Whether a payment of the principal of a liquidated debt after maturity discharges not only the principal but also any interest which may be due, depends on whether the interest is due by the terms of the contract between the parties or merely as damages.96a," "Where interest is due because the debtor has expressly agreed to pay it, the interest is considered as an integral part of the debt, and the right to recover it may remain, even after the principal has been paid. But where interest is claimed as damages by virtue of the non-payment of a debt when due, and for that reason is allowed by law, it is then considered not an integral part of the debt, but merely as an incident to the debt, and in such cases, when the principal is paid and accepted without interest, the right to interest extinguished." 97 A protest at the time of payment because of the non-payment of interest does not change this rule.98
An unliquidated claim is one the amount of which has not been fixed by agreement or cannot be exactly determined by the application of rules of arithmetic or of law.99 A disputed claim may be either liquidated or unliquidated. A claim of A against B for $5, admittedly lent by A to B, but concerning the payment of which there is a dispute, is a disputed claim; but the amount of the claim, if it exists at all, is fixed.1 As the amount of an unliquidated claim is unknown, and as either the existence or the amount of a disputed claim is unknown, whether a claim is unliquidated or disputed, it comes under the rule generally applicable to consideration,2 that the law, where it can avoid doing so, will not attempt to put a value on a consideration agreed upon by the parties. The surrender of a disputed claim, whether unliquidated or liquidated, if the dispute is honest and not obviously frivolous, is, therefore, consideration which the law cannot attempt to value.3 Accordingly any sum given and accepted as consideration for an agreement to discharge a claim which is unliquidated or the subject of bona fide and reasonable dispute is valid consideration.4 But a frivolous dispute or disingenuous disclaimer of liability will not help an attempt to compromise an obvious obligation.4a
96See infra, Sec. 1412. 97 Bassick Gold Mine Co. v. Beards-lev, 49 Col. 275. 112 Pac 770, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 852; and see to the same effect, Stewart p. Barnes, 153 U. S. 456, 38 L. Ed. 781, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 849; Southern Ry. Co. v. Dunlop Mills, 70 Fed. 505, 22 C. C. A. 302, 42 U. S. App. 169; New York Trust Co. v. Detroit Ac Ry. Co., 251 Fed. 514, 163 C. C. A. SOS; Wescott v. Waller, 47 Ala. 492; Chandler v. People's Sav. Bank, 61 Cal. 401; Can-field v. Eleventh School Dist., 19 Conn. 529; American Bible Soc. v. Wells, 68 Me. 572, 28 Am. Rep. 82; Simmons v. Alrar, 103 Mass. 33, 36; Davis v. Har-rington 160 Han. 278, 35 N. E. 771; Paul Revere Trust Co. v. Castle, 231
Mass. 129, 120 N. E. 352 [see quart in Whittaker Chain Tread Co. v. Standard Auto Supply Co., 216 Mass. 204,103 N. E. 695, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 315, as to correctness of Tuttle v. Tut-tie, 12 Met. 551, 46 Am. Dec. 701]; Arnold v. Sedalia Nat. Bank, 100 Mo. App. 474, 74 S. W. 1038; Cutter v. Mayor, etc., of New York, 92 N. Y. 166; King v Phillips, 95 N. C. 245, 59 Am. Rep. 238; Bennett v. Federal Coal Co., 70 W. Va. 456, 74 S. E. 418, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 588.
98 Graves v. Saline County, 104 Fed. 61, 43 C. C. A. 414; Cutter v. Mayor, etc, of New York, 92 N. Y. 166.
99Charoley c. Sibley, 73 Fed. 980, 982, 20 C. C. A. 157; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Clark, 92 Fed. 968, 985, 35 C. C.
A.120;Hargroves v. Cooke, 15 Ga. 321. Treat v. Price, 47 Neb. 875, 66 N. W. 834, 836.
1 The question is merely one of words, since it is unquestionably true that a disputed claim may, like an unliquidated claim, be settled for such sum as the parties may agree; but as a mere matter of words, one cannot agree with the statement, "when it is admitted that one of two specific sums is due, but there is a general dispute as to which is the proper amount, the demand is regarded as 'unliquidated' within the meaning of the term as applied to the subject of accord and satisfaction." Lestienne v. Ernst, 5 N. Y. App. Div. 373, 39 N. Y. S. 199, 200.
2See supra, Sec. 115.
3 See infra, Sec. 135.
4 Read v. Gt. Eastern R. Co., L. R., 3 Q. B. 555; United States v. Child & Co., 12 Wall. 232,20 L. Ed. 360; In re D. H. Bride & Co., 132 Fed. 285; Hand Lumber Co. v. Hall, 147 Ala. 561, 41 So. 78; Bull v. Bull, 43 Conn. 455; Blake v. Baldwin, 54 Conn. 5, 5 Atl. 299; Sanford v. Abrems, 24 Fla. 181.
2 So. 373; Harland v. Staples, 79 111. App. 72; Bingham v. Browning, 97 111. App. 442, affirmed in 197 111. 122, 64 N. E. 317; Janci v. Cerny, 287 111. 359, 122 N. E. 507; Ennis v. Pullman Palace-Car Co., 165 111. 161, 46 N. E. 439, affirming 60 111. App. 398; Little v. Koeroer, 28 Ind. App. 625, 63 N. E, 766; Storch v. Dewey, 57 Kans. 370, 46 Pac. 698; Baugh v. Fist, 84 Kans. 740, 115 Pac. 551; Barber v. State, 24 Md. 383; Alvord v. Marsh, 12 Allen, 603; Pollman 4 Bros. Coal & S. Co. v. St. Louis, 145 Mo. 651, 47 S. W. 563; Maack v. Schneider, 51 Mo. App. 92; Brink v. Garland, 58 Mo. App. 356; Chamberlain v. Smith, 110 Mo. App. 657, 85 S. W. 645; Slade v. Swedeburg Elevator Co., 39 Neb. 600, 58 N. W. 191; Palmerton v. Huxford, 4 Denio, 166; Bandman v. Finn, 185 N. Y. 508, 78 N. E. 175,12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1134; Laroe v. Sugar Leaf Dairy Co., 87 N. Y. App. D. 585, 84 N. Y. S. 609 (reversed on another ground in 180 N. Y. 367, 73 N. E. 61); Riggs v. Home Mutual Fire Protection Asso., 61 S. C. 448, 39 S. E. 614; Hussey v.