As has been seen, a vendor who is not able to convey a perfect title, or whose ability to perform is deficient in some particular, can, nevertheless, enforce a contract specifically with compensation sufficient to make good the incompleteness of his performance provided the defect is not great, but only-subject to this proviso.80 A purchaser, on the other hand, can require defective specific performance with abatement of the price or with compensation, without regard to the extent of the deficiency, unless when he entered into the contract he was aware that the vendor was unable to fulfil the contract.81

78 Sec supra, Sec.879.

79 Hoggart v. Scott, 1 Rubs. A M. 293; Wylson v. Dunn, 34 Ch. Div. 509; Halkett v. Dudley, [1907] 1 Ch. 590; Hepburn v. Dunlop, 1 Wheat 179, 4 L. Ed. 65; Day v. Mountain, 137 Fed. 756, 70 G. C. A. 190; Mackey Wall Plaster Co. v. United States Gypsum Co., 244 Fed. 275; Gibson v. Brown, 214 11I. 330, 73 N. E. 578; Guild v. Atchison, etc., R. Co., 57 Kan. 70, 45 Pac. 82, 33 L. R. A. 77, 57 Am. St. Rep. 312; Logan v. Bull, 78 Ky. 607; Maryland Constr. Co. v. Kuper, 90 Md. 529, 542, 45 Atl. 197; Dresel v. Jordan, 104 Mass. 407; Luckett v. Williamson, 37 Mo. 388, 395; Scannell v. American Soda Fountain Co., 161 Mo. 606, 61 S. W. 889; Johnson v.Higgins, 77 Neb. 35,108 N. W. 168; Oakey v. Cook, 41 N. J. Eq. 350, 7 Atl. 495; Van Riper v. Wicker-sham, 77 N. J. Eq. 232, 76 Atl. 1029, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 25, Ann. Cas. 1912 A. 319; Jenkins v. Fahey, 73 N. Y. 355; Wilson v. Tappan, 6 Ohio, 172; Armstrong v. Maryland Coal

Co., 67 W. Va. 589, 69 S. E. 195. See also Blanton v. Kentucky Ac. Warehouse Co., 120 Fed. 318 s. c sub nam. 149 Fed. 31, 80 C. C. A. 343; and supra, Sec.852. A few contrary decisions baaed on lack of mutuality are not to be supported. Gage v. Cummings, 209 111. 120, 70 N. E. 679 (much qualified by Gibson v. Brown, 214 HI. 330, 73 N. E. 578); Luse v. Deit, 46 la. 205. See also Norris v. Fox, 45 Fed. 406; Ten Eyck v. Manning, 52 N. J. Eq. 47, 27 Atl. 900.

80 See supra, Sec.844.

81 Barnes v. Wood, L. R. 8 Eq. 424; Horrocks v. Rigby, 9 Ch. Div. 180; Burrow v. Scammell, 19 Ch. D. 175; Townsend v. Vanderwerker, 160 U. S. 171, 40 L. Ed. 383, 16 Sup. Ct. 258; Dixon v. Anderson, 252 Fed. 694,164 C. C. A. 634; Bogan v. Daugh-drill, 51 Ala. 312; Bonner v. little, 38 Ark. 397; Swain v. Bumette, 76 Cal. 299, 18 Pac. 394; Cochrane 0. Justice Co., 16 Colo. 415, 26 Pac 780; Knox v. Spratt, 23 Fla. 64, 66,

In a few cases where the defect in title is extreme the purchaser has been denied relief.82 Especially this has been held when the vendor was unable to obtain release of an inchoate right of dower.83 But many jurisdictions allow specific performance,

0 So. 924; Phinisy v. Guernsey, 111 Ga. 346, 36 S. E. 796, 50 L. R. A. 680; Moore v. Gariglietti, 228 111. 143, 81 N. E. 826; Kuhn v. Eppstein, 219 11I. 154,76 N. E. 145,2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 884; Wilson v. Brumfield, 8 Blackf. 146; Townsend v. Blanchard, 117 Iowa, 36, 90 N. W. 519; Pingree v. Coffin, 12 Gray, 288, 316; Covell v. Cole, 16 Mich. 223; Wilkinson v. Kneeland, 125 Mich. 261, 84 N. W. 142; Melin v. Woolley, 103 Minn. 498, 115 N. W. 654, 946, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 595; Chambliss v. Person, 77 Miss. 806, 28 So. 21; Luckett v. Williamson, 31 Mo. 54; Lanyon 0. Chesney, 186 Mo. 540, 85 S. W. 568; Borden v. Curtis, 48 N. J. Eq. 120, 21 Atl. 472; Keator v. Brown, 57 N. J. Eq. 600, 42 Atl. 278; Campbell v. Hough, 73 N. J. Eq. 601, 68 Atl. 759; Ferrell v. Bork, 76 N. J. Eq. 615, 79 Atl.. 897; Jersey City v. Hynn, 74 N. J. Eq. 104, 70 Atl. 497; Waters v. Travis, 9 Johns. 450; Boet-wick v. Beach, 103 N. Y. 414, 9 N. E. 41; Palmer v. Gould, 144 N. Y. 671, 39 N. E. 378; Henry 0. Liles, 2 Ired. Eq. 407; Tillery v. Land, 136 N. C. 537, 48 S. E. 824; Ketchum v. Stout, 20 Oh. St. 453, 459; Lucas v. Scott, 41 Oh. St. 636, 640; Napier v. Darlington, 70 Pa. 64; Payne v. Melton, 69 8. C. 370, 48 S. E. 277; Harbers 0. Gadsden, 6 Rich. Eq. 284, 62 Am. Dec 390; Moses v. Wallace, 7 Lea, 413; Austin 0. Ewell, 25 Tex. 403; Roberta' Heirs v. Lovejoy, 60 Tex. 258; Dunsmore v. Lyle, 87 Va. 391, 393, 12 S. E. 610; Morgan 0. Brest, 34 W. Va. 332, 12 S. E. 710; Garrett 0. Goff, 61 W. Va. 221, 56 S. E. 351; Lathrop v. Columbia Collieries Co., 70 W. Va. 58, 73 S. E. 299; Docter 0. Hellberg, 65 Wis. 415, 27 N. W.

