The contracts of trustees even more clearly than those of executors must bind the fiduciary personally if binding as contracts at all. The Common Law at least recognized the possibility of a judgment against an executor or administrator as such, by virtue of which execution would issue against the goods of the deceased, but no similar judgment against a trustee was possible at law. Any judgment against him in an action at law must be against him personally, and his contracts though incurred with reference to the trust are his personal obligations.79 Trustees who are thus obliged to meet liabilities on behalf of the trust estate, are entitled to reimbursement and indemnity from it, to the extent that such liabilities were rightfully incurred.80

79 Duvall v. Craig, 2 Wheat. 45, 4 L. Ed. 180; Taylor v. Davis' Adm., 110 U. S. 330, 4 S. Ct. 147, 28 L. Ed. 163; Wade v. Pope, 44 Ala. 690; Johnson v. Leman, 131 111. 609,23 N. E. 435, 7 L. R, A. 656, 19 Am. St. Rep. 63; Dinsmoor v. Breeder, 66 111. App. 207; Bloom v. Wolfe, 50 Ia. 286; Farmers', etc. Bank v. Deposit Co., 108 Ky. 384, 56 8. W. 671; Everett v. Drew, 129 Mass. 150; Odd Fellows Assoc, v. McAllister, 153 Mass. 292, 26 N. E. 862, 11 L. R. A. 172; Hussey v. Arnold, 185 Man. 202, 70 N. E. 87; King v. Stow-ell, 211 Mass. 246, 98 N. E. 91; Packard v. Kingman, 109 Mich. 497, 67 N. W. 551; McGovem v. Bennett, 148 Mich. 558, 109 N. W. 1055; Feldman v. Preston, 194 Mich. 352, 160 N. W. 655; Truesdale v. Philadelphia Trust, etc., Co., 63 Minn. 49, 65 N. W. 133; Norton v. Phelps, 54 Miss. 467; Koken Iron Works v. Kinealy, 86 Mo. App. 199; Noyee v. Blakeman, 6 N. Y. 567; United States Trust Co. v. Stanton, 139 N. Y. 531, 533, 34 N. E. 1098;

Mander v. Low, 12 N. Y. Misc. 316, 33 N. Y. S. 719; Mitchell v. Whitlock, 121 N. C. 166, 28 S. E. 292; Ogden Ry. Co. v. Wright, 31 Orag. 150, 49 Pac. 975; Ransau v. Davis, 85 Oreg. 26, 165 Pac. 1180; Fehlinger v. Wood, 134 Pa. St. 517, 19 Atl. 746; Williams Nat. Bank v. Groton Mfg. Co., 16 R. I. 504, 17 Atl. 170; McIntyre v. Williamson, 72 Vt. 183, 47 Atl. 786, 82 Am. St. Rep. 929; Poinderter v. Burwell, 82 Va. 607; Carr v. Branch, 85 Va. 597, 8 S. E. 476. This is true though the instrument creating the trust empowers the trustee to bind the estate. Connally v. Lyons, 82 Tex. 664, 18 S. W. 799, 27 Am. St. Rep. 935.

80 Nelson v. Duncombe, 9 Beav. 211; Chester v. Rolfe, 4 De G. M. A G. 798; Gisborn v. Charter Oak life Ins. Co., 142 U. S. 326, 12 8. Ct. 277, 35 L. Ed. 1029; Mitau v. Roddan, 149 Cal. 1, 84 Pac. 145; Thome v. Allen, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 987, 70 S. W. 410; Hayes v. Hall, 188 Mass. 510, 74 N. E. 935; King v Stowell, 211 Mass. 246,

