The seller or lessor of property as distinguished from a business or good will may by a restrictive promise reasonably limited agree to refrain from himself engaging in a business or from disposing of his property in such a way that others can engage in a business which would impair the value of the property to the buyer for the purpose for which he intended to use it,78 or from selling other property remaining in his hands at athe most stringent manner for exclusive use of the lessor's machinery for a period of seventeen years in all of the processes of manufacture by the lessee. It may be urged that however lawful the lessor's monopoly in the property leased, his right to impose conditions or covenants in return for its use cannot include the privilege of thereby securing an unlawful monopoly in regard to other articles. Where the effect of the covenant is for a short time and narrowly limited in space and will not produce a monopoly, its provisions for exclusive dealing are not objectionable. Thus a covenant by a lessee to sell no beer, except that of a particular brewer, has also been upheld.87
77 S. Jarvis Adams Co. v. Knapp, 121 Fed. 34, 58 C. C. A. 1; Robinson v. Suburban Brick Co., 127 Fed. 804, 62 C. C. A. 484; Davis v. Booth, 131 Fed. 31, 66 C. C. A. 269; Barrows v. McMurtry, 54 Colo. 432, 131 Pac. 430; Holtman v. Knowles, 141 Ga. 613, 81 S. E. 852; Up River Ice Co. v. Denier, 114 Mich. 296, 72 N. W. 157, 68 Am. St. Rep. 480; Buckhout v. Witwer, 157 Mich. 406, 409, 122 N. W. 184, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 506; Kronschnabel-Smith Co. v. Kronschnabel, 87 Minn. 230, 91 N. W. 892; Anders v. Gardner, 151 N. C. 604,66 S. E. 665; Bradford v. Furniture Co., 115 Tenn. 610, 92 S. W. 1104, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 979; Kradwell v. Thiesen, 131 Wis. 97, 111 N. W. 233. Under a local statute (see supra, Sec. 1639, n. 60), the California court felt constrained to reach a different conclusion. Merchants' Ad Sign Co. v. Sterling, 124 Gal. 429, 57 Pac. 468, 46 L. R. A. 142, 71 Am. St. Rep. 94; Dodge Stationery Co. v. Dodge, 145 Cal. 380, 78 Pac. 879. But the Michigan court, construing a similar statute followed the rule of the common law. Buckhout v.
Witwer, 157 Mich. 406, 122 N. W. 184, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 506.
78 Altaian v. Royal Aquarium Soc., 3 Ch. D. 228; Holloway v. mil,  2 Ch. 612; Oregon Steam Nav. Co. v. Winsor, 20 Wall. 64, 22 L. Ed. 315; Hitchcock v. Anthony, 83 Fed. 779, 28 C. C. A. 80; Fleischman v. Rahmstorf, 226 Fed. 443, 141 C. C. A. 273; Morris v. Tuscaloosa Mfg. Co., 83 Ala. 565, 3, So. 689; Harris v. Theus, 149 Ala. 133, 43 So. 131,10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 204,123 Am. St. Rep. 17; University Club v. Deakin, 265 111. 257, 106 N. E. 790, L. R. A. 1915 C. 854; Vanover v. Justice, 180 Ky. 632, 203 S. W. 321, L. R. A. 1918 E. 662; Boone v. Burn-ham, 179 Ky. 91, 203 S. W. 315; Wittenberg v. Mollyneaux, 60 Neb. 583, 83 N. W. 842; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Rogers, 42 N. J. Eq. 311,11 Atl. 13; Dunlop v. Gregory, 10 N. Y. 241, 61 Am. Dec. 746; Stines v. Dorman, 25 Oh. St. 580; Tardy v. Creasy, 81 Va. 553, 59 Am. Rep. 676; Shaft v. Carey, 107 Wis. 273, 83 N. W. 288. Cf. Can-v. King, 24 Cal. App. 713,142 Pac. 131; Stewart v. Stearns Ac. Lumber Co. 56 price which would depreciate the value of the buyer's purchase.79 Similarly a buyer may make a reasonable contract restricting himself from using the property which he has bought in a way which would compete with the seller,80 or be obnoxious to him.81 It seems indeed to have been suggested by the Supreme Court of the United States,82 that as to patented articles there is an inherent inconsistency in selling property and imposing a restriction on the buyer. This can only mean, however, that the patent laws give no protection to restrictive promises exacted from a buyer and that they must stand or fall under the common law as if the article was unpatented. That one who transfers the title to property may limit the use of it in various ways is clear. The seller of real estate may reserve an easement or he may bind the buyer by a contract, which will not create an easement in the land, to refrain from using his ownership in certain ways; as, for instance in selling intoxicating liquors.83
Fla. 570, 48 So. 19,24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 649; Texas etc. Coal Co. v. Lawson, 89 Tex. 394, 32 S. W. 871,34 S. W. 919.
