There has never been any real basis for supposing that a new promise or part payment by a principal debtor after his debt was barred could renew the liability of the surety unless the principal debtor and surety were joint obligors. It has, however, been decided in a few cases that if the liability of the principal debtor is extended by partial payments made before the Statute has barred the claim, the surety's liability is similarly extended.43
It is always important when a surety or guarantor makes a collateral contract, to observe the terms of it. Its terms may be such that the surety binds himself to pay whatever indebtedness the principal may be under at or during a future period, and the Statute of limitations on the surety's obligation will not run until that time. Therefore it may not begin to run at the same time that it begins to run on the principal's indebtedness.44 But it certainly cannot be admitted, and it is not and never was the law that where a principal and surety are severally bound for the same debt, the principal can in any way extend the statutory period as to the surety 45 without the assent of the latter given either in his original contract or subsequently. Even though a payment on account of the debt be made in the surety's presence 46 or at his request,47 or is made by the surety himself, but with his principal's money, and on behalf of his principal,48 the facts have been held insufficient to warrant the inference of a promise by the surety to pay the remainder of the debt. Nor will a new promise or part payment by a surety revive or enlarge the period of limitation against the principal.49
42 Watson v. Woodman, L. R. 20 Eq. 721; In re Tucker,  3 Ch. 420; Cronkhite v. Herrin, 15 Fed. 888; Bell v. Morrison, 1 Pet. 351, 7 L Ed. 174; Espy v. Comer, 76 Ala. 501; Tate v. Clements, 16 Fla. 339, 354, 26 Am. Rep. 709; Kullenbach v. Dickinson, 100 111. 427, 39 Am. Rep. 47; Bletben v. Murch, 80 Me. 313, 14 Atl. 208; Ide v. Ingraham, 5 Gray, 106,108; Peirce v. Tobey, 5 Metc. 168; Gates v. Fisk, 45 Mich. 522, 8 N. W. 558; May-berry v. Willoughby, 5 Neb. 368, 25 Am. Rep. 491; Tappan v. Kimball, 30 N. H. 136,142; Van Keuren v. Panne-lee, 2 N. Y. 523, 51 Am. Deo. 322; Graham v. Selover, 59 Barb. 313; Kerper v. Wood, 48 Ohio St. 613, 29 N. E. 501, 15 L. R, A. 656; Jack v. McLanahan, 191 Pa. 631, 43 At!. 356; Folk v. Russell, 7 Baxter, 591.
43 The principal authority for this position is Cross v. Allen, 141 U. S. 528,35 L.Ed. 843,128.Ct.67. In this case the court made the remarkable blunder of confusing the question of payment by a joint debtor with payment by a principal debtor. In all the cases which the court cites of extension of debts by payments made by a principal debtor, the principal and surety were joint debtors and this was the ratio decidendi in those cases. In Cross v, Allen, however, the surety was not a joint debtor. The obvious truth was stated in Clinton County v. Smith, 238 Mo. 118,141 S. W. 1091, 37 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 272. "The reason why a payment by the principal stops it [the statute] as to a surety is not because one is principal and the other surety, but because both are usually joint promisors) that is, the surety is affected by the act of the principal in his capacity as a joint promisor." Other decisions holding the Liability of a surety who was not jointly indebted with his principal to have been extended by payments made by the principal are - Bloom v. Kern, 30 La. Ann. 1263; Hooper v. Hooper, 81 Md. 155, 31 All. 508, 48 Am. St. Rep. 496.
44 See In re Powers, 30 Ch. D. 291; Hooper v. Hooper, 81 Md. 155, 31 Atl. 508, 48 Am. St. Rep. 496. Id Mutual L. I. Co. v. United States Hotel Co., 82 N. Y. Misc. 632, 144 N. Y. 8. 476, the court denied validity to an agreement by a surety to remain liable on a debt until actual payment, holding it in effect an attempt to waive the statute perpetually. See supra, Sec. 183.
45 Underwood . Patrick, 94 Fed. 468, 36 C. C. A. 330; Lowther v. Chappell, 8 Ala. 363, 42 Am. Dec. 643; Dean v. Munroc, 32 Ga. 28; McLin v. Harvey, 8Ga. App. 360,69 S. E. 123; Deaton v. Deaton, 109 111. App. 7; Mozingo v. Ross, 150 Ind- 688, 50 N. E. 867, 41 L. R. A. 612, 65 Am. St. Rep. 387; Drake v. Stuart, 87 Iowa, 341,54 N. W. 223; McMillan v. Leeds, 58 Kan. 815, 49 Pac. 159; Citizens' Bank v. Mur-dock, 22 La. Ann. 130; Godde v. Marvin, 142 Mich. 518, 105 N. W. 1112; Northwest Thresher Co. v. Dohltorp,
104 Minn. 130,116 N. W. 66; Regan v. Williams, 185 Mo. 620, 84 S. W. 959,
105 Am. St. Rep. 600; Dwire v. Gentry, 95 Neb. 150, 145 N. W. 350; Lang v. Gage, 65 N. H. 173, 18 All. 795; Newell v. Clark, 73 N. H. 289, 61 Atl.
555; Mason v. Eilcourse, 71 N. J. L. 472, 59 Atl. 21; Ulster County Sav. Inst. v. Deyo, 116 N. Y. App. Div. 1, 101 N. Y. S. 263, affd. 191 N. Y. 505, 84 N. E. 1122; Wood v. Barber, 90 N. C. 76; Homewood People's Bank v. Hastings, (Pa. 1919), 106 Atl. 308; Browning v. Tucker, 9 R. I. 600. But where a note was signed by officers of a corporation for its accommodation, the corporation not being a party to the instrument, subsequent payments by the makers, though made from funds of the corporation, extended their liability. Gordon v. Russell, 98 Kans. 537, 158 Pac. 661.
46 Godde v. Marvin, 142 Mich. 618, 105 N. W. 1112.
47 Borden v. Fletcher's Est., 131 Mich. 220, 91 N. W. 145; Littlefield v. Littlefield, 91 N. Y. 203, 43 Am. Rep. 663; cf. First Natl. Bank v. Ballou, 49 N. Y. 155.
48 Lang v. Gage, 65 N. H. 173,18 Atl. 795; Ulster County Savings Inst. v. Deyo, 116 N. Y. App. Div. 1, 101 N. Y. S. 263; affd. without opinion, 191N. Y. 505, 84 N. E. 1122; cf. Maininger v. Mohr, 41 Mich. 685, 3 N. W. 183.
49Winchell v. Hicks, 18 N. Y.