There is felt by the courts to be "a certain anomaly in granting the half way relief of an injunction . . . when the court is not prepared to enforce the performance to accomplish which indirectly is the only object of the negative decree."61 This anomaly may easily be overemphasized. It might well be asked: Is the contract one which equity would enforce as a whole, if it were not for inherent difficulties or technical rules, and if so will the partial enforcement of the contract by injunction probably lead to the performance of the whole, or at least give the plaintiff a fuller measure of relief than he could otherwise obtain, and impose no undue penalty on the defendant? Contracts for personal services are not ordinarily enforceable specifically,62 but the reason is often not because it is undesirable if damages are inadequate relief, but because of the inherent difficulties in enforcing a decree to perform the services. There is no inherent difficulty, however, in the enforcement of an injunction which goes no farther than to prohibit entering into other employment.

If, however, the services require no special skill, there is no occasion for granting any equitable relief. Damages are an adequate remedy, and, therefore, the employer will not be granted an injunction.63 Where services contracted for are of defendant's performance of his negative obligation has no value to the plaintiff in itself an injunction will not generally be granted.68 The enforcement of a negative promise of vital importance has not been confined to contracts of employment. Thus the use of a vessel in a way different from that agreed upon in a charter party has been enjoined;69 one who had contracted to take his "whole supply" of electricity from the plaintiff has been enjoined from taking a supply from another70 and the same principle has been applied to other contracts.71

Co. v. Schmisseur, 135 111. 371, 25 N. E. 795; Southern, etc., Co. v. Garden City Sand Co., 223 111. 616, 79 N. E. 313, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 446; Carlson v. Koerner, 226 111. 15, 80 N. E. 562. See the criticism of the Illinois decisions by Professor Scho-field in 2 111. L. Rev. 217.

61 Javierre v. Central Altagracia, 217 U. S. 502, 508,30 S. Ct. 598, 600, 54 L. Ed. 859, per Holmes, J., quoted and applied in Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 251 Fed. 559, 163 C. C. A. 553.

62 See supra, Sec. 1423.

63 Cochrane v. Exchange Tel. Co., a special character and cannot properly be performed by others than the promisor, damages are inadequate, and injunctions have often been granted prohibiting an employee from entering into engagements inconsistent with his contract with the plaintiff.64 This principle has been frequently applied to the contracts of actors and singers.65 It has also been applied to a newspaper correspondent under exceptional circumstances,66 and to a baseball player of extraordinary reputation.67 In most of the decisions, however, the negative undertaking of the defendant had importance to the plaintiff apart from the pressure which its enforcement would put upon the defendant to perform his affirmative undertaking, and if the

65 L. J. Ch. 334; Arthur v. Oakes. 63 Fed. 310, 11 C. C. A. 209, 25 L. R, A 414; Kennerley v. Simonds, 247 Fed. 822; Rogers Mfg. Co. v. Rogers, 58 Conn. 356, 20 Ail. 467, 7 L. R. A. 779, 18 Am. St. Rep. 278; Simms v. Burnette, 55 Fla. 702, 46 So. 90, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 389, 127 Am. St. Rep. 201; Burney v. Ryle, 91 Ga. 701, 17 S. E. 986; H. W. Gossard Co. v. Crosby, 132 la. 155, 109 N. W. 483, 6LR.A. (N. S.) 1115; Rosenstein v. Zentz, 118 Md. 564, 85 Atl. 675, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 63; E. Jaccard Jewelry Co. v. O'Brien, 70 Mo. App. 432; Sternberg v. O'Brien, 48 N. J. Eq. 370, 22 Atl. 348; Taylor Iron & Steel Co. v. Nichols, 73 N. J. Eq. 684, 69 Atl. 186, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 933, 133 Am. St. Rep. 753; Driver v. Smith, 89 N. J. Eq. 339, 104 Atl. 717; Kessler v. ChappeUe, 73 N. Y. App. Div. 447, 77 N. Y. S. 285; Columbia College v. Tunberg, 64 Wash. 19,116 Pac. 280.

