By the rule of the common law, the father of an infant was entitled to his services and therefore to his earnings,59 and generally it is held that a widowed mother succeeds to the father's rights in this respect.60 Accordingly the right of action for wages earned by a minor is vested in the parent;61 and a payment made to the child will not discharge the employer from liability to the parent.62 Since, therefore, the infant may avoid his contract, and the parent cannot be deprived of the right to the infant's services, neither the minor nor the parent is bound by any contract of employment made without the parent's assent.63 And even though the parent is entitled to his child's services, and the child owes obedience to the parent, the law cannot compel the child to perform a contract of employment made for him or on his behalf by his parent, nor will it attempt to do so indirectly by enjoining the child from working for any one else.64 The parent may, however, surrender his right to the child's services by emancipating him. Such emancipation may be by express agreement or may be shown by the circumstances of the case.65 Thus, if with his parent's express or implied consent a minor make a contract for his services, under which he is personally to receive the benefits of the contract, he is thereby emancipated.66 The marriage of a minor also effects his emancipation; 67 as does the failure or refusal of a parent to furnish

84Herbert v. Turball, 1 Keb. 689; Fitzhugh v. Dennington, 6 Mod. 259; Wells v. Wells, 6 Ind. 447; Banco De Sonora v. Bankers', etc., Co., 124 la. 576, 100 N. W. 532, 104 Am. St. Rep. 367; United States v. Wright, 197 Fed. 297, 116 C. C. A. 659; Bardwell v. Purrington, 107 Mass. 419; Ross v. Morrow, 85 Tex. 172, 19 8. W. 1090, 16 L. R. A. 542.

55 This is true in Arkansas, California, Colorado, Dakota, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, Oregon, Vermont, Washington.

56 So in California, So. Dakota. See Ganahl v. Sober (Cal.), 5 Pac. 80; Ex parte Wood, 5 Cal. App. 471, 90 Pac. 961.

57 This is true in Maryland, Nebraska, Oregon, Texas. See Ward v. Laverty, 19 Neb. 429, 27 N. W. 393; Grayson v. Lofland, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 503, 52 S. W. 121.

58This is true in Iowa, Louisiana, Washington. See Ex parte Hollopeter, 52 Wash. 41,100 Pac. 150, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 847, 132 Am. St. Rep. 952.

59 1 Bl. Com. 453; Tiffany on Persons, 255; In re Riff, 205 Fed. 406. As a bastard at common law was nullius filitus, Friesner v. Symonds, 46 N. J. Eq. 521, 527, 20 Atl. 257, the father of a bastard is not entitled to his services. State d. Byron (N. H.), 104 Atl. 401, 402.

60 Tiffany on Persons, 256; Howlligs-wroth v. Swedenboig, 49 Ind. 378, 19 Am. Rep. 687, and cases cited.

61 Duffeld v. Cross, 12 111. 397; Hol-lingsworth v. Swedenborg, 49 Ind. 378, 19 Am. Rep. 687; Shute v. Dorr, 5 Wend. 204; Cloud v. Hamilton, 11 Humph. 104, 53 Am. Dec. 778; Mona-ghan v. School District, 38 Wis. 100.

62White v. Henry, 24 Me. 631; Weeks v. Holmes, 12 Cush. 215; Sherlock v. Kimmell, 75 Mo. 77; Dunn v.

Allman, 50 Mo. App. 231. The same principle is involved in decisions holding inconclusive a recovery of damages by a minor for personal injuries. The parent is entitled also to recover for the value of the child's services. Horgan v. Pacific Mills, 158 Mass. 402, 33 N. EL 581, 35 Am. St. Rep. 504.

63In England the minor would, it seems, be bound if such a contract were on the whole beneficial. See infra, Sec. 228.

64Cain v. Garner, 169 Ky. 633, 185 S. W. 122, L. R. A. 1916 E. 682.

65 In re Riff, 205 Fed. 406; Donegan v. Davis, 66 Ala. 362; Story & Clark Piano Co. v. Davy, (Ind. App. 1918), 119 N. E. 177; Dennysville v. Trescott, 30 Me. 470; Whiting v. Earle, 3 Pick. 201; Hall v. Hall, 44 N. H. 293; Shute v. Dorr, 5 Wend. 204, 206; Kain v. Larkin, 131 N. Y. 300, 30 N. E. 105; Chase v, Elkins, 2 Vt. 290; Penn v. Whitehead, 17 Gratt. 503,94 Am. Dec. 478; Grotjan v. Rice, 124 Wis. 253, 102 N. W. 591.

66Cloud v. Hamilton, 11 Humph.

104, 53 Am. Dec. 778; Famsworth v. Wakefield, 12 Cush. 514; cf. Monaghan v. School District, 38 Wis. 100.

