In Adams v. Messinger, 147 Mass. 186, 17 N. E. 491, 9 Am. St. Rep. 679, the court enforced specifically a contract by which the defendant had agreed to furnish and deliver certain patented injectors. It was assumed that they were yet to be made when the contract was entered into but that no skill peculiar to the defendant was required to construct' them, and that they could be made by any intelligent artificer in the metals of which they were composed. The court said: "The details of then-manufacture are given by reference to the patents which are referred to in the agreement, so that no difficulty such as has sometimes been experienced could have been found in describing accurately, and even minutely, the articles to be furnished. Nor are there found in the case at bar any continuous duties to be done, or work to be performed, requiring any permanent supervision, which, as it could not be concluded within a definite and reasonable time, has sometimes been held an obstacle to the enforcement of a contract by the court."

88 Romer, L. J., in Wolverhampton v. Emmons, [1901] 1 K B. 515, 625, paraphrasing Fry on .Specific Performance (3d ed.), 44, 45. Substantially the same statement is made in Wheeling Traction Co. v. Board of CoDMnissioners, 248 Fed. 205, 212, 160 C. C. A. 283.

89 Blackett v. Bates, L. R. 1 Ch.

tracts involving such oversight by equity will be enforced if justice makes it imperative. Therefore where the plaintiff has conveyed land or parted with valuable consideration in return for the promise of a railroad to maintain stations or switching tracks or to stop trains, such contracts have been enforced.90 And in recent years a recognition by the courts of the interests of the public in the performance by public service companies of some of their obligations, has established the principle that where public interests require, equity will decree specific performance of contracts, though they involve a long continued series of acts.91 Even though no public interest is involved, if

117 (furnishing power to draw cars for a period which might extend to twenty-one years); Powell, etc., Goal Co. v: Taffvale Ry. Co., L. R. 9 Ch. 331 (moving switches and signals necessary to enable the plaintiff to ran its cars); Texas & P. R. Co. v. Marshall, etc., Co., 136 U. S. 393, 34 L. Ed. 385,10 Sup. Ct. 846 (maintaining permanently railway offices as agreed. Cf. Tyler v. St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co., 99 Tex. 491, 91 S. W. 1); Louisville, etc., Ry. Co. v. Boden-schatz-Bedford Stone Co., 141 Ind. 251, 39 N. E. 703 (furnishing shipping facilities); Richmond v. Dubuque & Sioux City, etc., R. Co., 33 la. 422 (giving the handling of all through grain); Jones v. Mississippi Farms Co., 116 Miss. 295, 76 So. 880 (operating a railroad); Fort Clinton R. Co. v. Cleveland, etc., R. Co., 13 Oh. St. 544 (operating a railroad).

90 Phillips v. Great Western R. Co., L R. 7 Ch. 409; Taylor v. Florida East Coast R. Co., 54 Fla. 635, 45 So. 574, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 307, 127 Am. St. Rep. 155; Brown v. Western Maryland Ry. Co, (W. Va. 1919), 99 S. E. 457.

91The leading case is Joy v. St. Louis, 138 U. S. 1, 34 L. Ed. 843, 11 Sim. Ct. 243. See also the following cases where the operation of railroads was enforced: Union Pac. E. Co. v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 163

