775, 33 8. E. 666, the court reached a contrary conclusion quoting from Jones d. Glover, S3 Ga. 484, 487, 21 S. E. 50. "In order to infer an equitable assignment, such facta or circumstances must appear as would not only raise an equity between the assignor and assignee, but show that the parties contemplated an immediate change of ownership with respect to the particular fund in question, not a change of ownership when the fund should be collected or realized, but at the time of the transaction relied upon to constitute the assignment." But the true test is whether an immediate power is given to collect the money when it is due. If an immediate change of ownership must necessarily have been contemplated, an assignment of a future claim would never be possible unless the parties conceived themselves able to transfer immediately ownership to something not then existing. Cf. Kingsbury v. Bunill, 151 Mass. 19ft, 24 N. E. 36.
26Wylie v. Coke, 15 How. 415, 14 L. Ed. 753; In re Paschal, 10 Wall. 483, 19 L. Ed. 992; Canty v. Latterner, 31 Minn. 238, 17 N. W. 385; Torney v. Wilson, 45 N. J. L. 282; Marshall v. Meech, 51 N. Y. 140, 10 Am. Rep. 572; Wright v. Wright, 70 N. Y. 98; Fatten v. Wilson, 34 Pa. St. 29ft; Milmo Nat. Bank v. Convery, 8 Tex. Civ. App. 181, 27 S. W. 828.
27De Winter v. Thomas, 34 App. Cas. D. C. 80, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 634. In Ingersoll v. Coram, 211 U. S. 335,29 S. Ct. 92, 53 L. Ed. 208, however, it was held a lien was created though the payment was to be made by the present assignment to secure or pay an antecedent debt is valid. No other consideration is needed, but a promise to make such an assignment is not even a contract to assign, unless some requested promise or performance is given in exchange. Assuming, however, that sufficient consideration for the promise is given to create a contract, whether such a contract to make an assignment in the future or to pay a debt in the future out of a particular fund should give rise to an equitable lien involves the same question that arises wherever there is a contract to transfer in the future personal property not ordinarily the subject of specific performance. How far such a contract may give rise to equitable rights in the property is a question upon which there is much conflict of authority.28 It has been said that" The doctrine may be stated in its most general form that every express executory agreement in writing, whereby the contracting party sufficiently indicates an intention to make some particular property, real or personal, or fund, therein described or identified, a security for a debt or other obligation, or whereby the party promises to convey or assign or transfer the property as security, creates an equitable lien upon the property so indicated, which is enforceable against the property in the hands not only of the original contractor, but of his heirs, administrators, executors, voluntary assignees and purchasers or encumbrancers with notice."29 This statement certainly goes beyond the law of a number of American jurisdictions.30 As specifically applied to promises to assign a fund in the future the statement would involve the consequence that an equitable hen upon the fund would be created by such a promise to assign in the future a claim as security for a debt though not by a promise to assign the claim in payment of the debt. In fact there are a few decisions where an executory promise has been held to create an immediate equitable right, but no distinction is taken in these cases between a promise to assign as security original creditor when he acquired the fund. The decision seems inconsistent with Christmas v. Russell, 14 Wall. 69, 20 L. Ed. 762; and Trist v. Child, 21 Wall. 441, 22 L. Ed. 623.
28See Williston, Sales, Sec.138; 19 Harv. L. Rev. 667.
29 3 Pomeroy Eq. Jurisprudence, Sec. 1235, quoted with approval as a basis for decision in Walker v. Brown, 165 U. S. 654, 655, 41 L. Ed. 865, 17 S. Ct.453.
30 See 19 Harv. L. Rev. 557.
31 In Thompson v. Erie Railroad, 207 N. Y. 171, 100 N. E. 791, it became important to decide whether the date of an assignment was to be regarded as the date when a written assignment was delivered or a prior date when a contract to assign was made. The court said at page 180, "It may be reasonably assumed that an agreement to assign B's salary was made at the time H. & Co. purchased the note. Such firm thereby became the equitable owner of B's salary as of that day." In this case the promised assignment was for security, but the importance of that was not suggested by the court, and in Deleter v. Gordon, 11 App. Cas. D. C. 60, an agreement to assign a part of a claim in the future was held to give an equitable right to the promisee though the assignment was not to be as security but in payment of an obligation. See also Greey v. Docken-dorff, 231 U. S. 513, 34 S. Ct. 166, 58
L. Ed. 339; Citizens' Loan Assoc, v. Boston ft Maine R. Co., 196 Mass. 528, 530, 531, 82 N. E. 696,14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1026, 124 Am. St. Rep. 584; Crumlish v. Central Imp. Co., 38 W. Va, 390, 18 S. E. 456, 23 L. R. A. 120, 45 Am. St. Rep. 872.
32 Supra, Sec. 428,
33 It was held in Benford v. Banner, 40 Pa. 9, 80 American Dec. 545, that a promise to assign post-office warrants in the future gave no ownership in the warrants to the promisee.
34 This is necessarily involved in those of the decisions cited supra, Sec. 428, where there was present consideration for the promise in question, since those cases though generally stating merely that such a promise did not amount to a partial assignment involved the broad question whether the promisee had any right whatever in the fund. Moreover the New York Court of Appeals has held that - " Whatever