67 Mitchell's Succession, 33 La. Ann. 353; Bucksport v. Rockland, 56 Me. 22; Taunton v. Plymouth, 15 Mass. 203; State v. Lowell, 78 Minn. 166, 80 N. W. 877, 46 L. R. A. 440, 79 Am. St. 358; Aldrich v. Bennett, 63 N. H. 415, 56 Am. Rep. 629; Porch v. Fries, 3 C. E. Green, 204; Cochran v. Cochran, 196 N. Y. 86, 89, 89 N. E. 470, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 160, 17 Ann. Cas. 782; Burr v. Wilson, 18 Tex. 367; North-field v. Brookfield, 50 Vt. 62. See also King v. Wilmington, 5B.& Ald. 525; Ward v. Laverty, 19 Neb. 429, 27 N. W. 393. It has been held that unless the father consents to the marriage, the minor is not emancipated. White v. Henry, 24 Me. 531. See also Delaware Ac. R.v. Petrowsky, 250 Fed. 534, 162 C. C. A. 570. But this would not be everywhere admitted. In Commonwealth v. Graham, 157 Mass. 73, 31 N. E. 706, 16 L. R. A. 578, 34 Am. St. Rep. 255, it was held that a minor support,68 unices the failure to support is due to the refusal of the minor to accept the support offered in his parent's home.69 If an infant makes a contract for his services with his father, emancipation is implied and he can then recover either on the contract, or on the basis of quasi-contract for the fair value of the services.70 Emancipation may be partial.71 Until it has been acted upon, emancipation may be revoked by the father unless made for sufficient consideration or under seal.72 Emancipation does not give an infant enlarged capacity to contract,73 even when brought about by marriage.74 In some States, however, it is provided that by decree of court the disabilities of an infant may be removed.75 Such statutes go beyond mere emancipation in their effect. An attempt by a parent to relieve himself from a liability imposed by law to support his child, by emancipating the child, is contrary to public policy and ineffectual.76 son who married without his father's consent was entitled, to his wages at least bo far as necessary to support himself and his wife and children. Probably a minor daughter would in any event be held emancipated by marriage without her parent's consent. See cases supra, and Atwood v. Hol-oomb, 39 Conn. 270, 274.

68 in re Riff, 205 Fed. 406, 408; Atwood v. Holcomb, 39 Conn. 270, 274; Farrell v. Farrell, 3 Houst. 633; Hol-ingsworth v. Swedenborg, 49 Ind. 378, 19 Am. Rep. 687; Robinson v. Hathaway, 150 Ind. 679, 50 N. E. 883; McCarthy v. Boston A Lowell R. Co., 148 Mass. 550, 552, 20 N. E. 182, 2 L. R. A. 608.

69 White v. Henry, 24 Me. 531.

70Godfrey v. Hays, 6 Ala. 501, 41 Am. Dec. 58; Danley v. Rector, 10 Ark. 211, 50 Am. Dec. 242; Wilson v. McMillan, 62 Ga. 16,35 Am. Rep. 115; Hall v. Hall, 44 N. H. 293; Titman's Adm'r v. Titman, 64 Pa. 480; cf. In re Riff, 206 Fed. 406.

71 Winn v. Sprague, 35 Vt. 243.

72In re Riff, 205 Fed. 406; Abbott v. Converse, 4 Allen, 530.

73 Wickham v. Torley, 136 Ga. 594, 71 S. E. 881, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 57; Mason v. Wright, 13 Metc. 306; Tyler p. Gallop's Est., 68 Mich. 185,35 N. W. 902, 13 Am. St. Rep. 336; Chapman v. Hughes, 61 Miss. 339; Genereux v. Sibley, 18 R. I. 43, 26 Att. 345; Person v. Chase, 37 Vt. 647, 88 Am. Dec. 630.

74 Burns v. Smith, 29 Ind. App. 181, 64 N. E. 94, 94 Am. St. Rep. 268; Mitchell's Succession, 33 La. Ann. 353; Taunton v. Plymouth, 15 Mass. 203; Commonwealth p. Graham, 157 Mass. 73, 76, 31 N. E. 706, 16 L. R. A. 578. But see Burr p. Wilson, 18 Tex. 367.

75 See Boykin v. Collins, 140 Ala. 407, 37 So. 248; Young p. Hiner, 72 Ark. 299, 79 3. W. 1062; Pochelu's Emancipation, 41 La. Ann. 331, 6 So. 541; Marks v. McEIroy, 67 Miss. 545, 7 So. 408; Lake p. Perry, 95 Miss. 550, 49 So. 569; Brown v. Wheelock, 75 Tex. 385, 12 S. W. 111.

76 Snell v. Ham (Tex. Civ. App.), 151 S. W. 1077.

Sec. 226. Infants' contracts are now held voidable and not void. Though the early American decisions followed the statements in the English decisions referred to in a preceding section 77 dividing the acts of infants into the three classes of void, voidable and binding,78 it became clear, ultimately, that it was a very difficult question for a court to undertake to decide, whether a given contract was necessarily prejudicial to an infant; and also that even if a contract were prejudicial, the infant had sufficient protection in the right given him to avoid the contract if it were held not void but merely voidable. At the present day, therefore, the view generally maintained is that an infant's contract or transfer is with the slight exceptions hereafter noted voidable.79