10 In Leake on Contracts (6th ed.), 443, the author says: "A doctrine formerly prevailed that an express promise moved by a previously existing moral obligation furnished sufficient consideration to create a valid contract. But it is obvious that a promise moved by a sense of moral obligation only is simply voluntary; and it is now settled, in accordance with the general rule, that no valid contract arises from it."

11 See infra, Sec.Sec. 151, et seq. 12Morris v. Norton, 75 Fed. 912,

21 C. C. A. 553; Kenan v. Holloway,

16 Ala. 53, 50 Am. Dec. 162; Cook v.

Bradley, 7 Conn. 57,18 Am. Dec. 70;

Finch v. Green, 225 111. 304, 80 N. E.

318; Eakin v. Fenton, 15 Ind. 59; Schnell v. Nell, 17 Ind. 29, 79 Am. Dec. 453; Wills v. Ross, 77 Ind. 1; Farnham v. O'Brien, 22 Me. 475; Mills v. Wy-man, 3 Pick. 207; Valentine v. Foster. 1 Met. 520; Hendricks v. Robinson, 56 Miss. 694, 31 Am. Rep. 382; Ehle v. Judson, 24 Wend. *97; Thomson v. Thomson, 76 N. Y. App. Div. 178, 78 N. Y. S. 389; Parsons p. Teller, 188 N. Y. 318, 80 N. E. 930; McGuire v. Hughes, 207 N. Y. 516, 101 N. E. 460, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 577; Stembergh v. Provost, 13 Barb. 365; Nine v. Starr, 8 Ore. 49; Shepard v. Rhodes, 7R. 1.470, 84 Am. Dec. 573; Davis v. Anderson, 99 Va. 620, 39 S. E. 588. And see cases cited infra, Sec. 156.

13 Binnington v. Wallis, 4 B. & Ald. 650; Jennings v. Brown, 9M.&W, 496, 501; Beaumont v. Reeve, S Q. B. 483; Wallace v. Rappelye, 103 111. 220, 249. But such a promise (unlike a promise in consideration of continuing cohabitation) is not illegal and, therefore, in a jurisdiction where seals still have their same effect as at common law, a bond given in consideration of a cohabitation which has ceased is enforceable. Turner v. Vaughan, 2 Wils. 339; Annandale v. Harris, 2 P. Wms. 432. See infra, Sec. 1745.

14 Beaumont v. Reeve, 8 Q. B. 483.

15 Mortimore v. Wright, 6 M. & W. 482; Cook v. Bradley, 7 Conn. 57, 18 Am. Dec. 79; Wigging v. Keiser, 6 Ind. 252; Dawson v. Dawson, 12 Ia. 512; Mercer p. Mercer, 87 Ky. 30, 7 S. W. 401; Freeman v. Dodge, 98 Me. 531, 57 Atl. 884, 66 L. R. A. 395; Ellicott v. Peterson's Ex'crs, 4 Md. 476, 493; Miller v. Wyman, 3 Pick. 207; Dodge v. Adams, 19 Pick. 429; Kelley p. Davie, 49 N. H. 187, 6 Am. Rep. 499;

Freeman v. Robinson, 38 N. J. L. 383,

20 Am. Rep. 399; Chilcott v. Trimble, 13 Barb. 502; Valentine v. Bell, 66 Vt. 280, 29 Atl. 251; Davis v. Anderson, 99 Va. 620, 39 S. E. 588. See also. Nine v. Starr, 8 Oreg. 49; Shugart v. Shugart, 111 Tenn. 179, 102 Am. St. Rep. 777.

16McElven v. Sloan, 66 Ga. 208; Schroeder v. Fink, 60 Md. 436; Parker v. Carter, 4 Munf. 273, 6 Am. Dec 513.

17 Royer v. Kelly, 174 Cal. 70, 161 Pac. 1148; Stevens v. Mayberry, 82 Me. 65, 19 Atl. 92.

18Schnell v. Nell, 17 Ind. 29, 79 Am. Dec. 453; Gay v. Botts, 13 Bush, 299; Murphy's Est., 11 Phils. 2.

