One of the prominent reasons for holding contracts invalid which restrict the right of a party to carry on trade or business, is the hardship upon him, and though in most cases this reason is combined with others-as that the scope of the promise is wider than the requirements of the promisee, or that the public will suffer some more direct injury than that due to the individual hardship of the promisor - there is a broad policy forft H. R. Co. v. Scovill, 71 Conn. 136, 41 Atl. 246, 42 L. R. A. 157, 71 Am. St. Rep. 159; Kates v. Atlanta Baggage ft Cab Co., 107 Ga. 636, 34 S. E. 372, 46 L. R. A. 431; Hart v. Atlanta Terminal Co., 128 Ga. 754, 58 S. E. 452; Old Colony R. Co. v. Tripp, 147 Mass. 35, 17 N. E. 89, 9 Am. St. Rep. 661; Boston ft A. R. Co. v. Brown, 177 Mass. 65, 58 N. E. 189, 52 L. R. A. 418; Boston AM. R. Co. v. Sullivan, 177 Mass. 230, 58 N. E. 689, 83 Am. St. Rep. 275; Godbout v. St. Paul Union Depot Co., 79 Minn. 188, 81 N..W. 835, 47 L. R. A. 532; Hedding v. Gallagher, 72 N. H. 377, 57 Atl. 225, 64 L. R. A. 811, overruling 69 N. H. 650, 45 Atl. 96, 76 Am. St. Rep. 204, and 70 N. H. 631, 47 Atl. 614; Barney v. Oyster Bay ft H. S.

66 Express Companies' Cases, 117 U. S. 1, 29 L. Ed. 791, 6 Sup. Ct. 542; Blank v. Illinois, etc., R. Co., 182 111. 332, 55 N. E. 332; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Keefer, 146 Ind. 21, 44 N. E. 796, 38 L. R. A. 93, 58 Am. St. 348; Dulaney v. United Railways, etc., Co., 104 Md. 423, 65 Atl. 45; Atlantic Express Co. v. Wilmington-, etc., R. Co., Ill N. C. 463,16 S. E. 393,18 L. R. A. 393,32 Am. St. Rep. 805.

67 New England Exp. Co. v. Main R. Co., 57 Me. 188, 2 Am. Rep. 31; Kidder v. Fitchburg R. Co., 165 Mass. 398, 43 N. E. 115; McDuffee v. Portland, etc., R. Co., 52 N. H. 430,13 Am. Rep. 72; Sandford v. Catawissa, etc., R. Co., 24 Pa. St. 378, 64 Am. Dec. 667; Texas v. Missouri, etc., R. Co., 99 Tex. 516, 91 S. W. 214, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 783.

68 Barker v. Midland Ry. Co., 18 C. B. 46; Beadell v. Eastern Counties Ry. Co., 2 C. B. (N. S.) 509; Painter v. London, B. ft 8. C. Ry. Co., 2 C. B. (N. S.) 702; Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co., 199 U. S. 279, 50 L. Ed. 192, 26 Sup. Ct. 91; Jencks v. Coleman, 2 Sumn. 221; The D. R. Martin, 11 Blatch. 233; Union Depot ft R. Co. v. Meeking, 42 Colo. 89, 94 Pac. 16, 126 Am. St. 145; New York, N. H.

B. Co., 67 N. Y. 301, 23 Am. Rep. 115; Snyder v. Union Depot Co., 19 Ohio bidding a man from contracting himself into slavery or unduly restricting his personal liberty.70 This policy is apparent not only in cases where employees make restrictive promises71 (wherefore a contract to withdraw from all business whatever even within a limited space is invalid),72 but also where creditors for greater security impose restrictive contracts upon their debtors;73 or the owners of patents exact excessive and ineq-

C. C. 368, rev'g 7 Ohio N. P. 64; State v. Union Depot Co., 71 Ohio St. 379, 73 N. E. 633, 68 L. R. A. 792; Oregon Short Line R. Co. v. Davidson, 33 Utah, 370, 94 Pac. 10, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 777.

69 Yasoo ft M. V. R. Co. v. Crawford, 107 Miss. 355, L. R. A. 1915 C. 250, 65 So. 462.

70 "There are certain fundamental rights which no man can barter away, such, for instance, as his right to life and personal freedom, and, in criminal cases, the right to be tried by a jury of his peers." Pope Manufacturing Co. v. Gormully, 144 U. S. 224, 234, 36 L. Ed. 414, 12 Sup. Ct. 632.

71 See, e. g.t Herbert Morris, Ltd., v. Saxelby, [1916] 1 A. C. 688.

72 Baker v. Hedgecock, 39 Ch. D. 520; Perls v. Saalfeld [1892] 2 Ch. 149. A contract for "permanent employment " was, however, enforced against the employer in Carnig v. Carr, 167 Mass. 644, 46 N. E. 117, 36 L. R. A. 512, 57 Am. St. Rep. 488. See supra, J 39 n. 27.

73 In Horwood v. Millar's Timber & Trading Co., Ltd., [1916] 2 K. B. 44, the plaintiff as assignee of the earnings of one Bunyan, an employee of the defendant, sued to recover them. The court denied recovery, Lush, J. saying (p. 60): "The question is whether this contract can be said to operate, if I may use a comprehensive term, in restraint of trade; whether it is a contract which unduly and improperly fetters the free disposal of the assignor's labour. If it so restricts it, if it applies such fetters upon it as to make it injurious not only to the man himself but injurious to the public interest, we should be justified in holding, and indeed bound to hold, that the contract is not one which can be enforced at the suit of the plaintiff. I propose, therefore, to examine somewhat more closely the terms of the deed. In it

Bunyan is called 'the mortgagor' and is described as a clerk in the employment of the present defendants. It recites that the mortgagor is indebted to the various persons mentioned in the schedule and has requested the lender to pay those debts, which the lender agrees to do on having the repayment secured. [His Lordship read clause 1 [which assigned all future wages in any employment] and continued:] Clause 2 provides for redemption; then follow certain covenants by the mortgagor which go to strengthen the security. Clause 3, sub-clause (d), is as follows: 'That during the continuance of these presents the mortgagor shall diligently and faithfully devote himself to his duties wheresoever he may be employed and will not do or suffer anything to be done which may or might cause him to be dismissed or liable to be dismissed or have his salary reduced but shall use his best endeavours to advance his position wheresoever employed.' So far no objection can be taken to that provision, but then follow these words: '.and shall not without the express sanction in writing of the lender determine his engagement with Messrs. Millar's Timber and Trading Company limited or other his employer for the time being.' By sub-clause (h) the mortgagor covenants not to borrow or attempt to borrow, and not to enter into any gambling contract, bet, or wager. Sub-clause (i) says 'Not without the consent of the lender in writing first had and obtained uitable promises not to contest the validity of the patents.74 A contract to remove from a city or limited district and remain away from it is, however, enforceable;75 and one entering an asylum may contract that he will submit to restraint of his personal liberty for a limited stated period.76