176; Connor v. Potts, [1897] 1 Ir. 534; Stammers v. O'Donahue, 28' Grant Ch. (Up. Can.) 207.

82 Phillips v. Stanch, 20 Mich. 369; Hall v. Loomis, 63 Mich. 709, 30 N. W. 374; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Diir-ant, 44 Minn. 361, 46 N. W. 676; Corby v. Drew, 55 N. J. Eq. 387, 36 Atl. 827; Eickwort v. Powers, 17 N. Y. S. 137.

83 In Kuratli 0. Jackson, 60 Or. 203, 210, 118 Pac. 192, 1013, 38 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 1195, Ann. Gas. 1914 A. 203, the court said: "It is said in Riess's Appeal, 73 Pa. 485, 491, that the dower right of the widow is of such a contingent' nature, depending as it does upon her surviving her husband, as well as her continuing in life after his death, that no abatement in the price can be made which would be just to both parties, without in effect making a new contract for them; a contract which, perhaps in the first instance, neither party would have agreed to, certainly not the vendor. This is the holding in Aiple-Hemmelmann, etc., Co. v. Spel-brink, 211 Mo. 671, 111 S. W. 480, in which the opinion is exhaustive, and is supported by the authorities which are there collated. [The decision is overruled by Tebeau v. Ridge, 261 Mo. 547, 170 S. W. 871, L. R. A. 1915 C. 367.] The following cases support that view: Reilly v. Smith, 25 N. J. Eq. 158: Riess's Appeal, 73 Pa. 485; Fortune v. Watkins, 94 N. C. 304, 315; Cowan v. Kane, 211 111. 572, 71 N. E. 1097; Sternberger v. McGovern, 56 N. Y. 12, 19; Lucas v. Scott, 41 Oh. St. 641; Graybill v. Brugh, 89 Va. 895, 899, 17 S. E. 558, 21 L. R. A. 133, 37 Am. St. Rep. 894; Barbour v. Hickey, 2 App. D. C. 207, with compensation in such a case,84 and there seems little reason for making any exception to the general rule merely because the deficiency is extreme; and the purchaser should be and has been allowed to enforce the contract in such a case.85 The only proper ground for refusing a decree with compensation is that no exact equivalent in compensation is possible, and ft may be urged with some force that this is true where the defect in question is an inchoate right of dower. It is often objected that where the defect is extreme equity would be enforcing a contract which the parties did not make if it gave specific enforcement of part with compensation for the defect. If this objection were sound it would be fatal to any decree for less than the entire promised performance with compensation for the remainder. Equity has no more right to enforce as a contract something a little different from that which the parties undertook than one which is widely different. But the objection is unsound: The rule of equity requiring complete equitable relief if any is to be given,86 is merely one of expediency. By the terms of this contract the purchaser is entitled, on paying the contract price for entire performance, to receive such partial performance as the vendor can give, and the purchaser after thus carrying out the bargain would also have a right of action against the vendor for the latter's failure to perform in full. A court of equity in giving relief with compensation is merely disposing in one suit of the two rights of the purchaser. In jurisdictions where damages for breach of contract by a vendor are restricted to a recovery of the purchase money 87 the damage allowed a purchaser who obtained specific performance with compensation, should be a proportional part of

24 L. R. A. 763; Plum v. Mitchell, 16 Ky. L. Rep. 162, 26 S. W. 391.

"Others hold that, if the vendee had knowledge that the vendor was married, specific performance with abatement will not be decreed. Lucas v. Scott, 41 Ohio St. 641; SavingB Bank Go. v. Parisette, 68 Ohio St. 450, 67 N. E. 896, 96 Am. St. Rep. 672; Downer v. Church, 44 N. Y. 647; Fortune v. Watkins, 94 N. C. 304, 315." This was the decision in the purchase price. If the purchaser when he entered into the contract knew of the facts which subsequently prevented the vendor from conveying a perfect title, no compensation is allowed the purchaser who seeks specific performance.88

Kuratli v. Jackson, 60 Oreg. 203, 118 Pac. 192, 1013, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1195, Ann. Cas. 1914 A. 203.

84 See supra, Sec.1422.

85 Jones v. Evans, 17 L. J. Ch. 469; Oceanic Co. v. Sutherbury, 16 Ch. D. 236, 246; Bass v. Giliiland'a Heirs, 5 Ala. 761; Bogan v. Daughdrill, 51 Ala. 312; Napier v. Darlington, 70 Pa. 64.

86 See supra, Sec. 1430.

87 See supra, Sec. 1399.