Jurisdictions which deny to one who has contracted for the purchase of real estate other relief against a vendor free from moral fault than a restoration of any payments and expenses which may have been incurred,87 would apply the same rule to a contract to give a lease;88 but " where under such a contract the lessor has prevented the lessee from entering and occupying the leased premises, or where an owner of property has broken his agreement to give a lease thereof to a prospective tenant, the measure of damages in an action for this breach of contract, if no rent has been paid and if nothing further appears, is the difference between the actual value of the leasehold estate that should have been enjoyed and the agreed rental that was to have been paid therefor.89 This value, as in all cases in which the value of real estate or an interest therein is concerned, means the value for any and all uses to which the property is adapted and can readily be applied. If it is capable of being used in some particular way and has an enhanced value by reason of its availability for such use, the fact may be shown, and the value to be ascertained is the value thus enhanced; not because this is any other or greater value than the real market value of the property, but because it is the real value which is the subject of inquiry, and that value must depend much upon the nature of the property and its availability or adaptability for advantageous or profitable use. This rule generally has been applied where the value of property taken for a public use is to be determined, but it is not limited to such cases.90 The value of a leasehold estate, like that of any interest, is to be determined with reference to the use to which it can be most advantageously put."91 For breach by the tenant of an agreement to hire property, the measure of damages is the difference between the agreed rent under the contract, and the rental value of the property, which may be shown by the rent which was actually obtained by a new lease, if the plaintiff used diligence in obtaining the best rent possible.92
85 Collins v. Karatopsky, 36 Ark. 316, 329; Retaking v. Goodell, 161 la. 404, 133 N. W. 774, 143 N. W. 573; Campbell v. Miltenberger, 26 La. Ann. 72; Leavitt v. Fletcher, 10 Allen, 119; Flynn v. Trask, 11 Allen, 550; Tuttle v. Gilbert Mfg. Co., 145 Mass. 169, 13 N. E. 465; Reiner v. Jones, 38 N. Y. App. D. 441, 56 N. Y. S. 423; Goldberg v. Besdine, 76 N. Y. App. D. 451, 78 N. Y. 8. 776; Cantrell v. Fowler, 32 S. C. 589, 10 8. E. 934; Brown v. Toronto General Hospital, 23 Ont. 599.
86 Culver v. Hill, 68 Ala. 66, 44 Am. Rep. 134; Miller p. Sullivan, 77 Kans. 252, 94 Pac. 266, 16 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 737; Phillips v. Ehrmann, 8 N. Y. Misc. 39, 28 N. Y. 8. 519; Blumenthal v. Prescott, 70 N. Y. App. Div. 560, 75
N. Y. 8. 710; Parker v. Meadows, 86 Tenn. 181, 6 8. W. 49.
87 See supra, J 1399.
88 Noyes v. Anderson, 1 Duer, 342, and see cases in the preceding section, n. 77.
89 Neal v. Jefferson, 212 Mass. 517, 522, 99 N. E. 334, 41 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 387, Ann. Cas. 1913 D. 205, citing Jewett v. Brooks, 134 Mass. 505; Riley v. Hale, 158 Mass. 240, 33 N. E. 491; Dodds v. Hakes, 114 N. Y. 260, 21 N. E. 398; Giles v. OToole, 4 Barb. 261; Denison v. Ford, 10 Daly, 412; Cilley v. Hawkins, 48 HI. 308; Bern-hard v. Curtis, 75 Conn. 476, 54 AtL 213; Leslie E. Brooks Co. v. Long, 67 Fla. 68, 64 So. 452; Favar v. Riverview Park, 144 III App. 86; Skinner v.
Gibeon, 86 Kan. 431, 121 Pao. 513; Shuberi v. Sonheim, 138 N. Y. App. Div. 800,123 N. Y. S. 529; Wertheimer v. Rosenbaum (N. Y. Misc.), 146 N. Y. 8.177; Sloan v. Hart, 150 N. C. 269, 63 8. E. 1037, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 239,134 Am. St Rep. 911; Gross v. Heckert, 120 Wis. 314, 97 N. W. 952.
90 Neal v. Jefferson, 212 Mass. 517, 99 N. E. 334, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 387, Ann. Gaa. 1913 D. 205, citing Providence & Worcester Railroad v. Worcester, 155 Mass. 35, 29 N. E. 56; May-Lard v. Northampton, 157 Mass. 218, 31 N. K 1062; Blaney v. Salem, 160 Mass. 303, 35 N. E. 858; Sargent v. Merrimac, 196 Mass. 171, 81 N. E. 970,11L. R. A. (N. S.) 996,124 Am. St. Rep. 528. (See also Hodges v. Fries, 34 Ha. 63, 15 So. 682; McCafferty o. Griswold, 99 Fa. 270.)
91 Neal v. Jefferson, 212 Mass. 517, 99 N. R 334, 41 L. R. A. (N. R) 387,
Ann. Gas. 1913 D. 205;.dting Manning v. Fitch, 138 Mass. 273; Tufts v. Atlantic Telegraph Co., 151 Mass. 269, 23 N. E. 844. The court added: "In this case both parties agreed that the property could best be used as a hotel for winter visitors, and that it was intended to be so used; and if that was so, the measure of damages was prima facie the value of the property for this use during the two years after June 1, 1910, over and above the rent which was to be paid therefor. That there might be some difficulty in fixing this value, or that its determination must be partly the result of an estimate rather than of an exact computation, does not affect the application of the rule. Magnolia Metal Go. v. Gale, 189 Mass. 124,133,75 N. E. 219; Hunt v. Boston Elevated Railway, 199 Mass. 220, 225, 85 N. E. 446; Page tr. Johnston, 205 Mass. 274,278,91 N. E. 214. Putting the case in another way, the plaintiff has been prevented from making that use of the property which it was contemplated that he should make, and he is entitled to the damages which thus have been caused to him, Townsend v. Nickerson Wharf Co., 171 Mass. 501, 503; Eostopolos v. Pes-setti, 207 Mass. 277,93 N. E. 571, Ann. Gas. 1912 A. 859; Snow v. Pulitser, 142 N. Y. 263, 36 N. E 1059; Stewart v. Lanier House Co., 75 Ga. 582."