Payment of a debt, or part of a debt, by one who does not owe it, is obviously a legal detriment to him, and a legal benefit to the creditor. Therefore a partial payment by such a person is sufficient consideration for a promise to him to discharge the debt; and if it is not essential that consideration should move from the promisee,87 sufficient consideration for a promise by the creditor to the debtor. Also, if the debtor at the creditor's request induces a third person to make part payment, this must be sufficient consideration for a promise to the debtor. The courts without much distinguishing these several possible cases, have generally held payment by a third person sufficient consideration for a promise to or for the benefit of the debtor.88
86 See infra, Sec. 1922.
87 See supra, Sec. 114.
88 See Cook v. Lister, 13 C. B. (N. S.) 543, 504; Hirachand Punamchand v. Temple,  2 K. B. 330; Gordon v. Moore, 44 Ark. 349, 51 Am. Rep. 606; Wilks v. Slaughter, 49 Ark. 235,4 S. W. 766; Marshall v. Billiard, 114 Iowa, 462 87 N. W. 427, 64 L. R. A S62;
Sigler v. Sigler, 98 Kans. 524, 158 Pac. 864; Saunders v. Whitcomb, 177 Mass. 457, 59 N. E. 192; Cunningham v. Irwin, 182 Mich. 629, 148 N. W. 786; Clark v. Abbott, 53 Minn. 88,55 N. W. 542, 39 Am. St. Rep. 577; Grant v. Porter, 63 N. H. 229; Ebert v. Johns, 206 Pa. 395, 55 Atl. 1064; Seymour v. Goodrich, 80 Va. 303.
A promise for the creditor to the person thus paying the whole or part of another's debt not only to discharge the latter, but also to confer some benefit upon the payer is equally valid, since adequacy of consideration is immaterial.89 But where the debtor himself furnishes the money for the purpose to the third person who then makes the bargain with the creditor, the case is the same as if the money had been paid by the debtor himself, instead of by the hand of an agent.90 There is no detriment to the promisee and no benefit to the promisor beyond that to which he was legally entitled. And if the debtor borrows money from a third person, and himself makes the payment, there is not more consideration for an agreement to discharge the balance, than if the debtor had acquired the money otherwise;91 unless indeed the borrowing was requested by the creditor as part of the consideration for his agreement.92
It is universally held that where several creditors of an insolvent or embarrassed debtor agree each to receive a percentage of his claim, the agreement is binding.93 The considera-
89 Allen v. McNeelan, 79 Oreg. 606, 156 Pac 274.
90Shaw v. Clark, 6 Vt. 607, 27 Am. Dec. 578. See also Bliss v. Shwarts, 85 N. Y. 445.
91 Schleasinger v. Schletoinger, 39 Col. 44,88 Pac. 970,8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 863; Specialty Glass Co. v. Daley, 172 Mass. 460, 52 N. E. 633; Bunge v. Koop, 48 N. Y. 226, 8 Am. Rep. 546. But see Dalrymple v. Craig, 149 Mo. 345,508. W. 884; Ivy Court Realty Co. v. Knapp, 79 N. Y. Misc. 200, 139 N. Y. S. 918; Rotan Grocery Co. v. Noble, 36 Tex. Civ. App. 226, 81S. W. 686.
92Even under circumstances approaching this the consideration was: beld insufficient in Harriman v. Har-riman, 12 Gray, 341; Bunge v. Koop, 48 N. Y. 225, 8 Am. Rep. 546.
93 Steinman v. Magnus, 11 East, 390;
Good v. Cheesman, 2 Barn. & Ad. 328; Norman v. Thompson, 4 Exch. 755; Boyd v. Hind, 1H.&N, 938; Slater v. Jones, L. R. 8 Ex. 186; Dyer v. Muhlenberg County, 117 Fed. 588, 54 C. C. A. 172; Wosoott P. Waller, 47 Ala. 492; Bank of Montgomery a, Ohio Buggy Co., 100 Ala. 626, 13 So. 621; Wilks v. Slaughter, 49 Ark. 235, 4 S. W. 766; Humiston v. Smith, 21 Cal. 129; Wilson v. Samuels, 100 Cal. 514, 35 Pac. 148, 559; Union Pac. R. Co. v. Anderson, 11 Colo. 293, 18 Pac. 24; Stewart v. Langston, 103 Ga. 290, 30 S. E. 35; Devou v. Ham, 17 Ind. 472; Robert v. Barnum, 80 Ky. 28; Parkins v. Lockwood, 100 Mass. 249, 250, 6 Am. Dec. 158; Martin v. Meles, 179 Maes. 114,119,60 N. E. 397; Newell v, Higgins, 55 Minn. 82, 56 N. W. 577; Mullin v. Martin, 23 Mo. App. 537; Gage v. DeCourcey, 68 N. H. 579, tion which is said to exist in such cases to support the agreement of each creditor is the promise of every other creditor to discharge a portion of his claim; and it has even held that in order to make a composition valid, it must appear that each creditor made such an agreement not only with the debtor but with other creditors.94 The statement of promises between the creditors may well be inserted in a composition agreement,'but without any such express promise or any evidence of mutual promises in fact between the creditors, the existence of such promises would probably be generally assumed as a necessary fiction from the mere making of a composition agreement with the debtor.95 Moreover, even if the law makes such a requirement, and it is in fact satisfied, though the promises of the creditors with one another would be sufficiently supported, it is hard to see how that consideration supports a promise to the debtor, and any question of the validity of compositions generally arises between the debtor and one or more creditors, not between the creditors themselves. It might be urged that the debtor should be allowed to take advantage of the promises between the creditors, as being made for his benefit; but he is allowed to set up a composition in jurisdictions like England and Massachusetts where a beneficiary who is not a promisee is not allowed to enforce a contract. In truth the doctrine that promises in composition papers are supported by valid consideration must be regarded as exceptional.96
41 Atl. 183; Bartlett v. Woodworth-Mason Co., 69 N. H. 316, 41 Atl. 264; Morris Canal & Banking Co. v. Van-Vorat, 21 N. J. L. 100; White v. Hunts, 107 N. Y. 518, 14 N. E. 423, 1 Am. St. Rep. 886; Crawford v. Krueger, 201 Pa. 348, 50, Atl. 931; Cohen v. P. E. Harding Const. Co. (R. I.), 103 Atl. 702; Arnold v. Bailey, 24 S. C. 493; Paddleford v. Thacher, 48 Vt. 574; Continental Nat. Bank v. McGeoch, 92 Win. 286, 66 N. W. 606.
94Argall v. Cook, 43 Conn. 160; Smith v. Mechanics' Nat. Bank, 108 Ga. 211, 216, 33 S. E. 857; First Nat. Bank v. Ware, 95 Me. 388, 50 Atl. 24;
Perkins v. Lockwood, 100 Mass. 249, 1 Am. Rep. 103; Sage v. Valentine, 23 Minn. 102; Newell v. Higgins, 55 Minn. 82, 56 N. W. 677.
95 See cases supra, n. 93.
96 See 12 Harv. L. Rev. 526, by Prof. Ames. Doubtless the debtor may make promises in a composition agreement which would furnish consideration for all the creditors' promises to the debtor. Thus in Bank of Montgomery v. Ohio Buggy Co., 100 Ala. 626, 13 So. 621, the debtor promised to incur no new indebtedness, but such promises are not essential to the validity of a composition agreement.