Those who have contracted with the trustee have ordinarily no right on this account to a remedy against the cestui que trust,81 or the trust estate,82 unless the contract relates to land or other unique property belonging to the trust. Such a contract if the trustee was authorized to make it, equity will specifically enforce by compelling the trustee to convey.83 In a few States, moreover, by statute, an action is allowed against the trustee in his representative capacity for the enforcement of all claims rightfully created incurred by the trustee in behalf of the estate.84 As a trustee's contract is his personal obligation, a successor in the trust is not liable for the contracts of his predecessor; 84a but the trustee himself, though no longer such, or if he is dead his personal representative, would remain bound.85 It is possible by clear language for a trustee to indicate that no personal liability on his part is contemplated, and such language will be given effect.86 Where personal liability is thus excluded, the creditor's only remedy is by bill in equity to subject the trust estate to his claim.87 It is possible for the trustee instead of excluding personal liability altogether, to limit his liability to the amount of the assets in the trust estate from which he can claim reimbursement.88 Apart from statute, the mere description of an obligor as trustee or as trustee of a named estate does not exclude personal liability,89 while a signature "as trustee but not individually"

260, 98 N. E. 91; Truesdale v. Philadelphia Trust Co., 63 Minn. 49, 51, 65 N. W. 133; Fearn v. Mayers, 53 Miss. 458; Matter of Nesbit, 140 N. Y. 609, 35 N. . 942; Steinway v. Stein-way, 112 N. Y. App. D. 18, 98 N. Y. S. 99. As to the right of the trustee to claim reimbursement from the cestui que trust personally, if the trust estate is insufficient, see 14 Harv. L. Rev. 539, criticising the case of Har-doon v. Belilios, 83 L. T. Rep. 573, where the Privy Council held a cestui que trust personally bound to indemnify his trustee from liability for calls on stock which the trust estate was inadequate to meet, though the trust was not undertaken at the request of the cestui que trust. Cf. Fraser v. Murdoch, 6 App. Cas. 855, per Lord Blackburn. Where the trust is undertaken at the request of the cestui que trust, there seems no reason to doubt that a personal obligation to indemnify the trustee arises. Gris-Bell v. Bristowe, L. R. 4 C. P. 36; Hemming v. Maddick, L. R. 7 Ch. 395. See also Hanover Nat. Bank v. Cocke, 127 N. C. 467, 37 S. E. 507.

81 Hartley v. Phillips, 198 Pa. 9, 47 Atl. 929.

82 Farhall v. Farhall, L. R. 7 Ch. 123; Taylor v. Crook, 136 Ala. 354, 34 So. 905; Etowah Min. Co. 9. Wills Valley Min. Co., 143 Ala. 623, 39 So. 336; Johnson v. Leman, 131 111. 609, 23 N. E. 435, 7 L. R. A. 656, 19 Am. St.

Rep. 63; Hussey v. Arnold, 185 Mass. 202, 70 N. E. 87; Truesdale v. Philadelphia Trust Co., 63 Minn. 49, 52, 65 N. W. 133; School District v. Peterson, 74 Minn. 122, 76 N. W. 1126; Hudson v. Wright, 204 Mo. 412, 103 & W.; 8Mulrein v. Smillie, 25 N. Y. App. D. 135, 48 N. Y. S. 994; De-cillia v. Mascelli, 152 N. Y. App. D. 304,136 N. Y. S. 573; Wright v. Franklin Bank, 59 Ohio St. 80, 51 N. E. 876; Rennseleer, etc., R. Co. v. Miller, 47 Vt. 146. Compare Yerkes c. Richards, 170 Pa. 346, 32 Atl. 1089. See further, Sec.313.

83 Judge v. Pfaff, 171 Man. 195, 50 N. E. 524.

84Ala. Code (1907), 6085-6089 (only if the trustee is insolvent, and the trustee may also be held personally); Taylor v. Crook, 136 Ala. 354, 375, 34 So. 905, 96 Am. St. Rep. 26; Dant-der v. Mclnois, 151 Ala. 293, 44 So. 193, 13 L. R. A. {N. S.) 297, 125 Am. St. Rep. 28; Calif. Civ. Code,Sec. 2267; Conn. Gen. Statutes (1902), Sec. 739 (but the trustee may also be held personally); Georgia Code, Secs. 3786 - 3791 (see Bailie v. Carolina Loan Assoc., 100 Ga. 20, 28 S. E. 274; Riggins v. Adair, 105 Ga. 727, 31 S. E. 743; Sanders v. Houston Guano Co., 107 Ga. 49, 55, 32 S. E. 610); Mont. Civ. Code, 5 3020; No. Carolina Code (1905), Secs. 627-629; N. Dak. Comp. L. (1913), Sec. 6305; S. Dak. Civ. Code (1913) ! 1642.

