Damages are frequently a wholly inadequate remedy for breach of a promise to render personal services, but two analogous difficulties stand in the way of specific enforcement. (1) Long and minute supervision might be needed to secure the proper execution of the decree; (2) the proper performance of the services to the best of the defendant's ability is uncertain and difficult to gauge. And any attempt to overcome these difficulties might involve too serious an infringement of per-sonal liberty to be tolerable. Therefore such promises are not enforceable by affirmative decree;82 and while they are still executory, counter promises for the conveyance of land, or for other performance within the jurisdiction of equity, are equally unenforceable 83 because of lack of mutuality.84 And in contracts besides those ordinarily designated as contracts of service, it is generally true so far as affirmative relief is concerned, that "Equity will not award specific performance where the duty to be enforced is continuous and reaches over a long period of time, requiring constant supervision by the court." 85 Therefore, "There is no doubt that as a general rule the Court will not enforce specific performance of a building contract." 86 The basis of equity's disinclination to enforce building contracts specifically is the difficulty of enforcing a decree without the expenditure of effort disproportionate to the value of the result. But where the inadequacy of damages is great, and the difficulties not extreme, specific performance will be granted and the tendency in modern times has been increasingly towards granting relief, where under the particular circumstances of the case damages are not an adequate remedy.87 In an Eng-

103 Fed. 860, 43 C. C. A. 381, 51 L. R. A. 292; In re McArdle, 126 Fed. 442; Ellis v. Small, 209 Mass. 147, 95 N. E. 79, 81. An agent who agreed to transfer his agency may be required to do so subject to the consent of the principal to accepting the transferee. Kelsey v. Distler, 141 N. Y. App. D. 78, 126 N. Y. 8. 602.

81 Hopper v.Hopper, 16 N. J. Eq. 147.

82 Clarke v. Price, 2 Wils. Ch. 157; Johnson v. Shrewsbury, etc., R. Co., 3 De 6. M. & G. 914; Shubert v. Woodward, 167 Fed. 47, 92 C. C. A. 509; Blue Point Oyster Co. v. Haagen-son, 209 Fed. 278; Life Preserver Suit Co. v. National life Preserver Co., 252 Fed. 139,164 C. C. A. 251; Roquemore v. Mitchell, 167 Ala. 476, 52 So. 423, 140 Am. St. Rep. 52; EL W. Gossard Co. v. Crosby, 132 la. 155, 109 N. W. 483, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1115; Sims v. VanMeter Lumber Co., 96 Miss. 449, 51 So. 459. Cf. infra, Sec. 1450.

82 Cooper v. Pena, 21 CaL 403; Pacific El. R. Co. v. Campbell-Johnston, 153 CaL 106, 94 Pac. 623; Deita v. Stephenson, 51 Oreg. 596, 95 Pac. 803.

84See wtfro, {1440.

85 Pantages v. Grauman, 191 Fed. 317, 112 C. C. A. 61. See also Dominion Coal Co. v. Dominion etc. Steel Co., [1909] A. C. 293; Warmack v. Major Stave Co., 132 Ark. 173, 200 S. W. 799; Pacific, etc., R. v. Campbell-Johnson, 153 CaL 106, 94 Pac.

623; Rosenkrantz v. Chattahoochee Brick Co., 147 Ga. 730, 95 S. E. 225; Standard Fashion Co. v. Siegel-Cooper Co., 167 N. Y. 60, 51 N. E. 408, 43 L R. A. 854, 68 Am. St. Rep. 749, and cases in the following notes.

86 Romer, L. J, in Wolverhampton 9. Emmons, [1901] 1 K. B. 515, 524. See also South Wales R. Co. v. Wythes, 1 K. A J. 186; Oregonian R. Co. v. Oregon R., etc., Co., 37 Fed. 733; Bromberg v. Eugenotto Constr. Co., 158 Ala. 323, 48 So. 00, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1175; Pacffio Electric R. Co. v. Campbell-Johnson, 153 Cal. 106, 94 Pac. 623; Robinson v. Lather, 134 la. 463, 109 N. W. 775; Madison Athletic Assoc, v. Brittin, 60 N. J. Eq. 160, 46 Atl. 652; Beck p. Allison, 56 N. Y. 366, 15 Am. Rep. 430; Cartwright v. Oregon Elec. R. Co., 88 Oreg. 596, 171 Pac. 1055.

87 In the following cases specific performance was granted: Storer v. Great Western Ry. Co., 2 Y. A C. (C. C.) 48 (building and maintaining an archway); Sanderson v. Cocker-mouth Co., 11 Beav. 497 (making roads and accommodations for cattle); Wolverhampton v. Emmons, [1901] 1 K. B. 515.(building structures on land owned by the defendant of a certain height in consideration of a conveyance which had been made by the plaintiff); American Smelting Ac. Co. v. Bunker Hill Ac. Min. Co., 248 Fed. 172 (disponing of ore which required operation of mines); Wheeling Traction Co. v. Board of Commissioners, 248 Fed. 205,160 C. C. A. 283 (pav-ing streets); Hooker v. Savannah, etc., R. Co., 69 Ala. 529 (grading streets); Ross v. Purse, 17 Col. 24, 28 Pac. 473 digging a well); Flege v. Covington, etc., Railroad Co., 122 Ky. 348,91S. W. 738, 121 Amer. St. Rep. 463 (building a retaining wall); Jones v. Parker, 163 Mass. 564, 40 N. E. 1044, 47 Am. St. Rep. 485 (installing apparatus for heating and lighting leased premises); Hubbard v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 63 Mo. 68 (building a depot); Gregory v. Ingwersen, 32 N. J. Eq. 199 (building steps); Post v. West Shore Co., 123 N. Y. 580, 26 N. E. 7 (building a road. Cf. Conger v. New York, etc., Co., 120 N. Y. 29, 23 N. E. 983); Strauss v. Estates of Long Beach, 187 N. Y. App. D. 876, 176 N. Y. S. 447 (constructing a sewer, where defendant controlled the land on which it was contracted to be built, Chambersburg v. Chambers-burg Ac. R. 258 Pa. 57, 101 Atl. 922 (repairing road); Grubb v. Starkey, 90 Va. 831, 20 S. E. 784 (laying a water pipe). But see the following cases where equitable relief was denied: Robinson v. Luther, 134 la. 463, 107 N. W. 775 (building a drain); Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Washburn, 25 Ind. 259 (fencing a railroad); Columbus, etc., R. Co. v. Watson, 26 Ind. 50 ((fencing a railroad); McCarter lish case the requirements for specific performance of such contracts have been thus stated: "The first is that the building work, of which [the plaintiff] seeks to enforce the performance, is defined by the contract; that is to say, that the particulars of the work are so far definitely ascertained that the Court can sufficiently see what is the exact nature of the work of which it is asked to order the performance. The second is that the plaintiff has a Substantial interest in having the contract performed, which is of such a nature that he cannot adequately be compensated for breach of the contract by damages. The third is that the defendant has by the contract obtained possession of land on which the work is contracted to be done.88 But not all American decisions where relief has been granted fulfil the third requisite, which seems merely one illustration of a situation where the second requisite is fulfilled. The indisposition of equity to grant specific performance of acts which require time for their performance, such as building contracts, is increased where a continuous series of acts must be performed according to the terms of the contract for an indefinite period of time. Thus contracts which call for the operation of a railroad in a particular way for a considerable or indefinite time have not generally been enforced.89 But conv. Armstrong, 32 S. C. 203, 601, 10 S. E. 963, 11 S. E. 634, 8 L. R. A. 626 (building and maintaining a drain).