Contracts containing promises unlawful because of too extended restrictive effect have not been held so unlawful in their general purpose as to invalidate the whole transaction of which they were a part;26 and the fact that a covenant in restraint of trade is more extended than the law allows will not preclude the enforcement of separable lawful restrictive promises. This is true where the restraint is over an excessive territory,27 or for an excessive time,28 is too broad in the nature of the business included,29 or in the classes of persons with whom the promisor engages not to do business.30

23 Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U. S. 20, 57 L. Ed. 107, 33 Sup. Ct. 9.

24 Straus v. American Publishers' Assoc., 231 U. S. 222, 58 L. Ed. 102, 34 Sup. Ct. 84.

25 Pulp Wood Co. v. Green Bay Paper Ac. Co. (Wis.), 170 N. W. 230, 235, citing Harding v. American Ac. Co., 182 11I. 551, 55 N. E. 577, 64 L. R. A. 738, 74 Am. St. Rep. 189; People v. Milk Exchange, 145 N. Y. 267, 39 N. E. 1062, 27 L. R. A. 437, 45 Am. St. Rep. 609.

26 Hall Mfg. Co. v. Western Steel & Iron Works, 227 Fed. 588, 593, 142 C. C. A. 220, L. R. A. 1916 C. 620, and cases cited. See also cases in the following note. Compare an agreement by which the owner of land agrees to use all legal means by argument before a legislative committee to bring about the passage of a bill; and also, if necessary, to bribe the legislators, in order to bring about the desired result. It may be supposed that the whole agreement would be invalid.

27Price v. Green, 16 M. & W. 346; Tallis v. Tallis, 1 E. & B. 391; Underwood v. Barker, [1899] 1 Ch. 300; Goldsoll v. Goldman, [1914] 2 Ch. 603; Oregon Steam Nav. Co. v. Win-sor, 20 Wall. 64, 22 L. Ed. 315; More v. Bonnet, 40 Cal. 251, 6 Am. Rep. 621; Ragsdale v. Nagle, 106 Cal. 332, 39 Pac. 628; Wiley v. Baumgardner, 97 Ind. 66, 49 Am. Rep. 427; Dean v. Emerson, 102 Mass. 480; Peltz v. Eichele, 62 Mo. 171; Mallinckrodt Chemical Works v. Nemnich, 169 Mo. 388, 69 S. W. 355; Ammon v. Keill, 95 Neb. 695, 146 N. W. 1009, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 503; Trenton Potteries Co. v. Oliphant, 58 N. J. Eq. 507, 43 Atl. 723, 46 L. R. A. 255, 78 Am. St. Rep. 612; Meckenstein Bros. Co. v. Fleckenstein, 76 N. J. L. 613, 71 Atl. 265,24 L. R. A. (N. S.)913; Central New York etc. Co. v. Averill, 199 N. Y. 128, 92 N. E. 206, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 494, 139 Am. St. 878; Lange v. Werk, 2 Oh. St. 519; Smith's Appeal, 131 Pa. 579, 6 Atl. 251; Monongahela River Consolidated, etc., Co. v. Jutte, 210 Fa. 288, 59 AH. 1088, 105 Am. St. Rep. 812.

28 Baines v. Geary, 35 Ch. D. 154.

If, however, a promise is not only wider than is permissible but is also indivisible, the court will not attempt to give partial effect to the promise but the whole will fall.31 Thus a promise not to engage in business within the limits of a State, excepting in one city, is indivisible as to the whole territory included in the promise,32 while a promise not to engage in a particular business in a named city, or. at any other place, is enforceable as to the city.33 A promise not to engage "in any business whatever " is totally invalid,34 while a promise not to engage in the business of baker, confectioner, or other business is valid as to the particular occupations named.35 The test is whether the restriction can be stated as separate and distinct covenants.36