The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has held 96 that though a partial assignee may maintain a suit to enforce his assignment, making both assignor and debtor parties, nevertheless, where a creditor has given orders upon his debtor for a part of the debt, thereby making a partial assignment, the debtor might refuse to recognize the assignment and "could at any time have discharged its debt to the plaintiff (the assignor) by paying him the whole sum due, without regard to the rejected orders or liability to their holders;" and that therefore unless the debtor chose to assent to the partial assignment, the assignor could maintain an action against him for the whole claim. This doctrine finds some support in a few other cases.97 Such a doctrine is, however, inconsistent with a recognition of any equitable right in the partial assignee. If he has such a right and the debtor has notice of it, the debtor should be liable if he knowingly destroys the right by paying the assignor, just as one who owes money to a trust estate would continue to be liable if he should pay the trustee, his legal creditor, when he knew that the trustee was about to defraud his cestui que trust. If the debtor is unwilling to pay his debt in separate sums corresponding to the respective interests of the assignor and assignee, he should pay the whole fund into court and ask the court to distribute it among the parties equitably entitled. A settlement with the assignor will not discharge him from liability. The weight of authority supports the conclusion that payment to the assignor will not discharge the debtor.98 Where the partial assignment is to an attorney the case may perhaps be distinguished on the ground that public policy favors the termination of litigation. This reasoning is particularly applicable to claims for torts;99 but even such partial assignments would probably be generally protected99a In jurisdictions where the partial assignee is protected, if the debtor settles with the assignor, with notice of the partial assignment, for less than the full amount of the claim, the assignor must pay the assignee the full amount of his share.1

91 Delaware County Commissioners v. Disbold Safe A Lock Co., 133 U. S. 473, 488,10 S. Ct. 399, 33 L. Ed. 674; Evans v. Durango Land A Coal Co., 80 Fed. 433, 26 C. C. A. 531; Guagler v. Chicago Ac. R, Co., 197 Fed. 79; Schilling v. Mullen, 66 Minn. 122, 56 N. W. 686; Whittemore v. Judd etc. Oil Co., 124 N. Y. 565, 27 N. E. 244, 21 Am. St. Rep. 708; National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Denver etc. R. Co., 44 Utah, 26, 137 Pac. 663; Watson v. Milwaukee etc R. Co., 67 Wis. 332,15 N. W. 468; Ramsey v. Johnson, 8 Wyo. 476, 68 Pac. 766, 80 Am. St. Rep. 948. See also Pueblo v. Dye, 44 Colo. 36, 96 Pac. 969. But see Independent School Districts v. Independent School District, 50 Ia. 322; Pelly v. Bowyer, 7 Bush, 513.

92Trinity County Lumber Co. v. Holt (Tex. Civ. App.), 144 S. W. 1029; Wells v. Crawford, 23 Colo. App. 103, 127 Pac, 914. See also Reid v. Hen-nessy Co., 46 Mont. 462, 124 Pac. 273.

93Thompson v. Gimbel Bros., 71 N Y. Misc. 126, 128 N. Y. S. 210.

94 National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Denver Ac. R. Co., 44 Utah, 26, 137 Pac. 653.

95 See Delaware County v. Diebold Safe A Lock Co., 133 U. S. 473, 10 S. Ct. 399, 33 L. Ed. 674, where the court distinguished partial assignments of contracts for public works from other building contracts.

96 In Thiol v. John Week Lumber Co., 137 Wis. 272, 118 N. W. 802.

97 Kendall v. United States, 7 Wall. 113, 19 L. Ed. 85; Shearer v. Shearer, 137 Ga. 61, 72 S. E. 428; Chapman v. Shattuck, 8 111. 49; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Nichols, 57 III. 464; Eaves v. Chicago etc. R. Co., 200 111. App. 380; Skobis v. Ferge, 102 Wis. 122,78 N. W. 426. See also Sheats v. Markley, 249 Fed. 315, 161 C. C. A. 323; Carter v. Nichols, 58 Vt. 553, 5 Atl. 197. But it may be assumed such courts would all hold with Burditt v. Porter, 63 Vt. 296, 21 Atl. 955, 25 Am. St. Rep. 763, that a creditor of the assignor who has garnished the debt cannot set up that a partial assignment is ineffectual, if the debtor does not wish to object.

98 Liquidation Estates Purchase Co. v. Willoughby, [1898] A. C. 321; Ballinger v. Vates, 26 Colo. App. 116, 140 Pac. 931; Western & Atlantic R, Co. v. Union Investment Co., 128 Ga. 74, 57 S. E. 100; Palmer v. Palmer, 112 Me. 149, 91 Atl. 281; James v. Newton, 142 Mass. 366, 372, 8 N. E. 122, 56 Am. Rep. 692; Schilling v. Mullen, 55 Minn. 122, 66 N. W. 586; A. K. Mclnniss Lumber Co. v. Rather, 111 Miss. 55, 71 So. 264; Bank of Harlem v. Bayonne, 48 N. J. Eq. 246, 21 Atl. 478; Todd v. Meding, 56 N. J. Eq. S3, 38 Atl. 349; Field v. Mayor, 8 N. Y. 179, 57 Am. Dec. 435; Marshall v. Meech, 51 N. Y. 140,10 Am. Rep. 572; Brill v. Tuttle, 81 N. Y. 454, 37 Am. Rep. 515; Fairbanks v. Sargent, 117 N. Y. 320, 330, 331, 22 N. E. 1039, 6 L. R. A. 475; Seiter v. Smith, 105 Tex. 205, 147 S. W. 226; Gulf etc. Ry.