayton v. Clark, 74 Miss. 499, 22 So. 189, 37 L. R. A. 771, 60 Am. St. Rep. 521; Frye v. Hubbell, 74 N. H. 358, 68 Atl. 325, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1197); Brown v. Kern, 21 Wash. 211, 57 Pac. 798; Baldwin v. Daly, 41 Wash. 416, 417, 83 Pac. 724.

47 In North Carolina any agreement whether executed or executory, to set-tie a claim by payment in part, is valid. Jones v. Coffey, 109 N. C. 515,14 S. E. 84; York v. Westall, 143 N. C. 276, 55 S. E. 724; Pruden v. Railroad Co., 121 N. C. 509, 28 S. E. 349; Ramsey s. Browder, 136 N. C. 251, 48 S. E. 651. The Indian Contract Act, Sec.63, is equally broad, as is British Columbia Supreme Court Act, Sec. 19, Sub. sec. 25. In Georgia, (Code, Sec. 4329), Maine (Rev. St., c 84, Sec. 59), Virginia (Code, Sec.2858), and perhaps California (Civ.

Code, Sec. 1698), an agreement actually executed by the payment of part of a debt discharges the debt in accordance with the intention of the parties. But an executory agreement to pay part is insufficient consideration. Molyneaux v. Collier, 13 Ga. 406; Stovall v. Hair-ston, 55 Ga. 9; English v. Reid, 55 Ga. 240; Blalock v. Jackson, 94 Ga. 469, 20 S. E. 346; Burgess v. Denison Paper Mfg. Co., 79 Me. 266, 9 Atl. 726; Fuller v. Smith, 107 Me. 161, 77 Atl. 706. See also Standard Sewing Mach. Co. v. Gunter, 102 Va. 568,46S. E. 690; In re Turpin Hotel Co., 248 Fed. 25, 160 C. C. A. 165 (Cal.). In Alabama (Code, Sec.3973), California (Civil Code, Sec. 1524), North Dakota (Comp. Laws of 1913, Sec.5828}, Oregon (Lord's Or. Laws, Sec.778), South Dakota (Comp. Laws, Sec. 1180), Tennessee (Code, 1918, Sec. 5571), are statutes which give to a written receipt or written agreement to accept a part payment in full the same effect which the common law gave to a release under seal. See Stegall v. Wright, 143 Ala. 204, 38 So. 844; Dob-inson v. McDonald, 92 Cal. 33, 36, 27 Pac. 1098; Coopey v. Keady, 73 Ore. 66, 144 Pac. 99; Eggland v. South, 22 S. Dak. 467, 118 N. W. 719; Hagen v. Townsend, 27 S. D. 457,131N. W. 512. In these States it will be noticed a seal has generally been deprived of its common-law efficacy. See infra, Sec. 218. The same effect is given without the aid of statute to a receipt in full in a few States, most of which have modified by statute the common-law rules as to sealed instruments. Dreyfus v. Roberts, 75 Ark. 354, 87 S. W. 641, 69 L. R. A. 823; Aborn v. Rathbone, 54 Conn. 444, 8 Atl. 677; Johnson v.

has at least the merit of consistency with the general rule of consideration governing the formation and discharge of contracts. It follows also from the same rule that payment of the whole or part of a debt is equally ineffectual to support any other promise than a promise to discharge the balance of a claim. Thus a promise of temporary forbearance in consideration of part payment of a debt is invalid.48 So an agreement to release a claim for personal injuries,49 or for a wrongful discharge,50 or illegal removal from office,51 or any other claim,52 is not supported sufficiently by payment of an admitted debt; nor will such consideration support a promise to surrender a lien, 53 or to give a power of attorney,54 or to enter into a contract with a third person,55 or to pay a commission.56 Since the actual payment of a debt or the performance or partial performance of any existing obligation is insufficient consideration, a promise to pay a debt or to perform such a previous obligation in whole or in part is equally insufficient.57

Cooke, 85 Conn. 679, 84 Atl. 87; Green v. Langdon, 28 Mich. 221 (but see statement in Cunningham p. Irwin, 182 Mich. 629,148 N. W. 786, that the payment "though accepted and receipted for as in full satisfaction," is only valid as a payment pro tanto). Gray v. Barton, 56 N. Y. 68, 14 Am. Rep. 181; Ferry v. Stephens, 66 N. Y. 321; Carpenter v.Soule,88N.Y.251,42 Am. Rep. 248; McKenzie v. Harrison, 120 N. Y. 260, 24 N. E. 468, 8 L. R. A. 267,17 Am. St. Rep. 638. So far, however, as these New York decisions hold that a liquidated debt, the amount of which is undisputed may be discharged by part payment, accompanied by a receipt in full, they are overruled. Fuller v. Kemp, 138 N. Y. 231, 237, 33 N. E. 1034, 1035, 20 L. R. A. 785; Larse v. Sugar Loaf Dairy Co., 180 N. Y. 367, 73 N. E. 61; Galowits v. Hendlin, 150 N. Y. S. 641.

48 Barron v. Vandvert, 13 Ala. 232; Liening v. Gould, 13 Cal. 598; Benedict v. Greer-Robbins Co., 26 Cal. App. 468, 147 Pao. 486; Solary v. Stultz, 22 Fls. 263; Holliday v. Poole, 77 Ga. 159; Bush v. Rawlins, 89 Ga. 117; Phoenix Co. v. Rink, 110 111. 538; Shook v. Board of Commissioners, 6 Ind. 461; Dare v. Hall, 70 Ind. 545; Davis v. Stout, 126 Ind. 12,22 Am. St. Rep. 665; Tudor v. Security Trust Co., 163 Ky.

614,173 S. W. 1118; Potter v. Green, 6 Allen, 442; Warren v. Hodge, 121 Mass. 106; Keira v. Andrews, 59 Miss. 39; Price v. Cannon, 3 Mo. * 453; Tucker v. Bartle, 85 Mo. 114; Rogers v. Union Iron Co., 167 Mo. App. 228,160 S. W. 100; Rubs v. Hobbs, 61 N. H. 93; Parmelee v. Thompson, 45 N. Y. 58, 6 Am. Rep. 33; Bloomingdale v. Braun, 80 N. Y. Misc. 527, 141 N. Y. Strop. 690; Sands v. Gillenm, 159 N. Y. App. Div. 37, 144 N. Y. S. 337; Tumbull v. Brock, 31 Oh. St. 649; Hartman v. Danner, 74 Pa. 36; Yeary p. Smith, 45 Tex. 66, 72.