Payments derived from the sale of collateral have given rise to some difference of decision. Doubtless if a payment is obtained from collateral by the creditor acting in invitum, there is no basis for implying a new promise.22 Nor is the crediting on the indebtedness, without the debtor's authority, the amount of a cross-claim due the latter.23 If, however, the debtor transfers property to his creditor with directions for its immediate sale, and for the application of the proceeds of the creditor's claim, since it is said that the credit given for the proceeds of the property must be regarded as given with the assent of the debtor it has been held in several cases that the statute will begin to run afresh from the time when credit is given;24 though if the creditor fails for more than a reasonable time to carry out the authority given him, the debtor cannot be regarded as giving such an assent to the transaction as to imply a new promise when the credit is made.25 It would be a more logical position to deny that in any case a renewed right arises at the time payment is collected by the creditor from collateral in his hands, unless at least the debtor at the time of the sale voluntarily authorizes the credit or subsequently voluntarily ratifies it.26 In any other case though it be granted that the debtor originally authorized the collection, a new promise may fairly be implied only at the time when the authority was given. The authority when once given could not subsequently be revoked by the debtor had he wished to do so, and there is nothing from which it can be inferred that at the time the collection was made the debtor still acknowledged the existence of the debt or was willing to pay it.27 Where a third person under a revocable authority is directed to make a payment on behalf of the debtor, time may well be counted from the making of the payment, not from the giving of authority,28 for the fact that the debtor allowed a revocable agency to continue until payment was made indicates that the payment when made is to be given the effect of a voluntary payment at that time by the debtor. If, however, authority given a third person is irrevocable, as that given to a trustee under a deed of trust, the date of the authority, not of its exercise, is the time from which the statute runs.29 Indeed unless the creditor is a party to the transaction, or the trustee is in effect his agent, the authority given to the trustee can amount to no more than an acknowledgment to an unauthorized third person and will be ineffectual to revive the debt even from the time when the authority was given.30

Oh. St. 566; Kilton v. Providence Toot Co., 22 R. I. 605, 620, 48 Atl. 1039; Benton p. Holland, 68 Vt. 533, 3 Atl. 322. A contrary decision is Letson v. Kenyon, 31 Kans. 301, 1 Pac. 562. And see Lulcy v.Foad, [1899] 2 Ch. 107, where payment by a receiver was held sufficient to revive the debt.

19American Woolen Co. p. Samuel-sohn, (N. Y. 1919), 123 N. E. 154; Simpson v. Tootle etc. Co., 42 Okl. 275, 141 Pac 448.

20Morgan p. Rowlands, L. R, 7 Q.B. 493.

21 Gallagher v. Whalen, 10 Ky. L. Rep. 468, 9 S. W. 390, 701; Miser p. Emigh, 63 Neb. 245, 88 N. W. 479; Harper v. Fairley, 53 N. Y. 442; Union Bank p. Dean, 164 N. Y. App. Div. 869, 139 N. Y. S. 836. But under the Oregon Statute whatever amounts to part payment, if made before the . limitation has expired, though not made with the debtor's assent, revives the debt. Sheak v. Wilber, 48 Oreg. 376, 86 Pac. 375.

22 Nunn v. McKnight, 79 Ark. 393, 396, 96 S. W. 193; Jones p. Langhorae, 19 Col. 206, 34 Pac. 997; Ferris p. Curtis, 53 Col. 340, 127 Pac. 236; Good v. Ehrlich, 97 Kans. 94,72 Pac. 645; Wol-ford p. Cook, 71 Minn. 77, 73 N. W. 706, 70 Am. St. Rep. 315; Atwood v. Lemmers, 97 Minn. 214, 106 N. W. 310; Fletcher v. Brainerd, 75 Vt. 300, 306,55 Atl. 608. See also Desha Bank & Trust Co. v. Quilling, 118 Ark. 114, 176 S. W. 132, L. R. A. 1915 E, 794.

23 Atchison etc. R. v. Atchison Grain Co. (Kan.), 70 Pac. 933; Samuel p. Samuel's Adm., 151 Ky. 235, 151 S. W. 676, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1155; Freese v. Lockhard, 87 Mo. App. 102; Arthur v. Burke, 83 Wash. 690, 145 Pac. 974. Cf. MoKeon v. Byington, 70 Conn. 429, 39 Atl. 863; Lawrence v. Harrington, 122 N. Y. 408, 25 N. E. 406, where the credit was made with the debtor's authority.

24 Haven v. Hathaway, 20 Me. 345; Porter v. Blood, 5 Pick. 54; Taylor v. Foster, 132 Mass. 30; Somberger v.

Lee, 14 Neb. 193, 15 N. W. 345, 45 Am. Rep. 106; Rowell v. Lewis' Estate, 72 Vt. 163, 47 At. 783. See also Mc-Keon v. Byington, 70 Conn. 429, 39 Atl. 853; Latson v. Eenyon, 31 Kan. 301, 1 Pac. 562. In Boulder Nat. Bank v. Rowland, 1 Col. App. 468, it was held that where authority was given by the debtor to a third person, at the time of making a deposit of collateral, to sell the collateral and apply the proceeds to the debt in case of the debtor's default, such sale and payment of proceeds revived the indebtedness.

25 Good v. Ehrlich, 67 Kans. 94, 72 Pac. 545; Harper v. Fairley, 53 N. Y. 442. Cf. First Nat. Bank v. King, 164 N. C. 303, 80 S. E. 251.

26 Nunn v. McKnight, 79 Ark. 393, 96 S. W. 193; Myers v. Muskegon Imp. Co., 169 Mich. 689, 135 N. W. 949; Security Bank v. Finkelstein, 76 N. Y. Misc. 461,135 N. Y. S. 640,160 N. Y. App. Div. 315,145 N. Y. S. 5. On the other hand, where the debtor makes a voluntary payment, though he derives the means from property held as security for the debt it is clearly revived.

Thus where plaintiff loaned money to defendant on the security of stock and bonds of a corporation, and defendant, as the interest coupons became due, collected them from the company and sent a peraonal check to the plaintiff for the amount, the Statute of Limitations was tolled. Carlson v. Dixon, 155 Win. 63, 143 N. W. 1064. 27 Gowan v. Forster, 3 B. & Ad. 507; Brown v. Latham, 58 N. H. 30; Smith v. Ryan, 66 N. Y. 352,23 Am. Rep. 60; Brooklyn Bank v. Barnaby, 197 N. Y. 210, 90 N. E. 834, 27 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 843. The force of this reasoning is shown when the facts in Divine v. Miller, 70 S. Car. 225, 49 S. E. 479, 106 Am. St. Rep. 743, are considered. The creditor acted under instructions from the debtor, but after bis death. The Statute was held not arrested. See also cases cited supra, a. 18, in which it is held that payments by an assignee under a general assignment by the debtor do not revive the debt. In such cases also the payment when made is made under an authority originally given by the debtor.