79 Rackemann v. Riverbank Imp. Co., 167 Mass. 1, 44 N. E. 990, 57 Am. St. Rep. 427 (land).
80 Pavkovich v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 150 Cal. 39, 87 Pac. 1097; Hodge v. Sloan, 107 N. Y. 244, 17 N. E. 335, 1 Am. St. Rep. 816.
81 Thus a provision in a deed that no intoxicating liquors shall be manufactured or sold on the premises has uniformly been upheld. Cowell v. Springs Co., 100 U. S. 52, 57, 25 L. Ed. 547; Collins Mfg. Co. v. Marcy, 25 Conn. 242; Ferris v. American Brewing Co., 155 Ind. 539,542, 58 N. E. 701, 52 L. R. A. 305; O'Brien v. Wetherell, 14 Kan. 616; Orchard Canal Co. v. Sikes, 8 Gray, 562; Smith v. Barrie, 56 Mich. 314, 22 N. W. 816, 56 Am. Rep. 39; Watrous v. Allen, 57 Mich. 362, 24 N. W. 104, 58 Am. Rep. 363. Unless the grantor's convenants are of such a nature as to create an easement in property retained by him (as to which see supra, Sec. 491), they will not be enforced against subsequent purchasers of the property. Norcross v. James, 140 Mass. 188, 2 N. E. 946; Napa Valley Wine Co. v;. Boston Block Co., 44 Minn. 130, 46 N. W. 239, 20 Am. St. 562; Brewer v. Marshall, 19 N. J. Eq. 537, 97 Am. Dec. 679; Tardy v. Creasy, 81 Va. 553, 59 Am. Rep. 676. Cf. Waldorf-Astoria Segar Co., v. Salomon, 109 N. Y. App. D. 65, 95 N. Y. S. 1053, aff'd 184 N. Y. 584, 77 N. E. 1197.
82 United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 247 U. S. 32, 38 Sup. Ct. 473, 482, 62 L. Ed. 968, infra, n. 85.
83 In the following such a covenant of the grantee was held binding not only upon him but upon subsequent purchasers with notice. Star Brewery Co. v. Primas, 163 Dl. 652, 45 N. E. 145; Sullivan v. Kohlenberg, 31 Ind. App. 215, 67 N. E. 541; Sutton v. Head, 86 Ky. 156, 5 S. W. 410, 9 Am. St. Rep. 274; Whealkate Min. Co. v. Mulari, 152 Mich. 607, 116 N. W. 360, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 147. A similar covenant by a grantor re-
The only limits imposed by the law on the owner of property restricting his power to exact contracts from a subsequent purchaser to refrain from using the property in a certain way are those imposed by public policy, and though public policy forbids unreasonable restraint of trade, and therefore forbids a system of contracts attempting to control prices on resale,84 there seems no reason why it should prohibit contracts which reasonably protect a business of either buyer or seller without tending to affect the public injuriously by monopoly or enhancement of prices. How far equity will enforce the obligation of the contract against a third person who acquires the property with knowledge of the contract - that is, when a contract concerning the use of property will create an equitable easement is another question, elsewhere considered.85 A lease of patented articles by the owner of the patent has been distinguished in a recent case from a sale of such articles - that is, the lessor may impose restrictions which the law might not permit if the articles were not patented.86
The "tying clauses" in the leases under consideration in that case provided, even though one machine only was leased, in garding adjoining property retained by him was enforced in Anderson v. Rowland, 18 Tex. Civ. App. 460, 44 S. W. 911. In Catt v. Tourle, L. R. 4 Ch. 654, a covenant by the purchaser of land that the vendor should have the exclusive right to supply beer to any public house erected on the land was enforced against a sub-purchaser.
84 See infra, Sec. 1649.
85 See supra, Sec.Sec. 491-493.
86 In United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 247 U. S. 32, 38 Sup. Ct. 473, 482, 62 L. Ed. 968, the court said: "There is, however, a limitation upon [the owner of a patent]; he cannot grant the title and retain the incidents of it. Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 243 U. S. 490, 61 L. Ed. 866, L. R. A. 1917 E. 1196, 37 Sup. Ct. 412, Ann. Cas. 1918 A. 955; Bauer v. ODonnell, 229 U. S. 1, 57 L. Ed. 1041, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1185 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 616, Ann. Cas. 1915,
A. 150; Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U. S. 502, 510, 61 L. Ed. 871, 876, L. R. A. 1917, E. 1187, 37 Sup. Ct. 416, Ann. Cas. 1918 A. 959.
These cases have received review and application in Boston Store p. American Graphophone Co., decided March 4,1918 (246 U. S. 8,38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 257,62 L. Ed. 551). The principle of them was expressed to be that where an article has been sold it passes beyond the monopoly given by the patent, and conditions cannot be imposed upon it. Leases are not of this character; they do not convey the title. It is not contended, nor could it be, that in this case they are a disguise for something else, artifices to convey the machinery and yet keep it subject to the patent right and its exercise. It, therefore, follows that conditions may be imposed by them."