64 Montague v. Flockton, L. R. 16 Eq. 189; California Bank v. Fresno Canal, etc., Co., 53 Cal. 201; Rogers Mfg. Co. v. Rogers, 58 Conn. 356, 20 AtL 467, 7 L. R. A. 779, 18 Am. St. Rep. 278; Myers v. Steel Machine Co., 67 N. J. Eq. 300, 57 Atl. 1080; Taylor Iron & Steel Co. v. Nichols, 73 N. J. Eq. 684, 691, 69 Atl. 186,

24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 933, 133 Am. St. 753; Posner Co. v. Jackson, 223 N. Y. 325, 119 N. E. 573; Cort v. Lassard, 18 Oreg. 221, 22 Pac. 1054, 6 L. R. A. 653, 17 Am. St. Rep. 726; Philadelphia Ball Club v. Lajoie, 202 Pa. 210, 51 Atl. 973, 58 L. R. A. 227, 90 Am. St. Rep. 627. As to the discretionary character of the remedy, see Edmundson-Randle Drug Co. v. Partin Mfg. Co. (Ala.), 75 So. 966; Driver v. Smith, 89 N. J. Eq. 339, 104 Atl. 717.

65 The leading case is Lumley v. Wagner, 1 De G. McN. & G. 604, stated supra, Sec. 1447. To the same effect, see: Grimston v. Cunningham, [1894] 1 Q. B. 125; McCaull v. Bra-ham, 16 Fed. 37; Duff v. Russell, 133 N. Y. 678, 31 N. E. 622; Cort v. Lassard, 18 Oreg. 221, 22 Pac. 1054, 6 L. R. A. 653, 17 Am. St. Rep. 726. But the defendant must be a person of exceptional artistic ability or reputation to justify the relief. Carter r. Ferguson, 58 Hun, 569, 12 N. Y. S. 580; Cort v. Lassard, 18 Oreg. 221, 22 Pac. 1054, 6 L. R. A. 653, 17 Am. St. Rep. 726.

66 Tribune Assoc, v. Simonds (N. J. Eq.), 104 Atl. 386.

67 Philadelphia Ball Club v. Lajoie, 202 Pa. St. 210, 51 Atl. 973, 55 L. R. A. 227, 90 Am. St. Rep. 627.

68 In De Pol v. Sohlke, 7 Rob. Super. (N. Y.). 280, an injunction was refused restraining a 0danseuse from appearing in New York on the ground that the plaintiff had no theatre there and would not be injured by her appearance.

69 DeMattos p. Gibson, 4 De G. & J. 276; Messageries Imperiales Co. v. Baines, 7 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 763. Whether the doctrine of these cases would now be followed in England unless there were an express negative covenant may be doubted in view of the decision of Whitwood Chemical Co. v. Hardman, [1891] 2 Ch. 416.

70 Metropolitan Electric Supply Co. v. Ginder [1901] 2 Ch. 799. Hills v. Croll, 2 Phillips, 60, seems overruled. See Catt v. Tourle, L. R. 4 Ch. 654.

71 In Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U. S. 1, 43 L. Ed. 341, 19 Sup. Ct..77, a city had contracted to take its water supply from a water company and had agreed in the contract that it would not establish a system of its own. It was enjoined from issuing bonds for that purpose. In Dailey v. New York, 170 N. Y. App. D. 267, 156 N. Y. S. 124, affd. without opinion 218 N. Y. 665, 113 N. E. 1053, the plaintiffs used dumping scows for the disposal of the refuse of New York streets under a contract with the city. The city, dissatisfied with the scows, notified the plaintiff that their use would not be permitted. The court enjoined the defendant from refusing to deliver the refuse to the plaintiffs upon these scows.

In Alpers v. City and County of San Francisco, 32 Fed. 503, the plaintiff had a contract with San Francisco giving him the exclusive privilege for twenty years of having and removing the carcasses of all dead animals not slain for food. The board of supervisors having taken steps to obtain bids from parties desirous of obtaining the car-casses of dogB killed by the pound-keeper, the plaintiff applied for an injunction restraining the municipality from passing any ordinance impairing the obligation of his contract, and restraining the poundkeeper from delivering the carcasses of animals to any other person. The injunction against the poundkeeper was granted. See also Star Chronicle Pub. Co. v. New York Evening Post, 256 Fed. 435, 167 C. C. A. 563. But aee Welty v. Jacobs, 171 11I. 624, 49 N. E. 723, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 98; Baxtholomae Ac. Co. v. Modselewski, 260 I1L 539, 109 N. E. 1058. In Butterick Publishing Co. v. Fisher, 203 Mass. 122, 89 N. E. 189, 133 Am. St. Rep. 283, the defendant who was agent for the sale of the plaintiff's patterns had contracted not to sell or permit to be sold on his premises any other make of patterns.