19 As from advice in regard to investment-Morris v. Norton, 75 Fed. 912,

21 C. C. A. 553; Johnson v. Johnson, 3 Hawks, 556; Martin's Estate, 131 Pa. 638, 18 Atl. 987. See also Tucker v. Haughton, 9 Cush. 350; Hawley v. Far-rar, 1 Vt. 420.

Sec. 149. In a few states the doctrine of moral obligation is still recognized. Though the doctrine of moral obligation is generally discredited, it still survives in a few States. In Georgia the Code 24 provides that a "strong moral obligation" is sufficient consideration to support a promise.25 In Illinois,26 Maryland,27 Michigan,28 and especially in Pennsylvania 29 the doctrine still persists to a limited extent.30

20 Steele v. Syracuse University, 174 N. Y. App. D. 41, 160 N. Y. 8. 39; and see cases cited supra, Sec. 142.

221 Pourtales Gorgier v. Morris, 7 C. B. (N. S.) 588; Wulff v. Lindsay, 8 Aris. 168, 71 Pac. 963 (promise to pay for services rendered by a real estate broker); Dearborn v. Bowman, 3 Met. 155 (promise by election candidate to pay for services); Chamberlain v. Whit-ford, 102 Mass. 448; Sharp v. Hoopes, 74 N. J. L. 191, 64 Atl. 989 (promises to pay for services rendered by a real estate broker); Fulton p. Varney, 117 N. Y. App. Div. 572,102 N. Y. 8. 608 (a promise to pay money on account of a recommendation for certain employment made by the defendant).

22Duncan v. Hall, 9 Ala. 128; Mc-Farland v. Matins, 10 Ark. 560; Carson v. Clark, 2 111. 113, 25 Am. Dec. 79; Carr v. Allison, 5 Blackf. 63; Welch v. Bryan, 28 Mo. 30; Frear v. Harden-bergh, 5 Johns. 272, 4 Am. Dec. 356; Majory v. Shubert, 82 N. Y. App. Div. 638, 81 N. Y. S. 703; Bailey v. Rutjcs, 89 N. C. 517; Critcher v. Watson, 148

N. C. 150, 59 S. E. 544, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 270,125 Am. St. Rep. 570. But see cases cited infra, Sec. 150 ad fin.

23Massachusetts Mut. L. I. Co. v. Green, 185 Mass. 306, 70 N. E. 202; Thomson v. Thomson, 76 N. Y. App. Div. 178,78 N. Y. 8.389.

24 Sec. 2,741.

25 See McElven v. Sloan, 58 Ga. 208, 209; Gray v. Hamil, 82 Ga. 375,10 S. E. 205, 6 L. R. A. 72; Brown v. Lathan, 92 Ga. 280,18 S. E. 421. The Georgia court, however, in its latest pronouncements on the subject seems inclined to restrict rather than to enlarge the doctrine. In Davis v. Morgan, 107 Ga. 604, 43 S. E. 732,61 L. R. A. 148, 97 Am. St. Rep. 171, the court held a moral obligation sufficient only where there was "some antecedent legal obligation or present equitable duty."

25 Spear v. Griffith, 86 111. 652; Lawrence v. Oglesby, 178 111. 122, 52 N. E. 945. But see Thompson v. Minnich, 227 111. 430, 81 N. E. 336; Hobbs v. Greifenhagen, 91 111. App. 400.

Sec. 160. Promises to rectify mistakes, or previous illegal transactions. In every jurisdiction whether or not it professes to accept the doctrine of moral consideration, there are certain promises which are enforceable without present consideration, however difficult it may be to explain the reason for their enforcement. In some jurisdictions promises of this sort are more numerous than in others but in every jurisdiction there are some promises of this sort. These cases will now be separately considered, and first may be mentioned, promises intended to rectify a previous mistake or illegality. A promise to rebate to a judgment debtor so much of a judgment as is based on a plain error, for the correction of which no legal remedy remains open, has been enforced in several jurisdictions.31 Such decisions can be supported only on the ground of moral consideration. And in a number of cases it is held that where a benefit of pecuniary value is furnished with no intention to make a gift, though with no previous request, a subsequent promise by one who receives the benefit may be enforced.32