84a Foote v. Cutting, 195 Mass. 66, 60, 80 N. E. 600; United States Trust Co. v. Stanton, 139 N. Y. 531, 34 N. E. 109S. But see Yerkes v. Richards, 170 Fa. 346, 32 Atl 1089.

85 See Bangor v. Peiree, 106 Me. 527, 76 Atl. 946, 29 L. R. A. (N. S.) 770.

86Glenn v. Allison, 68 Md. 527; Shoe & Leather Nat. Bank v. Dix, 123 Mass. 148, 25 Am. Rep. 49; Hussey v Arnold, 185 Mass. 202, 70 N. E. 87; Rand v. Farquhar, 226 Mass. 91, 115 N. E. 286; Packard v. Kingman, 109 Mich. 497, 507, 67 N. W. 651; New v. Nicoll, 73 N. Y. 127, 29 Am. Rep. 1ll; Randall v. Duseubury, 39 N. Y. Super. 174, affd. 63 N. Y. 646; Fehlinger v. Wood, 134 Pa. 517, 523, 19 Atl. 746; Mclntyre v. Williamson, 72 Vt. 183, 47 Atl. 786. It was held by Warrington, J., in Watling v. Lewis, [1911) 1 Ch. 414, that a provision in a trustee's contract excluding all personal liability was repugnant to the promise itself, and therefore void. The same judge followed this decision in in re Robinson's Settlement, but the case was reversed by the Court of Appeal on other grounds in [1912], 1 Ch. 717, and one member of the court at least seemed of the opinion that the trustees were not bound personally in any event.

Whatever the law of England on the subject may be, it seems clear that in the United States, the proposition of the text would everywhere be accepted. But the fact that the instrument creating the trust exempts the trustee from personal liability does not prevent the trustee from being liable if he contracts in a way which is regarded as creating a personal contract. American Smelting Co. v. Converse, 175 Mass. 449, 66 N. E. 594.

87 Gisborn v. Charter Oak L. I. Co., 142 U. S. 326, 35 L. Ed. 1029, 12 S. Ct. 277; King v. Stowell, 211 Mass. 246, 251, 98 N. E. 91; Noyes v. Blakeman, 6 N. Y. 567; New v. Nicoll, 73 N. Y. 127, 29 Am. Rep. Ill; O'Brien v. Jackson, 167 N. Y. 31,33,60 N. E. 238; Fehlinger v. Wood, 134 Pa. 517, 19 Atl. 746; Wadsworth v. Arnold, 24 R. I. 32, 51 Atl. 1041. Cf. Bank of Topeka v. Eaton, 100 Fed. 8, 107 Fed. 1003, 47 C. C. A. 140.

88Williams v. Hathaway, 6 Ch. D. 544; Shoe & Leather Natl. Bank v. Dix, 123 Mass. 148, 26 Am. Rep. 49.

89 Muir v. City of Glasgow Bank, 4 A. C. 337; Durall v. Craig, 2 Wheat. 45, 4 L. Ed. 180; Taylor v. Davis' Adm., 110 U. S. 330, 4 Sup. Ct. 147, 28 L. Ed. 163; Savings A Loan Society or "as trustee but not otherwise" does exclude such liability.90 The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, has had a double effect in changing the law, so far as such instruments are concerned. On the one hand a trustee who is authorized to make a negotiable instrument will not be personally liable, if the body of the instrument or the form of his signature discloses the identity of the trust estate.91 On the other hand, if the trustee was not so authorized, though the form of the instrument would naturally exclude the inference of liability, he is bound.92 A note signed in such a form as to bind the trustee personally may be reformed if both parties intended that the trust estate only should be bound, provided the rights of bona fide purchasers have not intervened.93