Unless a chose in action has such tangible form as to induce the law to regard it as in the nature of chattel property, certainly no effective gift of it can be made without a deed, for either delivery or a deed is essential to a gift even of chattel property.62 Even though a deed of a chose in action be given, there is this difference between such a transfer and a transfer of chattel property by deed: the chose in action is in its nature not fully assignable, but the title to the chattel can and does pass without delivery. It is moreover constantly stated that equity will not aid a volunteer, and the inference is possible from such statements that equity will not give to a donee by deed of a chose in action the protection accorded to assignees of choses in action who pay value for the assignment. The cases are not wholly satisfactory, but even a voluntary assignment by deed should be protected as against the assignor or any successor to his rights. The assignment imports a covenant not to revoke the power given to the assignee or to derogate from the assignment. Accordingly if the assignor should do so he would be liable in damages. Moreover, the debtor will frequently be unable to determine without litigation whether the assignment was for consideration or not, and whether the assignment has been revoked or not. The situation is one where there are likely to be several suits if the assignment is not protected, where there should be none.63 Unless the authority

Stone v. Hackett, 12 Gray, 227; Henderson v. Sherman, 47 Mich. 267, 11 N. W. 163; Johnson v. Williams, 63 How. Pr. 233; Ham v. Van Orden, 84 N. Y. 257; Patton v. Cledennin, 3 Murph. (N. C.) 68; Chasteen v. Martin, 84 N. C. 391.

62 In Irons v. Smallpiece, 2 B. & A. 551, Tenterden said: "In order to transfer property by gift, there must either be a deed or instrument of gift or delivery." In Cochrane v. Moore, 25 Q. B. D. 57, 61, Pry, L. J., said of this statement: "If he meant that an instrument in writing not under seal was different from parol in respect of a gift inter vivos, he was probably in error." The numerous decisions showing the necessity of delivery of a gift. of chattel property are collected in 20 Cyc. 1195.

63 See Fortescue v. Barnett, 3 Mylne & K. 36; Be Patrick, [1891] 1 Ch. 82; Otis v. Beckwith, 49 111. 121; Massey v. Huntington, 118 111. 80, 7 N. . 269; Trough's Estate, 75 Pa. 115; Scott v. Dixon, 108 Pa. 6, 56 Am. Rep. 192. In Anning v. Anning, 4 Coram. Law Rep. (Australia, 1907) 1049, it was held that an assignment by deed was good. Some of the judges thought it was good on the general principle laid down in the English cases that the donor must do everything possible or given by the assignor is under seal or given for consideration it is revocable in spite of an intent or agreement that it shall be irrevocable. The agreement sounds in contract and requires for its validity the same requisites as any promise.64 In this respect an assignment differs from a declaration of trust, which is valid though made without consideration.65 An assignment without consideration will, however, create an effective though revocable agency. Therefore, if the assignor has not revoked the authority, the obligor cannot set up lack of consideration for the assignment.66 Whether in a jurisdiction which by statute permits an assignee to sue in his own name, an assignee merely for collection may do so, has been somewhat disputed, but it seems generally permitted.67 The fact the gift would be incomplete. Isaacs, J., however, suggested as another theory that the deed contained an implied covenant that the grantor would do nothing to derogate from his deed. Cf. Edwards v. Jones, 1 Mylne & C. 226. See further cases cited in the following section. Under the English Judiciary Act it has been held that a voluntary assignment of an existing debt is a valid legal assignment. Hambleton v. Brown, (1017) 2 K B. 93.

64 In Cook v. Lum, 55 N. J. L. 373, 26 Atl. 803, the assignor had deposited a sum of money with K, who gave her a paper upon which were figures showing the amount deposited, but nothing else except the date. This paper was given by the assignor on her death-bed to the plaintiff. After the assignor's death the plaintiff brought suit against the administrator of the assignor, but was held not entitled to recover. The court said: "The donor parted with nothing that was essential to her own dominion over the money in question." See also Sewell v. Moxey, 2 Sim. (N. S.) 189; Airey v. Hall, 3 Sm. & G. 315; Walker v. Bradford Bank, 12 Q. B. D. All; Re Richardson, 30 Ch. D. 396; Maynard v. Maynard, 106 Me. 667, 75 Atl. 299; Jackson v. Sessions, 109

Mich. 216, 67 N. W. 315; Murphy v, Bordwell, 83 Minn. 54, 85 N. W. 915 62 L. R. A. 849, 85 Am. St. Rep. 454; Smither v. Smither, 30 Hun, 632; De Caumont v. Bogert, 36 Hun, 382; Matson v. Abbey, 70 Hun, 475, 141 N. Y. 179, 36 N. E. 11; Re Huggins' Est., 204 Pa. 167, 53 Atl. 746; Read v. Long, 4 Yerg. 68; Cowen v. First Nat. Bank, 94 Tex. 647, 64 S. W. 778.

65 Ames' Cas. Trusts (2d ed.) 125 n.

66Walker v. Bradford Bank, 12 Q. B. D. 511; Harding v. Harding, 17 Q. B. D. 442; Henderson Nat. Bank v. Lagow, 3 Ky. L. Rep. 173,174; Philips v. Bacon, 183 Mass. 5, 66 N. E. 414; Coe v. Hinkley, 109 Mich. 608, 67 N. W. 916; Hickman v. Chaney, 155 Mich. 217, 118 N. W. 993; Richardson v. Mead, 27 Barb. 178; Merrick v. Brain-ard, 38 Barb. 574; Allen v. Brown, 51 Barb. 86; Sheridan v. Mayor, 68 N. Y. 30; Levins v. Stark, 57 Or. 189, 110 Pac. 960; Buxton v. Barrett, 14 R. I. 40; Pearce v. Wallis, 68 Tex. Civ. App. 315, 124 S. W. 496. But see contra, note, Brownlow & G. 40; Patterson v. Williams, Lloyd & G. temp. Plunket, 96; Hill v. Sheibley, 64 Ga. 629; Tall-man v. Hoey, 89 N. Y. 637.

67 Greig v. Riordan, 99 Cal. 316, 33 Pac. 913; Cobb v. Doggett, 142 Cal. 142, 75 Pac. 786; Goodnow v. Litchthat a declaration of trust may be made without consideration has in some cases led the courts to treat as declarations of trust transactions intended as gifts, but ineffectual as such for lack of either consideration or an assignment under seal.68 But the general rule is now well established that an intended transfer will not be given effect as a declaration of trust.69 An assignment made to secure an antecedent debt is generally held to have been made for value,70 as is also true of similar assignments of negotiable instruments,71 though generally not of chattels 72 except where made so by the Uniform Sales Act.73