It has already been said 39 that a conditional promise to pay a debt coupled with evidence that the condition has been performed, will revive the debt. It may be said more broadly, "If the admission be conditional, limited or qualified in any way or to any extent, the new promise will have a like quality, and the statute will operate so far as it may in view of the condition, limitation, or qualification. In case there is a condition, the creditor must show that it has been fulfilled or complied with, to entitle himself to the implication of a new promise." 40 A new promise may be to pay "on request, or at a future time, or on a condition." 41 Instances of conditional and limited promises may be found in the following sections.

As no immediate liability arises from a conditional obligation the statute runs afresh, not from the making of the new promise but from the time when it was to be performed,-thus on a new promise to pay when the creditor should make demand, only from the time when such demand was made,42 and on a promise to pay when the debtor should be able, only from the time of such ability.43

37 Walker v. Butler, 6 E. & B. 506; Food p. French, 97 Me. 403, 64 Atl. 920; Taylor v. Foster, 132 Mass. 30; Brafford v. Reed, 126 N. C. 311, 34 S. E. 443. In Taylor v. Foster, supra, the court said (at page 33): "But where the identity of the debt sued on with the debt on which the payment is made is established, such payment will take the whole debt out of the statute, whether it is represented by one note or by mors than one note. For instance, suppose a debtor owing a man three thousand dollars, evidenced by three notes of one thousand dollars each, says to the creditor, I owe you this three thousand dollars, I cannot pay you the whole debt, but I now pay you fifteen hundred dollars on account of it. This is clearly an acknowledgment of the whole debt, and would take it out of the operation of the statute of limitations, although neither party should at any time make any specific application of the money paid to either of the promissory notes." Compare the statement in Pond v. Williams, 1 Gray, 630, 835, quoted with approval in Kennedy v. Drake, 225 Mass. 303, 114 N. E. 310, 312. "To effect" the revival of the barred debt "the payment must be specifically made or directed by the defendant."

38 Nunn v. McKnight, 79 Ark. 393, 96S.W.193. See also Pond v. French, 97 Me. 403, 54 Atl. 920.

39 See supra, Sec. 162.

40Barker v. Heath, 74 N. H. 270, 272,67 Atl. 222. See also Big Diamond Milling Co. v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., (Minn. 1919), 171 N. W. 799; Mac-Diarmid v. Steele, 176 N. Y. App. D. 313, 162 N. Y. S. 263, and cases in Sec. 162 and this section, passim.

41 Rackham v. Marriott, 2 H. & N. 196. See to the same effect the passage quoted from Philips v. Philips, 3 Hare, 281, 299, infra, Sec. 196.