The first class is properly called a promise for the benefit of a third person, and the phrase "sole beneficiary" should be reserved for this class. There may conceivably be several promises in a contract and only one or a part of them for a sole beneficiary. As the promisee has no pecuniary interest in the performance of such a promise, he can have, generally speaking, no other intention than to benefit the third person, to give him a right. For this reason he may be called a donee beneficiary.27 A typical illustration is a contract of life insur--ance payable to some one other than the insured. Whatever may be the apparent technical difficulties, it is obvious that justice requires some remedy to be given the beneficiary. The original bargain was convenient and proper, and the law should find a means to enforce it according to its terms. The technical difficulty is twofold. The beneficiary is not a party to the contract, and apart from some special principal governing this class of cases cannot maintain an action. The promisee, though entitled to sue on the promise on ordinary principles of contract, having suffered no pecuniary damage by the failure of the promisor to perform his agreement, it would seem, cannot recover substantial damages;28 and even if it be granted that defence against the promisee 30 and these questions should not be determined in any litigation in which all three interested parties are not joined.31 Any procedure which not only permits but requires this meets the necessities of the case.
27 See 21 Yale. L. 3. 1008 (Corbin).
28 Wert v. Houghton, 4 C. P. D. 197 (but see Lloyds v. Harper, 16 Ch. D. 290; Re Flavell, 25 Ch. D. 89, 97); Peel v. Peel, 17 W. R. 586, per James, V. C; Burbank v. Gould, 15 Me. 118 (overruled in Baldwin v. Emery, 89
Me. 496, 499, 36 Atl. 994); Watson v. Randall, 20 Wend. 201; Adama v. Union R. R. Co., 21 R. I. 134, 137, 42 Atl. 515, 44 L. R. A. 273. See also . Board of Commerce v. Security Trust Co., 225 Fed. 454,463,140 C. C. A. 486; Axtel v. Chase, 77 Ind. 74. Therefore the wrong of the defendant, not the injury to the plaintiff, furnishes the measure of damages, the beneficiary gains nothing thereby; for it is no easier to find a principle requiring the promisee to hold what he recovers as a trustee for the beneficiary than to find a principle allowing a direct recovery by the beneficiary against the promisor.29