When a defendant has been notified, before entering into the contract in question, of facts indicating that unusual damages will follow or may follow his failure to perform his agreement, he is liable for such damages. Common consequential damages of this sort are those suffered from loss of a resale.37 The defendant may have had notice of a sub-contract but not of the price at which the resale was to be made. In such a case he will be liable for such ordinary profit as might be expected on a resale.38 Even though no contract for a resale had yet been made by the buyer, damages may be recovered for loss of one, if the probability of such a resale was contemplated,39 and defendant, knew that other goods of the kind contracted for could not be obtained by the buyer. The same principle applies where a seller has notice of a particular use for the goods contracted for, which will be defeated if the contract is not fulfilled. This has been held in regard to contracts to deliver machinery, lack of which caused a loss of production or injury to material, whether the action is against a seller or a carrier.40
37 Federal Wall Paper Co. v. Kemp-ner, 244 Fed. 240; Jordan v. Fatter-no, 67 Conn. 473, 35 Atl. 521; Carolina Portland Cement Co. v. Columbia Imp. Co., 3 Ga. App. 483, 60 S. E. 279; Hagpn v. Rawle, 143 111. App. 543; Pulaski Stave Co. v. Miller's Creek Lumber Co., 138 Ky. 372, 128 S. W. 96; Lissberger v. Kellogg, 78 N. J. L. 85, 73 Atl. 67; Delafield 9. J. K. Armsby Co., 131 N. Y. App. Div. 572, 116 N. Y. S. 71, affd. 199 N. Y. 518, 92 N. E. 1083; Meyer v. Bottenberg (Supr. Ct. App. Term.), 168 N. Y. S. 630; Chisholm Ac. Mfg. Co. 9. United States Ac. Co., Ill Tenn. 202, 77 S. W. 1062; Sedro Veneer Co. v. Kwapil, 62 Wash. 385, 113 Pac. 1100; Hubbard Steel Foundry Co. v. Federal Bridge Ac. Co., 169 Wis. 277, 171 N. W. 949.
38 Morgan & Wright v. Sultive Broa, 148 Iowa, 318, 126 N. W. 175;
Collins v. A. Luban Co., 127 N. Y. S. 461; Booth v. Spuyten Duyvil R. M. Co., 60 N. Y. 487. But if the price was exceptional or extraordinary, such recovery is not allowable. Home v. Midland Ry. Co., L. R. 8 C. P. 131.
39 Hammond v. Bussey, 20 Q. B. Div. 79; Jordan v. Patterson, 67 Conn. 473, 35 Atl. 521; Pulaski Stave Co. v. Miller's Creek Lumber Co., 138 Ky. 372, 128 S. W. 96; Sedro Veneer Co. v. Kwapil, 62 Wash. 385, 113 Pac. 1100.
40 D. A. Tompkins Co. v. Monti-cello C. O. Co., 153 Fed. 817; Van Winkle v. Wilkins, 81 Ga. 93, 7 S. E. 644, 12 Am. St. Rep. 299; Elzy v. Adams Express Co., 141 la. 407, 119 N. W. 705; Bates Machine Co. v. Norton Iron Works, 113 Ky. 372, 68 S. W. 423; Industrial Works 0. Mitchell 114 Mich. 29, 72 N. W. 25;
So for breach of a contract to deliver raw material or other goods,41 or land or buildings known to be designed for a particular use,42 or a telegram containing a message indicating by its contents not only that it is important, but the nature of the business to which it relates,43 or to do work known to be Cleveland, etc., Co. v. Consumers' Carbon Co., 75 Ohio St. 163, 78 N. E. 1009; Standard Supply Co. v. Carter & Harris, 81 S. C. 181, 62 S. E. 150, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 155; Story Lumber Co. v. Southern Ry., 151 N. C. 23, 65 S. E. 460; Pender Lumber Co. v. Wilmington Iron Works, 130 N. C. 584, 41 S. E. 797.
41 Gee v. Lancashire, etc., Ry. Co., 6 H. & N. 211; Taber Lumber Co. v. O'Neal, 160 Fed. 596, 87 C. C. A. 498; Iowa Mfg. Co. v. B. F. Sturte-vant Co., 162 Fed. 460, 89 C. C. A. 346, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 575; Pacific, etc., Works v. California Canneries Co., 164 Fed. 980, 91 C. C. A. 108; Ledger-wood v. Bushnell, 128 111. App. 555; Meyer v. Haven, 70 N. Y. App. Div. 529, 75 N. Y. S. 261; Lukens Iron & Steel Co. v. Hartmann-Greiling Co., 169 Wis. 350, 172 N. W. 894. In Hammer v. Scho&nfelder, 47 Wis. 455, 2 N. W. 1129, damage for loss of meat was held recoverable for breach of a contract to deliver ice, the seller knowing the ice was needed to preserve meat. If damages were not foreseeable, they are not recoverable. Thomas Raby, Inc., v. Ward-Meehan Co., 261 Pa. 468, 104 Atl. 750.
42 O'Conner v. Nolan, 64 HI. App. 357; Skinner v. Gibson, 86 Kans. 431, 121 Pac. 513; Neal v. Jefferson, 212 Mass. 517, 99 N. E. 334, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 387, Ann. Cas. 1913 D. 205.
43 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Graham, 1 Colo. 230, 9 Am. Rep. 136; McPeek v. Western Union Tel. Co., 107 Iowa, 356, 78 N. W. 63, 43 L. R. A. 214, 70 Am. St. Rep. 205; True v. International Tel. Co., 60 Me. 9, 11 Am. Rep. 156. In Stone & Co.
0. Postal Telegraph Cable Co., 35 R. I. 498, 509, 87 Atl. 319, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 180, the court said:-
"The plaintiff contends, however, that under the authority of a number of cases in several of the states, enough appeared in the messages in question to show that they related to business transactions between the plaintiff and the senders and that that is sufficient to charge the defendant with all the damages resulting from its negligence in transmission and delivery. Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v, Lathrop, 131 111. 575, 23 N. E. 583. The plaintiff claims that that circumstance would bring this case within the portion of the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale, which provides that if the special circumstances under which the contract was made were communicated to the defendant it would be liable for the extraordinary damages which might arise from a breach of the contract under those special circumstances. The weight of authority, however, and it seems to us the better reason is, that the knowledge merely that the messages are important or that they relate to a business transaction without information as to the exact nature and extent of that business transaction does not constitute such a disclosure of special circumstances as would render the defendant liable for unusual damages arising from a breach of the contract. Primrose v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 154 U. S. 1, 38 L. Ed. 883, 14 Sup. Ct. 1098; Wheelock v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co., 197 Mass. 119, 83 N. E. 313; Baldwin v. United States Telegraph needed for a purpose which will be defeated if the contract is broken.44