It is possible to make a gift of tangible property without notice to the donee if delivery is made to a third person on behalf of the donee.20 And not only may the legal title to property be transferred to a donee in this way, but also a trust may be created by either a declaration of trust on the part of the settlor or by a conveyance in trust of which the beneficiary has no knowledge.21 So a deed may be effectually delivered to a third person without notice to the grantee or covenantee.22 In all these cases the assent of the donee, if that is essential, is presumed, though subject to his right of rejection of the benefit when he gets knowledge of it. A tangible chose in action may be dealt with in similar fashion.23 But some limitations must be observed in the case of an intangible chose in action. The owner of such property may indeed declare himself trustee of it or assign it to another person (who is. not the debtor) as trustee for a third person. But he cannot make such an assignment to the debtor himself as trustee. A trust requires for its existence a res to which the trust may attach. The only existing res is the claim against the debtor and of this the debtor himself cannot be made trustee, since this would involve the same person being debtor and creditor. If the creditor attempted to make the debtor trustee and the latter assented a court of equity should hold him bound to pay the proposed cestui que trust, but the obligation would be that of one who makes a promise for the benefit of a third person, rather than of a trustee. To create such a contract the debtor must assent to the proposal.24

2020 Cyc. 1198.

21 39 Cyc 79.

22 See supra, Sec. 213.

23 See infra, Sec.1439.

24 In Alexander v. Steinhardt, [1903] 2 K. B. 208, Bighorn, J., held that where a debtor mailed instructions to hie agent directing the payment of certain money to a creditor end also mailed notice of this to the creditor but became bankrupt before either letter arrived, that an equitable assignment had been made on the posting of the letter. The court said: "There was a clear intention to assign, sufficiently evidenced by the letters. In my opinion the case is just the same as if Walker & Co. had inclosed in a letter to the plaintiff a draft at sight on the defendants by way of payment of their debt, and 1 cannot doubt that the rights of the plaintiff upon that draft would arise as soon as the letter inclosing it was posted." It is submitted, however, that the decision is unsound and that the case is not like