12Sullivan v. Kuykendall, 82 Ky. 483, 489, 56 Am. Rep. 901.

13 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Shotter, 71 Ga. 760; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Flint River Lumber Co., 114 Ga. 576,40 S. E. 815, 88 Am. St. Rep. 36; Ayer v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 79 Me. 493, 1 Am. St. Rep. 353; Wilson v. M. &N.W.E. Co,, 31 Minn. 481, 18 N. W. 291; Haubelt v. Rea & Page Mill Co., 77 Mo. App. 672; J. L. Price Brokerage Co. v. Chicago Ac. R., (Mo. App. 1917), 199

S. W. 732; Howley v. Whipple, 48 N. H. 487. See also Hasbrouck v. Telegraph Co., 107 Ia. 160, 77 N. W. 1034, 70 Am. St. 181. But Bee the contrary decisions of Henkel v. Pape, L. R. 6 Ex. 7; Verdin v. Robertson, 10 Ct. Sess. Cas. (3d series), 35; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Anniston Cordage Co., 6 Ala. App. 351, 59 So. 757; Jackson Lumber Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 7 Ala, App. 644, 62 So. 266; Postal Tel. Co. v. Schaefer, 110 Ky. 907, 62 S. W. 1119; Shingleur v. Western Union Tel. Co., 72 Miss. 1030, 18 So. 425, 30 L. R. A. 444, 48 Am. St. Rep. 601; Pepper v. Telegraph Co., 87 Term. 554,11 S. W. 783, 4 L. R. A. 660, 10 Am. St Rep. 699. See also Penobscot Fish Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 91 Conn. 35, 98 Atl. 341. The question has been disputed on the continent of Europe also. See Lyon-Caen et Renault, Traite de Droit Commercial, Vol. 111, Sec. 23.

14Germain Fruit Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 137 Gal. 598, 70 Pac. 658, 59 L. R. A. 575. The telegram as received, offered Riverside oranges at $1.60 a box. The market price was $2.60. See also Central of Georgia the same principle is applicable in any case where the offeree must know that the terms of the offer are unintended or misunderstood by the offeror. No contract based on the offer can be enforced by the acceptor.15 And if under these circumstances a buyer keeps property which was the subject of the transaction he is liable for its fair value, or if he discovers the seller's intended price before using the goods, for that price.16 The liability of one who signs a written promise in ignorance of the contents of the writing depends upon the same principles.17

Sec. 96. When mistake will prevent the formation of a contract. Though it is true that a party to a contract is bound by his express language, and cannot contradict the meaning of his words by denying that he intended this meaning, he is not bound by the interpretation which may be placed on ambiguous language unless he was himself blameworthy in permitting the ambiguity. Where a phrase of a contract, therefore, has no obvious meaning, or is reasonably capable ' of different interpretations, and is in fact differently understood, there is no contract. 18 This does not violate the principles stated in the preceding section. If the language used may fairly mean either of two things, each party is at liberty to attach his own meaning, at least unless he was in some way responsible for the other party's mistake. Such an error in language may relate to the object to which the apparent agreement relates,19 to the person with whom it was made,20 or

Ry. Co. v. Gortatowsky, 123 Ga. 366, 5l 8. E. 469. But see J. L. Price Brokerage Co. v. Chicago Ac. R., (Mo. App. 1917), 199 8. W. 733.

15Smith v. Hughes, L. R. 6 Q. B. 597; Tamplin v. James, 15 Ch. Div. 215; Cunningham Mfg. Co. v. Holograph Co., 30 App. Dist. Col. 524, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 368; Essex v. Day, 52 Coon. 483; Bromagin v. Bloomington, 234 111 114, 84 N. E. 700; C. H. Young Co. v. Springer, 113 Minn. 382, 129 N. W. 773; Tyra v. Cheney, 129 Minn. 428, 152 N. W. 835; Buckberg v. Washburn-Croaby Co., 115 Mo App. 701, 92 S. W. 733; Borden v. Richmond Ac. R. Co., 113 N. C. 570, 18 S. E. 392, 37 Am. St. Rep. 632; Butler v. Moses, 43 Ohio St. 166, 1 N. E. 316; Bartelder Seed Co. v. Bennett (Tex. Civ. App.), 161 S. W. 399; Everson v. International Granite Co., 65 Vt. 658, 27 Atl. 320; Harran v. Foley, 62 Wis. 584, 22 N. W. 837. See also Hartford etc. R. Co. d. Jackson, 24 Conn. 514, 63 Am. Dec 177; Shelton v. Ellis, 70 Ga. 297.