U. S. 564, 16 Sup. Ct. 1173, 41 L. Ed. 265 [affirming 51 Fed. 309, 2 C. C. A. 174, 47 Fed. 15]; In re Lennon, 166 U. S. 648, 41 L. Ed. 1110,17 Sup. Ct. 658; Donovan v. Pennsylvania R., 199 U. S. 279, 26 Sup. Ct. 91, 50 L. Ed. 192; Grand Trunk Western R. Co. v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 141 Fed. 785, 73 C. C. A. 43; Schmidt v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 101. Ky. 441, 41 S. W. 1015, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 666, 38 L. R. A. 809; Prospect Park, etc., R. Co. v. Coney Island, etc., R. Co., 144 N. Y. 152, 39 N. E. 17, 26 L. R. A. 610; Cumberland Valley R. Co. v. Gettysburg, etc., R. Co., 177 Pa. St. 519, 35 Atl. 952; Southern R. Co. v. Franklin, etc., R. Co., 96 Va. 693, 32 S. E. 485, 44 L. R. A. 297. In La Follette v. La Follette Water Co., 252 Fed. 762, 164 C. C. A. 602, a contract for furnishing the water supply of a city was specifically enforced at suit of the water company, though it had a number of years to run. In Chambersburg v. Chambers-burg Ac. R. Co., 258 Pa. 57, 101 Atl. 922, the obligation of a street railway to keep a portion of the highway in repair was specifically enforced. In Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 241 Fed. 162, it was held that a complaint by a railroad company against a telegraph company for the specific performance of a provision of a contract bethe legal remedy under the particular circumstances of the case is clearly inadequate, in recent years some courts at least are disposed to grant relief if possible, though the contract calls for long continued performance, as an instalment contract,92 or a covenant in a lease to heat and light demised premises.93 A disposition has existed, where the court was prepared to give relief calling for continuous performance to do so by a decree, in form negative, though in effect requiring affirmative action; but since the defendant must act, and not simply forbear there seems no reason why the decree should not so state.94 tween them that the telegraph company should transmit free messages pertaining to railroad business on lines not located along the railroad up to a certain amount each year, and thereafter should transmit such messages at one-half its regular rates, stated a case for equity; there being no adequate remedy at law. See also cases where contracts involving various forms of public service were enforced. Montgomery L. & P. Co. v, Montgomery Traction Co., 191 Fed. 657; Armour v. Texas R. Co., 268 Fed. 186 (C. C. A.); Mobile Electric Co. v. Mobile (Ala.), 79 So. 39; Dailey v. New York, 170 N. Y. App. D. 267, 156 N. Y. S. 124, aff'd without opinion 218 N. Y. 666, 113 N. E. 1063; Larchmont v. Larchmont Park, 185 N. Y. App. D. 330, 173 N. Y. S. 32; Great Northern R. v. Sheyenne Tel. Co., 27 N. Dak. 256, 145 N. W. 1062. But see Loan Star Salt Co. v. Texas Short Line R. Co., 99 Tex 434, 90 S. W. 663, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 828; Oconto Electric Co. v. City, 168 Wis. 91, 169 N. W. 293.

92St. Regis Paper Co. v. Santa Clara Lumber Co., 173 N. Y. 149, 65 N. E. 967; Dells Paper & Pulp Co. v. Willow Lumber Co. (Wis.), 173 N. W. 317. See also Buxton v. Lister, 3 Atk. 383. But see Fother-gill v. Rowland, L. R. 17 Eq. 132; Dominion Coal Co. v. Dominion Ac.

Steel Co., [1909] A. C. 293; Davison Chemical Co. v. Baugh Chemical Co., 133 Md. 203, 104 Atl. 404.

93 Jones v. Parker, 163 Mass. 564, 40 N. E. 1044, 47 Am. St Rep. 485. See also New York Ac. R. Co. v. Stoneman (Mass.), 123 N. E. 679.

94 This practice seems to have started with Lord Eldon. In Lane v. Newdigate, 10 Ves. 192, the plaintiff sought the enforcement of a covenant in a lease by which he was entitled to the unimpaired use of a canal and to have it kept in repair. Lord Eldon enjoined the defendant from impeding the plaintiff in his use of the canal, by continuing to keep it out of repair. Lords Lynd-hurst and Brougham in Blakemore v. Glamorganshire Canal Navigation Co., 1 Mylne & K. 154,184, expressed the opinion that it would be better if the jurisdiction were exercised to do so directly rather than in a "roundabout mode," but it was not until Jackson v. Normanby Brick Co., [1899] 1 Ch. 438, that the change in practice was actually made. See also in support of the direct rather than the roundabout decree, Fortescue v. Lostwithiel R. Co,. [1894] 3 Ch. 621, 640; Brown v. Western R. Co. (W. Va.), 99 S. E. 457. Cf. Keith v. National Tel. Co., [1894] 2 Ch. 147; Prospect Park R. Co. v. Coney Island R. Co., 144 N. Y. 152, 39 N. E. 17, 26 L. R. A. 610.