If the reasoning suggested in Frost v. Knight 58 and adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States 59 for the doctrine of anticipatory breach is accepted, namely, that a contract gives immediately an inchoate right to the performance of the bargain, which becomes complete when the time for performance has arrived; giving, in the meantime, a right to have the contract kept open as a subsisting and effective contract, the reasoning is as applicable to unilateral obligations to pay money, for instance by promissory note, as to any other form of contract. Indeed, the right to the unimpeached efficacy of the obligation before its maturity, is perhaps as desirable in the case of a promissory note as in any other case which can be put; yet it is probable that no court would enforce a promissory note prior to the date of its maturity,60 And it seems also unlikely that a unilateral promise for executed consideration to pay money at a future day can be enforced until that day arrives;60a nor is it easy to draw a distinction between unilateral promises to pay money and unilateral promises for other performances. The distinction, therefore, taken by the Court of Appeals of New York,61 and approved by the Supreme Court of the United States,62 will probably be generally adopted. It was said by the latter court:63 " It is not intimated that in the bald case of a party bound to pay a promissory note which rests in the hands of the payee, but which is not yet due, such note can be made due by any notice of the maker that he does not intend to pay it when it matures. We decide simply this case where there are material provisions and obligations interdependent. In such case, and where one party is bound, from time to time, as expressed, to deliver part of an aggregate and specified amount of property to another, who is to pay for each parcel delivered at a certain time and in a certain way, a refusal to be further bound by the terms of the contract or to accept further deliveries, and a refusal to give the notes already demandable for a portion of the property that has been delivered, and a refusal to give any more notes at any time or for any purpose in the future, or to pay moneys at any time, which are eventually to be paid under the contract, all this constitutes a breach of the contract as a whole, and gives a present right of action against the party so refusing to recover damages which the other may sustain by reason of this refusal." 64

55 See infra, Sec. 1984.

56 In re Imperial Brewing Co., 143 Fed. 579; In re Inman, 175 Fed. 312. But see contra, In re Pettingill, 137 Fed. 143.

57 See supra, Sec.880. This difficulty was suggested by the court in Wolins v. Conrad, 172 N. Y. S. 216.

58 L. R. 7 Ex. 111.

59 Central Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium Assoc., 240 U. S. 581, 60 L. Ed. 811, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 412, L. R. A. 1917 B. 580.

60 Roehm v. Hoist, 178 U. S. 1,17,44 L Ed. 963, 20 Sap. Ct. 780; Benecke v. Haebler, 38 N. Y. App. D. 344, 58 N. T. S. 16, aff'd without opinion, 166 N. Y. 631, 60 N. E. 1107.

60aWerner v. Werner, 169 N. Y. App. D. 91 154 N. Y. S. 570.

61 Nichols v. Scranton Steel Co., 137 N. Y. 471, 487, 33 N. E. 561.

62 Roehm v. Horst, 178 U. S. 1,17,44 L. Ed. 953, 20 Sup. Ct. 780.

63 Ibid.