16 Cunningham Mfg. Co. v. Roto-graph Co., 30 App. D. C. 524,15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 388; Mummenhoff v. Randall, 19 Ind. App. 44, 49 N. E. 40; Fullerton v. Dalton, 58 Barb. 237; Estey Organ Co. v. Lehman, 132 Wis. 144, 111 N. W. 1097,11 L. R. A. (N.S.) 254, 122 Am. St. Rep. 051.

17 See supra, Sec.35. *

18 Winnemucca Water etc. Co. v. Model Gas Engine Works, 179 Ind. 542, 101 N. E. 1007; Wheaton Building & Lumber Co. v. Boston, 201 Mass. 218, 90 N. E. 598.

19 In Raffles v. Wlchelhaus, 2 H. & C. 906, the parties had contracted for a cargo by the ship "Peerless" from Bombay. There were two ships from Bombay of that name, and the parties understood each a different ship. It was held there was no contract. Somewhat similar is Kyle v. Kavanagh, 103 Mass. 366, 4 Am. Rep. 660, where the parties entered into apparent agreement for the sale of a lot on " Prospect Street, Waltham." There were two streets of that name in Waltham, and the jury were instructed in effect that if the parties had in mind lots on different streets of that name there was no contract.

20 In Brighton Packing Co. v. Butch-era', etc., Assoc., 211 Mass. 398, 97 N. E. 780, a bill of equity for the specific performance of the provisions of a lease in writing, the court thus explained the nature of the transaction (at p. 402):" It was not an agreement made by the defendant with a person then present, but under some mistake as to the identity or character of that person, in which case it might have been merely voidable and good until avoided, like the bargain first considered in Edmunds v. Merchants' Despatch Co., 135 Mass. 283. Here the defendant's agreement was expressed to be with the South Dakota company, but there were before the defendant two companies, that of South Dakota and that of Maine, both acting through Batchelder but only the first one being known to the defendant. There was no agreement with the South Dakota company, because that company intended to make none, and did not execute the paper in which the purported agreement was embodied; none with the Maine company, because there was no intention to contract with it; it was not mentioned as a party to the agreement, and could no more gain the rights of a party by a surreptitious and really fraudulent execution thereof than, for example, the present plaintiff could have entitled itself to the estate created by the original lease if, without the knowledge and consent of the defendant, it had executed that lease as then drawn, while leading the defendant to suppose that the execution was really by the South Dakota company, the lessee therein named. No agreement can result from such a transaction so carried out. Rodliff v. Dallinger, 141 Mass. 1, 4 N. E. 806, 66 Am. Rep. 439; Consumers' Ice Co. v. Webster & Co., 53 N. Y. Supp. 66, 32 N. Y. App. Div, 592; Boulton v. Jones, 2 H. & N. 664; Hardman v. Booth, 1 H. & C. 803; Hol-lins v. Flower, L. R, 7 H. L. 757; Cundy v. Lindsay, 3 App. Cas. 459; 2Q. B.D. 96, reversing s.c.1 Q.B.D. 348; Baillie's Case, 118981 1 Ch. 110; Gordon v. Street, [1899] 2 Q. B. 641. This case differs essentially from those cases in which there was a real contract, though entered into by mistake or even produced by fraud. Stoddard p. Ham, 129 Mass. 383, 37 Am. Rep. 369; Hunter v. Giddings, 97 Mass. 41, 93 Am. Dec. 54; Rayner v. Grote, 15 M. & W. 359; Schmalta v. Avery, 16 Q. B. 655.